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PREFACE 
 
Never to be rid of oneself, this is the curse of depression. Never to have a self, this 
is the plight of the depressed. To be both rid of oneself and to become a self, this is 
suicide. Lost to others in isolation, present to self in pain; silence or scream is the choice 
of the depressed. It is absolute separation and omnipresence. The self is a symptom, a 
cure, and a source of depression, all excess and loss, never quite a self and never not a 
self. Neither fully a protest against the loss of a beloved object, nor fully a protest against 
the structures that constitute objects, depression is a protest of the self that one has 
become, that one has lost, and that one cannot escape. 
Depression uproots the familiar terrain of living and unearths internal discord. It 
comes as an earthquake, without warning. Or can slowly descend like a cloud, growing 
ever larger, darker, and heavier on the horizon. Depression confuses the mother tongue 
and obfuscates meaning. The aftershocks of depression leave behind shards of selves and 
enervated cells of life. The depressed is never speaking and never silent. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
MAJOR DEPRESSION: FIELDWORK IN PHILOSOPHY 
 
Introduction 
This dissertation aims at giving a philosophical account of the phenomenon of 
language-loss
1
 that accompanies major depression. While the dissertation has this 
particular and relatively narrow aim, most of the philosophical work takes place in 
establishing the necessary context for understanding this problematic phenomenon. 
Language-loss in depression, like language-use in general, belongs to a larger context. 
Language-use and language-loss function in a complex living network of social practices 
and material conditions. They operate at the level of the physical body, discursive 
agency, and personal identity. They are conditioned by intellectual and affective meaning 
structures. They belong to a distinct historical time and a particular temporalization. 
Language is meaningful only within a form of life; major depression, however, entails the 
disruption of a form of life and the disordering of language. 
Ultimately this dissertation reveals that language-loss is a complexly structured 
symptom – a surface phenomenon – that belongs to an overall disruption of agency and a 
form of life. While the conceptual work of the dissertation moves outward from the 
                                                 
1
 ‘Language-loss’ refers to the multiplicity of discursive practices disrupted in depression, such as: reading, 
writing, speaking, conversing, and thinking. 
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phenomenon of language-loss to the disruption of a form of life, the performative 
structure of the dissertation inverts this process. In the next chapter, I begin at the level of 
the form of life and in the following chapters I incrementally narrow the focus to the 
depressed individual’s estrangement from language. In the final chapter I will show that 
what is experienced as discursive disruption by the depressed individual is not in itself an 
exclusively linguistic problem. Rather, language-loss sits on top of a more pervasive 
estrangement from affective meaning in general. 
A part of what this dissertation accomplishes is a phenomenological account of 
depression. I provide an account of the depressive experience in terms of the depressed 
individual’s relation to a few central phenomenological structures: perception, time, 
space, self, and others. Another central feature of what this dissertation achieves is a 
reevaluation of the philosophical concepts of ‘agency’ and ‘personal identity’ through the 
lens of major depression. The main claim that I make in this dissertation is that affective 
disconnection and affective disordering are the principal sources of the depressive’s2 
disruption of language, agency, sociality, and her way of living.
3
 
In this chapter I provide a general account of ‘major depression,’ a brief 
justification of a philosophical investigation into depression, and an introduction to the 
various sources that will be used through the dissertation. In the second chapter I assess 
the Wittgensteinian idea of a ‘form of life’ and the implications of depression’s 
disruption of a form of life. In the third chapter, I evaluate the depressed individual’s 
                                                 
2
 My use of “the depressive” and “the depressed individual” or “depressives” does not indicated a unified 
depressive perspective or experience. I will explain further on pp. 16-17 and 29-30. 
3
 Throughout the dissertation I use feminine personal pronouns when referencing the depressed individual. 
This use of feminine pronouns is a matter of style and does not reflect an exclusively feminine form of 
depression or an exclusively feminine perspective. 
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altered perception, temporalization, and spatialization. The fourth chapter focuses on the 
depressive’s loss of self, disrupted agency, and socialization. Finally, in the fifth chapter I 
consider the depressed individual’s loss of language as an estrangement from meaning, 
and provide an account of the depressive’s recovery of discursive agency.  
 
‘Major Depression’ 
 
Problem of definition 
One of the challenges to a philosophical analysis of depression dwells with the 
imprecision of the concept ‘depression.’ The main difficulties that underlie an attempt to 
provide a comprehensive definition of depression lie with the variability of symptoms 
and causes, the subjective nature of the malady, cross-cultural disparities, and the history 
of related dejected states like melancholia. The criteria that are used to arrive at a 
definition of depression are polemical. For example, the Diagnostic Statistic Manual 
primarily focuses on symptomatology, but many contend that etiology should also be 
taken into account in defining ‘depression.’ In the field of psychopharmacology, 
‘depression’ is for the most part delineated according to symptoms alleviated by 
antidepressant medication. While general agreement about the key features of depression 
does exist within mainstream fields of clinical psychology and psychiatry, widespread 
disagreement persists when it comes to its treatment and etiology. One aspect of 
depression that tends to unite clinicians, theoreticians, and researchers is the critical 
outcome of depression. Depression will soon replace heart disease as a worldwide 
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leading cause of morbidity,
4
 and the people that survive serious depressive episodes still 
face the threat of relapse and the life-altering effects of a single episode. 
While ‘depression’ emerges as a more-or-less unified illness in the 20th century, 
symptoms associated with today’s depression have been associated with various other 
maladies throughout history. From the “noonday demon” of the Psalmist to the “black 
bile” (melaina chole) of Hippocrates and Aristotle; from the sinful acedia of Aquinas to 
the noble melancholia of the Renaissance; from the sweet melancholy of the Romantics 
to the nausea and despair of the existentialists; one would have to admit that at least the 
essential moods of depression are recurrent throughout history. In The Noonday Demon: 
An Atlas of Depression, Andrew Solomon gives both a personal and comprehensive 
perspective of depression, and reflects on depression’s recurrence throughout history. He 
writes: 
The shape and detail of depression have gone through a thousand cartwheels, and 
the treatment of depression has alternated between the ridiculous and the sublime, 
but the excessive sleeping, inadequate eating, suicidality, withdrawal from social 
interaction, and relentless despair are all as old as the hill tribes, if not as old as 
the hills.
5
  
 
However appealing, or perhaps discomforting, it might be to consider depression as a 
cohesive illness cartwheeling through time and space, there are many epistemological and 
ethical problems with equating today’s clinical depression with past conditions such as 
melancholy and acedia. Jennifer Radden, a contemporary philosopher of psychiatry, 
claims that only a “superficial continuity links today’s clinical depression with 
                                                 
4
 Radden, The Philosophy of Psychiatry, a Companion, 2004, 3 
5
 Solomon, 2002, 286  
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melancholy and melancholia.”6  She claims that the differences between depression and 
melancholy outweigh the similarities and that they should not be considered one and the 
same. Nevertheless, a wealth of insight has been passed down from the many firsthand 
accounts of melancholia that can help provide an understanding of the nature of clinical 
depression. While most of the literature analyzed in this paper is limited to 20
th
 and 21
st
 
century narratives, I also include writings on melancholia and related disorders from 
other periods.   
While the melancholia of the 17
th
 century might present quite differently from 
clinical depression of the 20
th 
century, within the 20
th
 century, especially in 
psychoanalytic literature, ‘depression’ and ‘melancholia’ appear to be used 
interchangeably. Kristeva speaks to this “confusion in terminology” and claims, “The 
terms melancholia and depression refer to a composite that might be called 
melancholy/depressive, whose borders are in fact blurred.”7 However, conceptual 
confusion does not only exist between ‘depression’ and ‘melancholy,’ for ‘melancholia’ 
also has a complicated conceptual history. In The Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), Robert 
Burton emphasizes the multifariousness of melancholy appearances: “…as the 
Philosophers make eight degrees of heat and cold: we may make 88 of Melancholy, as the 
parties affected are diversely seized with it, or have beene plunged more or lesse into this 
infernall gulfe.”8 Foucault explains that at “the end of the eighteenth century, all forms of 
madness without delirium, but characterized by inertia, despair, by a sort of dull stupor, 
                                                 
6
 Radden, Is this Dame Melancholy? Equating Today’s Depression and Past Melancholia?, 2003, 37 
7
 Kristeva, 1989, 10 
8
 Radden, The Nature of Melancholy: From Aristotle to Kristeva, 2000, 132 
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would be readily classified as melancholia.”9 Despite these difficulties, throughout the 
dissertation I often use melancholy and depression to refer to a composite pathological 
condition. 
That “depression” is used in both an everyday and clinical way further 
complicates an already tentative process of diagnosis, treatment, and conceptualization. 
The common usage of “depression” to represent a mood or emotion falls within the range 
of normal affective states rather than pathological. People frequently use the expressions 
“That’s depressing” or “I feel depressed” to indicate feelings of sadness or remorse. 
Often depression is equated with the blues or being down in the dumps. The everyday use 
of “depression” is everyday precisely because it is such a familiar emotional state. Similar 
to the confusion of whether “depression” refers to a normal affective state or an affective 
disorder, Stanley Jackson points to the conceptual confusion associated with melancholy:  
During the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries melancholia seems gradually to have become 
restricted once again to the disease, while melancholy remained both a synonym 
for melancholia and a popular term used with a breadth and diffuseness not unlike 
our use of the term depression today.”10  
 
The difference between depression as a mood and depression as a disorder partly rests on 
the intensity and duration of a depressed state. The intensity of a major depressive 
disorder can be understood in relation to the degree of disruption to a person’s ability to 
function in day-to-day life. Disruption is characterized by features such as debilitating 
physical symptoms, psychological distress, and extreme social unease. While more 
                                                 
9
 Foucault, 1988, 124  
10
 Jackson, 1986, 5 
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transient depressive moods do touch on the alienation, loss, and grief of severe 
depression, the fact of their relatively brief appearance in contrast to a depressive episode 
precludes them from equaling the strength and devastation experienced by the severely 
depressed.  
Advocates of biomedical approaches to major depression typically contend that 
the distinction between depression as a mood and depression as a pathological disorder is 
a qualitative one. According to this view, there is a discontinuity between a normal 
depressed mood and clinical depression. On the other hand, the psychologist James C. 
Coyne points out that advocates of “psychoanalytic, cognitive and behavioral, and 
interpersonal and social perspectives on depression have generally assumed a continuum 
between a normal depressed mood and clinical depression.”11 In other words, the 
difference between the mood and the disorder from these perspectives is a quantitative 
difference. While I do not consider major depression to be reducible to an exclusively 
physiological cause, I do agree with the biomedical assessment of major depression as 
being qualitatively different from a depressed mood. My reason for appealing to the 
difference as being qualitative is not exclusively based on a biomedical framework. 
Taking into account the social and intrapersonal dimensions of depression, it is my 
assessment that the disruption of a form of life is the basis of the qualitative difference 
between a major depressive disorder and depressive mood states. The difference in a 
severe depressive episode and a depressed mood does not simply dwell in having more of 
the attendant emotions for a longer period of time; rather, the difference is a matter of the 
sustained disruption of a person’s ability and desire to live.  
                                                 
11
 Coyne, 1985, 4 
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Although I argue in favor of a qualitative distinction, the ability to distinguish 
between ‘normalcy’ and ‘psychopathology’ is relatively limited and subjective. There are 
many resemblances between the everyday occurrences of a depressed mood and major 
depression such as feelings of sadness, inertia, etc. Commonalities also exist between 
depression and other normal affective conditions, in particular, mourning and grief. In 
addition, many of the emotions, thoughts, and behaviors that accompany a major 
depressive disorder and a depressive mood state do in fact exist on a continuum. Many, if 
not all, people who never experience major depression can nevertheless experience 
various aspects of severe depression without having the wholesale decontextualization 
that accompanies a major depressive disorder. Likewise, major depression resembles 
other illnesses that impair basic functioning and well-being. Depression and other mental 
disorders share many common features such as the alteration of affectation and cognitive 
disruption. However, even if one could give a lengthy list of the features of major 
depression, some of which are common to other phenomena and some of which are 
more-or-less unique to depression, this list would still not provide the basis for an 
adequate and comprehensive definition of major depression.
12
  
 In a way, by simply providing the defining features that delineate depression as a 
disorder opens up as many problems as it closes off. To narrow down the type of illness 
that depression is to the category ‘mental illness’ also poses conceptual problems. Often 
the classification of disorders such as depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia 
under this heading of “mental illness” obscures the differences among them. Yet, is not 
                                                 
12
 From this point on in the dissertation I will use “major depression,” “severe depression,” and 
“depression” synonymously, unless otherwise specified. 
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the difference between the schizophrenic person and the depressed person as qualitatively 
different from the difference between the depressed person and a “normal” person in a 
depressed mood? The presumption of commonality among different types of mental 
illnesses is largely based on how the illness is treated medically and how people with 
mental illnesses are treated culturally. 
 In a related manner, while there are emotions associated with depressive mood 
that often accompany a major depressive episode (e.g. grief, sorrow, sadness, 
hopelessness, despair, guilt, etc.), they are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for 
defining a depressive mood or a depressive disorder. No single emotion is unique to 
depression and no single emotion is a necessary condition for a diagnosis of depression. 
These emotions are features that have a family resemblance to one another and do not 
necessarily appear in conjunction with each other or in the same category of mental 
illness. For instance, grief is characteristic of other mental states and can be considered to 
be a mental state itself. In addition, grief might commonly accompany depression without 
appearing in every case of depression. Even emotions commonly perceived to be 
fundamental to depression do not necessarily appear in each case of depression. For 
example, it might come as a surprise to most people that around ten to fifteen percent of 
individuals diagnosed as having major depressive disorder “deny feelings of sadness 
(Whybrow, Akiskal, & McKinney, 1984).”13  
Another distinguishing characteristic between depression as a mood and a 
disorder is that normal depressive emotions are often accompanied by an identifiable 
reason or cause, whereas pathological depression can arise when no apparent cause can 
                                                 
13
 Coyne, 1985, 5 
10 
 
be detected. For example, depressive symptoms experienced due to the death of a loved 
one might not signal a depressive disorder, whereas depressive symptoms that occur as if 
“out of nowhere” usually signal a depressive disorder. A factor in designating depression 
as pathological is the inability to identify the causative event in a particular instance of 
depression. Freud contrasts the inexplicable nature of melancholy with mourning: “It is 
also most remarkable that it never occurs to us to consider mourning as a pathological 
condition.” He explains, “The only reason, in fact, why this behavior does not strike us as 
pathological is that we are so easily able to explain it.”14 Though mourning and severe 
depression are distinct conditions, prolonged mourning can for some people morph into 
major depression. In addition, just because a person has an identifiable, exogenous trigger 
does not therefore preclude the experience from being a severe depressive disorder. 
The Diagnostic Statistic Manual for Mental Disorders does set out to delineate the 
criteria for what counts as a major depressive disorder. The most recent publication, 
DSM-IV, lists the following conditions:
15
 
Five (or more) of the following symptoms have been present during the same 2-
week period and represent a change from previous functioning; at least one of the 
symptoms is either (1) depressed mood or (2) loss of interest or pleasure. 
1. Depressed mood, 
2.  markedly diminished interest or pleasure,  
3. significant weight loss when not dieting or weight gain, 
4.  insomnia or hypersomnia,  
5. psychomotor agitation or retardation,  
6. fatigue or loss of energy,  
7. feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt,  
                                                 
14
 Freud, Mourning and Melancholia, 2005, 203-4  
15
 American Psychiatric Association, 2000. A a final version of the DSM-V is expected to be released in 
2013. 
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8. diminished ability to think or concentrate,  
9. recurrent thoughts of death/ suicidal ideation 
 
The DSM-IV also indicates that most of the above symptoms need to last most of the day 
and/or nearly every day, and points out which symptoms need to be observable by others 
(e.g. psychomotor retardation) in addition to a subjective account (e.g. depressed mood). 
Also, depression can be diagnosed only if the aforementioned symptoms cannot be 
explained by another general medical condition or drug and alcohol abuse. Here it is 
important to note that in the method for determining what counts as depression, 
‘depression’ is not explained and defined, but rather diagnosed and described. Also, as is 
the case with most mental illnesses, the DSM-IV classifies depression based on 
symptoms, not causes. The DSM-IV also lists several features that can accompany a 
major depressive episode: with or without mood-congruent or mood-incongruent 
psychotic features; with catatonic features, postpartum onset, melancholic features, 
atypical features, and so forth.  
Despite the progress made by the psychiatric community in providing a diagnostic 
categorization of depression, Coyne notes that we are  
far from an adequate diagnostic system for depression. If one is to be achieved, it 
will have to come to terms with the enormous heterogeneity in the signs and 
symptoms, level of severity, causal factors, and clinical course that has been 
subsumed under the term ‘depression.’16  
Furthermore, the assessment of depression as an illness is not a normative-free, purely 
scientific form of judgment. Those with the power to provide definition to depression are 
not immune to political and economic pressures. For instance, how depression is defined 
influences whether insurance policies should provide mental health coverage. The 
                                                 
16
 Coyne, 1985, 14 
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definition of depression also affects pharmaceutical sales and funding for scientific 
research. There is a deep ethical and political dimension to the diagnosis and treatment 
(and not just the medical use of ‘diagnosis’ and ‘treatment’) of depression.17 
In this dissertation I use first-person accounts of depression written by individuals 
who have experienced one or more major depressive episodes, as opposed to dysthymic 
disorder or chronic low-grade depression. Typically, but not always, severe depression is 
considered to be endogenous rather than reactive. While major depression can apply to 
both reactive and endogenous forms of depression, by far the majority of the examples 
that I use are from people who experienced a sudden onset of endogenous depression. 
Also, many people with an endogenous major depressive disorder experience a 
recurrence of depressive episodes.  
 
Depression, estrangement, and loss 
In this dissertation, I focus on the experiences of dislocation and estrangement 
that often accompany depression, but which are not listed in the DSM-IV among the 
common symptoms. Dislocation and estrangement can and do occur with other types of 
experiences and conditions, some of which are sought after and are not intrinsically 
damaging to one’s health such as aesthetic and mystical experiences, as well as certain 
drug-induced states. It is not the case that the meaning of the concept ‘estrangement’ is 
essentially different in depression from how it might be in an aesthetic experience, but its 
meaning does take on a different force and does function differently in major depression 
                                                 
17
 I address these concerns in more detail in chapter 4. 
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from how it functions in an aesthetic experience. The difference resides in how 
estrangement is experienced, felt, and how one reacts to it. For example, one might find 
that a feeling of being estranged from the meaning of familiar objects or words can 
accompany a viewing of David Lynch’s films. However, one experiences this 
estrangement differently from the way a depressed person feels when she wakes up and 
the objects in her room look unfamiliar. In depression, estrangement is typically 
accompanied by persistent anxiety, fear, isolation, and disillusionment, which belong to 
an overall pattern of withdrawal, insomnia or hypersomnia, and/or suicidal ideation. In 
contrast, while a film can bring about an intense feeling of estrangement, this experience 
is more-or-less short lived, possibly intellectually stimulating, and accompanied by less 
deleterious behavior. Another aspect of the difference between an aesthetic-based 
estrangement and depressive-based estrangement is a matter of whether the sense of 
estrangement is perceived to be brought about by an external event. A film, for instance, 
is experienced as the source of the feeling of dislocation, whereas in endogenous 
depression one can simply find oneself unexpectedly feeling estranged from her 
surroundings. 
While trauma or loss can ignite depression, no identifiable trauma or loss is 
necessary to trigger or explain depression’s emergence, duration, or intensity. 
Nevertheless, the depressed person does suffer a form of trauma in loss – a loss of 
meaning, a loss of language, and a loss of self. While ‘loss’ usually implies possession, a 
having once had yet no longer having, many of the things taken to be lost in depression 
lack an identifiable object and do not easily fit the spatial-possessive way of viewing loss. 
The loss that accompanies depression need not be a literal loss. After all, the experience 
14 
 
of loss can arise when and where nothing ever was. A depressed person might speak of 
losing a certain ability or disposition that was never as intact as it appears to have been in 
its apparent absence. Also, the depressive’s sense of self-loss presumes a whole that was 
not necessarily a whole, and a loss that is not a complete loss. When a depressed 
individual says, “I feel as though I’ve lost myself,” or “I am no longer the same person,” 
the overwhelming feeling of loss tends to cast an image of a simple, coherent, and unified 
self that has only now been disrupted by depression. It is from the perspective of loss that 
one remembers and projects connection and cohesion even if one did not do so prior to 
depression. Since the loss that one feels is totalizing, it appears as though a whole is 
missing.  
Loss can be understood as estrangement and feeling lost, which speaks to a loss of 
familiarity and relationality. The loss of a sense of self in depression is primarily 
experienced as an estrangement from language, other people, meaning, and one’s own 
past and futurity. The depressed individual can also find herself at a loss in as much as 
the body can no longer adequately respond to the demands of everyday living. The 
journalist John Falk captures the amorphous quality of loss in his account of his first 
experience of depression. In his memoir, he recalls being a twelve year old boy trying to 
explain to his mom why he could not leave his room and go to school: “I sometimes tried 
to tell her what was happening, but the best I could do was keep repeating what I felt, that 
something was just gone.”18 Loss for the depressive points to a general lacking or waning 
of something that was once more or less working, more or less present, and more or less 
meaningful. The loss that comes out of depression reflects something that is now more or 
                                                 
18
  Falk, 2005, 50-51 
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less absent, more or less dysfunctional, more or less nonsensical, and felt to be “just 
gone.”  
With regards to language specifically, the depressed person loses what language 
once provided – overlapping language games that, for the most part and most of the time, 
generated and sustained meaningful communication. Language is a familiar and 
familiarizing mode of human existence. One counts on it to always be around, always be 
handy, and always be useful. It is always there and rarely present. In other words, most 
people, most of the time, use it without attending to it. Depression can make what was 
unreflectively there all along notable by dislocating it. For instance, a depressed person, 
who otherwise had no substantial problem conversing with other people prior to 
depression, can feel that conversations are increasingly laborious and that speaking 
demands excessive emotional energy. Not only does depression affect speech, but all 
forms of verbal comprehension often become difficult and dense. Depressives report the 
struggle to read, write, listen, and think coherently. In depression words no longer present 
themselves, but rather hide, disguising themselves as other words or morphing into ticks 
and tears. Words tease the depressed, at one moment comprehensible, at the next, 
nonsensical or forgotten. Words can lose their meaning and meaning can lose its 
expression. The sign, along with meaning, drifts and slips from the depressed. In this 
cloudy way, language and meaning are lost in depression, and when one is estranged 
from that which provides a meaningful framework for living, one feels as though one is 
cut off from even being a self. 
16 
 
  The loss of language in depression is bound to a loss of one’s identity and a loss 
of the affective constitution of words. When someone feels estranged from language she 
is left homeless. At home one typically functions easily and without having to 
consciously dwell on the familiarity of her surroundings. She is at home in her home. 
Similarly, the sound or sight of one’s own language is familiar. It is the space where 
things are known, and if not known can be easily assimilated. Heidegger equates 
language to “the house of being,”19 and as a house, language grounds, encloses, and 
protects its inhabitants. Language provides epistemic protection and order; it integrates 
and makes sense of experiences. However, while a house protects against both nature and 
other people, one can face great violence and insecurity in one's home. We are still 
susceptible to trauma in the house, and we are most vulnerable when the house itself is 
disrupted.  
 
Justification: Fieldwork in philosophy 
 
Even if we had unproblematic criteria in place for determining what counts as 
depression, the question still remains as to whether any general philosophical patterns can 
be distilled from such a deeply subjective experience. While despair, anxiety, and the 
phenomenon of suicide have been accepted as being of philosophical interest and being 
philosophical, in these cases angst and despair are commonly given the status of 
fundamental, existential modes of being, and suicide is presented as raising fundamental 
                                                 
19
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questions about the value of and moral commitment to life. In contrast, major depression 
falls under the category of mental illness and is therefore not deemed to be essential to 
what it is to be human. Given the fact that mental disorders are defined in terms of their 
deviance from normal mental structures, the attempt to look at mental disorders 
philosophically poses methodological problems for what many academicians consider to 
be the universal aims of philosophy.  
The subjective nature of mental illness can easily evade consistent theorizing and 
is wrought with exceptional cases. In “Mourning and Melancholia,” Freud relinquishes 
any claim to universalizable theories emerging from his essay due to the small sample he 
analyzes and also because of the variability of the forms and symptoms of melancholia. 
He explains: 
Melancholia, the definition of which fluctuates even in descriptive psychiatry, 
appears in various different clinical forms: these do not seem amenable to being 
grouped together into a single entity…We shall therefore relinquish all claim to 
the universal validity of our results.
20
 
Likewise, while I use the terms ‘depression’ and ‘the depressive’ in a way that suggests 
that it is a generalizable condition, albeit not a universalizable condition, I concur with 
Jeffrey Smith who writes in his memoir that depression “is minutely particular to each, 
perfectly adapted to its time, to its place, to its host.”21 Despite the heterogeneity of 
symptoms and causes within a particular depressed individual, as well as among 
depressives in general, the experience of depression does appear to have a similar pattern 
of disruption for most depressives. 
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In a significant sense, the main philosophical problem of assuming generality in 
the case of depression is not an ontological problem, but rather an ethical concern. Rollo 
May speaks of the practical difficulty of understanding and treating individuals according 
the same conceptual scheme:  
May not just this particular person require another system, another quite different 
frame of reference? And does not this patient, or any person for that matter, evade 
our investigations, slip through our scientific fingers like seafoam, precisely to the 
extent that we rely on the logical consistency of our own system?
22
  
May’s self-questioning about the relation of theory to the actual patient is applicable to 
this project as well. Philosophy struggles to account for a subject matter that is so deeply 
dependent on the psychological life of an individual. Despite the preemptory denials of 
universalizability by the likes of Freud and Rollo May, they, as well as countless others 
including me, proceed to speak of the malady as if it is a comprehensible entity with 
common identifiable traits.  
Even if one does not hold the view that philosophy should be restricted to 
universal human conditions and phenomena, one still might question the appropriateness 
of ‘depression’ as the object of philosophical reflection, and claim that it falls under the 
purviews of other disciplines. However, it is my contention that whether depression is 
considered to be a problem for psychology, philosophy, or the medical sciences depends 
on, in Wittgenstein’s words, “what we do with it, say about it.”23 Depression is an 
appropriate field for philosophical investigation, not because it is inherently 
philosophical, but because of the way that I am treating it. The context and questions of 
                                                 
22
  May, Ellenberger, & Angel, Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology, 1958,  3 
23
 Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, Revised Edition, 1996, §161  
19 
 
the dissertation make depression into a “fieldwork in philosophy.”24 In this dissertation, 
the work is the philosophical analysis of the disruption of a form of life, loss of agency, 
and estrangement from language, and the field is major depression.  
In this dissertation, unlike most dissertations in philosophy, I neither pursue a 
single, narrow philosophical problem, nor do I explore a single philosophical text or 
philosopher. I am interested in the problem of how a form of life can be disrupted by 
major depression. In particular, I am concerned with the way in which a person can 
become estranged from language and meaning as a result of mental illness. This 
dissertation proceeds from the vantage point of depressed individuals, rather than starting 
from a theoretical framework. It is my position that for philosophy to be equipped to 
address the problems associated with the depressive’s estrangement from language and 
meaning, it needs to be integrative and interdisciplinary. 
A relatively new field has emerged within philosophy dedicated to the study of 
the philosophical foundations and concepts within psychiatry and psychopathology. A 
philosophy of psychopathology is at its early stages and has been significantly advanced 
by the research and theoretical insight of Jennifer Radden and George Graham, to name a 
few. In addition, Matthew Ratcliffe and Jennifer Hansen have already paved the way for 
a phenomenology of depression. The venture of professional philosophy into questions of 
mental disorders can prove to be philosophically productive, both critically and 
constructively. Unlike philosophy of psychology, which focuses on traditional 
philosophical questions regarding cognition, language, perception, and the relationship of 
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the mind and brain in normal mental functioning, philosophy of psychiatry and 
psychopathology almost exclusively attends to the questions in relation to mental 
disorders. One of the main recurring concerns within philosophy of psychiatry deals with 
the classification of what counts as mental health and mental illness. Contemporary 
philosophers in this field, such as George Graham, claim that a coherent and 
comprehensive philosophy of mind requires an investigation into mental illness, and 
likewise, that theories of mental illness require a basic understanding of philosophy of 
mind. I contend that philosophical theories of meaning, language, and agency must be 
able to account for the philosophical problems that mental disorders expose, such as 
problems related to the depressive’s estrangement from language and a form of life. 
Jennifer Radden affirms the relevance of mental illness to philosophical work and the 
critical vantage that such a study can provide: 
At least in Western philosophical traditions, our conceptions of agency, 
personhood, self-identity, memory, desire, affectivity, character, and rationality 
are rooted in, and presuppose, certain psychological and social norms concerning 
subjectivity and behavior: these are the norms of mental health. Psychopathology 
exposes these norms, their incumbent limitations – their very normativity – and 
the gaps in our understanding that result from those limitations.
25
  
 
The investigation of the disruption of agency, a form of life, and language-use in 
depression does brush up against many traditional philosophical problems: problems 
dealing with perception, the construction of meaning and identity, and the mind-brain 
dilemma. A philosophical analysis of depression provides a different context from the 
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assumed context of mental health in which these problems arise and a different way of 
framing the problems.  
Moving beyond the rational subject to the embodied, emotional, and conflicted 
agent helps to expand the parameters of what academic philosophy has traditionally 
counted as intelligible beings. Philosophy can and should attend to the voices and 
epistemic standpoints of individuals with mental illnesses. The expansion of the 
fieldwork of philosophy into psychopathology provides philosophy with a practical 
context for understanding the limitations of concepts such as agency, meaning, and 
language. Rather than viewing the mind-brain relation in terms of a computational model 
or understanding it in relation to artificial intelligence, a philosophy of psychopathology 
takes the questions of philosophy of mind and language into a field of messy, complex, 
contradictory, and embodied lives.  
 
Methodology and Literature 
 
In this dissertation I bring in a variety of disciplines and speakers to the 
conversation. I consult the work of neuroscience, psychology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, 
sociology, and first-person narratives to provide a comprehensive picture of depression; 
nevertheless, my approach and goals are unmistakably philosophical. Each disciplinary 
conceptualization of depression has epistemic limitations. To view depression from the 
standpoint of objective socio-economic relations fails to account for the subjective and 
22 
 
intersubjective quality of the depressive experience. A sociological analysis of depression 
cannot account for the variability, intensity, and duration of depressive disorder, and 
furthermore cannot adequately differentiate between the presence of depressive 
symptoms and the presence of a major depressive disorder. Psychotherapeutic approaches 
have recovery as their aim, which can be too mechanistic in their attempts to influence 
behavioral change to provide an adequate account of the various social factors at play. 
Neuroscience assesses the symptoms of depression based on neurological functions and 
malfunctions and cannot account for the intersubjective and complex personal level 
experiences of depressives. Yet if one attempts to dissolve these limitations through an 
eclectic methodology, a synthesis of disparate disciplines often leads to conceptual 
confusion, a leveling of distinctions, and a superficial coherence.  
The integration of different disciplines, as well as non-academic writings, in this 
dissertation does pose several methodological problems. The philosopher José Bermúdez 
points out that in the social sciences the primary problem facing an interdisciplinary 
approach is that “what appears to be a single concept is not really a single concept after 
all.”26 Concepts such as ‘self,’ ‘loss,’ and ‘depression’ often represent divergent ideas and 
serve competing aims. Philosophy can help navigate and point out the conceptual 
disparities and similarities among the different methods. As Bourdieu explains, 
philosophy can be a “means of deciding between competing accounts of the same 
practices.”27 While philosophy can help mediate between competing accounts and clarify 
overlooked conceptual differences, a philosophical approach divorced from actual 
experiences of depressives runs the risk of interpellating depressive identities. For this 
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reason, I draw from the theoretical and practical resources of various disciplines while 
also attending to the actual voices of depressed individuals. 
I use a hybrid philosophical approach that combines a phenomenological account 
of depression based on firsthand accounts of depression along with a more-or-less 
Wittgensteinian investigation into to the language and agency, and lack thereof, of 
depressives. Ultimately this dissertation proceeds from a series of objectives, rather than 
a coherent, singular methodology. Perhaps the best description of my hybrid-
methodological orientation, or lack of a singular methodology, comes from 
Wittgenstein’s remark, “There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed 
methods, like different therapies.”28 In order to treat the philosophical problems that 
come to light in a phenomenological account of depression, this dissertation addresses the 
need for a view of agency that can account for and incorporate the extreme alterations 
and disruptions of meaning, identity, and language that take place in depression. 
 
Wittgenstein  
Wittgenstein’s methodology is more performative than systematic. He never 
articulates a guiding theory; rather, he implements a nuanced orientation to the treatment 
and diagnosis of philosophical problems. While Wittgenstein primarily gives examples of 
how to treat philosophical problems rather than asserting “hard and fast claims,”29 he 
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does in fact make certain claims – at times only performatively – about the scope and 
methods of philosophy. I read Wittgenstein as making a claim about the essential 
interconnection of meaning and practice within particular social contexts composed of 
complex social relations and heterogeneous practices. Wittgenstein attempts to wrestle 
meaning and concepts from their intellectualist contexts and understand them in their 
natural surroundings – ordinary language and practice. In this dissertation I use 
Wittgenstein to lay the groundwork for interpreting language and meaning in the context 
of social practice and a form of life.  
While philosophers have tried to restrict the “homes” of language to logic, certain 
speakers, or rarefied contexts, in line with Naomi Scheman’s following remark on 
Wittgenstein, I agree that the “homes” to which we should “bring our words are precisely 
the messy places from which the philosophers thought they needed to be extricated.”30 To 
view depression as a possible home for a philosophical investigation into language, 
however, is to investigate where language is in fact not at home. I contend that 
Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘form of life’ and how it is involved in his understanding of 
language-use serves as an entry point for addressing the question of how one can come to 
be estranged from meaning and language. A loss of language in depression belongs to the 
disruption of a form of life. One can understand how discursive disruption functions in 
the depressive experience by looking at the various overlapping domains of disruption to 
a form of life: meaning, identity, social relations, temporality, perception, etc. From the 
perspective of doing Wittgensteinian research, I am defending a position regarding the 
use and understanding of ‘form of life’ and how a form of life is intertwined with one’s 
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sense of time, space, oneself, and others. In this dissertation I show that the pragmatic 
context of meaning and language also crosses the planes of various phenomenological 
domains.  
 
Phenomenology 
In this dissertation I use Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty to represent two poles of 
contextualization, a form of life and the body respectively. The key feature of the body 
that I attend to is the affective dimension. In particular, I provide a phenomenological 
account of the roles of affective disconnection and disordering in the depressive’s 
perception, temporalization, spatialization, thought, social relations, and linguistic 
activity. While I set out to give a phenomenological account of depression, I am more 
interested in the depressive’s relationality rather than intentionality. An individual is not 
only directed towards
31
 the things and beings of her world, for the things and beings of 
the world can be said to push back against, cooperate with, and construct the individual’s 
experiences. The concept ‘form of life’ speaks to this mutual relationality and multi-
directionality between the individual and her natural and social environment that is often 
missing in a phenomenological account. In contrast to Husserl, I do not try to account for 
experience based on a general first-person perspective. Also, I do not approach 
experience from the perspective of being as do Sartre and Heidegger. In Phenomenology 
of Perception, Merleau-Ponty uses medical case studies to evaluate the interrelation of 
particular individuals with their surroundings. He looks to exceptional cases, such as a 
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man with a phantom limb and a neurotic woman with language-loss, to highlight the 
complexity and multiplicity of embodied life. In contrast to his predecessors, Merleau-
Ponty argues that philosophers “have no right to level all experiences down to a single 
world, all modalities of existence down to a single consciousness.”32 In addition to 
Merleau-Ponty’s use of empirical data and interest in the field of psychology, his 
attention to perception and the body make his philosophical work pertinent to the project 
of this dissertation. 
 
Psychotherapy 
My use of phenomenological concepts is also based on the practical application of 
phenomenology in the field of psychotherapy. The psychodynamic theoretical 
frameworks that I incorporate include psychoanalysis, existential psychotherapy, and 
phenomenological psychotherapy. The fields of philosophical therapeutic practice 
alluded to in this dissertation (existential psychotherapy, Gestalt psychotherapy, and 
phenomenological psychotherapy) are diverse in both their methodology and content and 
do not garner much approbation in academic psychology or philosophy. Nevertheless, 
there are two aspects common among therapeutic practices based on existential and/or 
phenomenological approaches, which are: a) their adherence to a broadly psychodynamic 
model of human psychology, and b) their insistence on the significance of a person’s 
relationship to and involvement in her world. The main contribution of philosophical 
psychotherapy to this dissertation is the emphasis on a person’s involvement with her 
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world, which centers on the principle that a person’s subjectivity is partially constituted 
by and partially constitutes the things of her world and her relationship with others. 
The use of philosophical psychotherapy in this dissertation poses some conceptual 
difficulties. First and foremost, one must confront the problem of interpreting 
psychotherapeutic writings in a purely theoretical manner, rather than in the context of 
therapeutic practice. Another problem with trying to integrate psychological concepts 
into a philosophical discussion is that many of the authors of the psychological texts (who 
are also practicing psychotherapists, psychoanalysts, or psychiatrists) are writing to 
communities unfamiliar with the history of many philosophical concepts. Given the lack 
of historical perspective about philosophically weighted problems, these writers often use 
philosophical concepts casually and fail to provide rigorous analysis to conceptual 
schemas that one finds prevalent in strictly philosophical texts. For example, I will be 
juxtaposing the writings of J.H. van den Berg, a phenomenological psychotherapist, with 
that of Wittgenstein. While van den Berg’s approach to therapy can be seen as 
sympathetic to my interpretation of Wittgenstein, the reader must hold in check the usual 
problems we associate with some of the terms that van den Berg uses such as ‘objects,’ 
‘mental states,’ and ‘world.’ Van den Berg adopts a phenomenological schema for the 
purposes of therapy, not for the purposes of philosophical clarity for its own sake. Take 
for example van den Berg’s following assertion: 
…mental states never stand by themselves and are never abstractions, but they 
ceaselessly reveal themselves in the reality of the surrounding world, in the reality of 
the objects, in the reality of personal relationships and in the reality of body and of 
28 
 
time.
33
  
 
For the most part, van den Berg appeals to a common sense understanding of concepts 
like ‘reality,’ ‘time,’ ‘world,’ and ‘objects,’ and he neither defines nor problematizes 
these concepts.  For example, his claim that mental states “never stand by themselves” is 
not an ontological claim about sense data or an epistemological assertion about tokenism. 
The significance of his view of mental states is that it shows that mental states are infused 
in every aspect of one’s way of living and it reinforces a holistic view of a person. Like 
other philosophical psychotherapists, van den Berg describes the psychological condition 
of the patient by means of her relation with various phenomenological domains such as 
time, space, and other people. This attention to the interrelation of multiple 
phenomenological domains in therapy corresponds to the emphasis of contextualism in 
philosophical analysis. A psychological evaluation of depressed individuals within the 
contexts of their involvement in the world provides a practical field of application for 
addressing a ‘form of life’ as it is lived out and disrupted in depressed individuals’ lives.  
 
Philosophy from the borders 
A philosophical investigation into depression can perhaps find its home on the 
margins of philosophy where philosophy is motivated by the ethical imperative to include 
the perspectives and voices of people who are often not taken into consideration in 
traditional philosophy. In particular, critical race theory, gender studies, and queer theory 
help to draw attention to the use of false binaries underlying many philosophical 
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concepts. They also expose political bias and show us where social categories of identity 
are hiding. However, the status of a depressive identification differs from other social 
categories of identity. The nature of depression as a marker of identity is qualitatively 
different from race, gender, and sexuality, which is not to say that these markers of 
identity are experienced in the same way or have the same status. Depression is 
intrinsically peripheral because it is a deleterious condition with harsh and devastating 
symptoms. Although depression can contribute to the personal identity of an individual, it 
is first and foremost a malady. Consider the difference that people of color have faced in 
the history of the United States in contrast to the mentally ill. While invidious 
discrimination and racism are the sources of pain for people of color, ‘race’ itself is not 
the cause of suffering. On the other hand, depression is the source of suffering for 
depressives. The social acceptability, and lack thereof, of mental illness is not the primary 
site of suffering for people with mental disorders. Depression is characterized by mental 
pain and suffering, even if the depressive is in a supportive and accepting social 
environment.  
Depression is a socially marginalizing experience regardless of one’s material and 
symbolic capital, and a reform of social structures would not eliminate depression. 
Depressives are marginalized not only by a hegemonic symbolic structure, but by the 
depressive’s tendency towards withdrawal and disengagement. The depressive’s 
disrupted agency is in part a matter of social withdrawal without being exclusively the 
product of social structures. While I do touch on the social structuring of depression, I do 
not primarily focus on the social and economic conditions of the depressive. It is not the 
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aim of this dissertation to elucidate the social subjugation of depressives or the forms of 
social marginalization that can lead to depression.  
 
First-person accounts 
This dissertation makes a performative avowal about philosophical clarity and its 
relation to actual everyday language use by looking at the statements, writings, and 
interviews of depressive individuals, rather than appealing to a general, abstract idea of 
‘ordinary language.’ I ground this investigation on how depression is talked about from 
the perspective of the depressed individual. I do not listen to depressives, as it were, by 
conducting surveys or interviews, in part because philosophical analysis typically does 
not deal directly with data collection. Also, not having been properly trained to conduct 
surveys and interviews, as well as not being trained for a clinical setting, any results 
would likely be insufficient. Given these limitations to a philosophical investigation into 
depression, I have found that the best method for obtaining a comprehensive picture of 
the depressive experience is through written first-person accounts of depression. In 
addition to depression memoirs, I also use transcripts of interviews, published letters, and 
a few case studies. While I have relied on a relatively small sampling of firsthand 
accounts, which are confined for the most part to the United States in the 20
th
 and 21
st
 
centuries, this sampling does include people of different genders, sexual orientations, 
racial and ethnic backgrounds, and ages. This dissertation only looks at individuals with 
developed and relatively normal linguistic abilities and not at individuals with pre-
existing linguistic disorders or young children and infants. All of the writers that I 
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reference claim to have suffered from major depression for a long period of time, usually 
for more than a year, and most have had recurring episodes. The majority of the writers 
also report having experienced suicidal ideation and/or attempting suicide. 
Since William Styron’s publication of his memoir on depression, many 
individuals have detailed their experience of depression through this highly accessible 
and revealing format of the depression memoir.  Some critics argue that William Styron 
was ill-equipped to write from the perspective of Nat Turner in his novel The Confessions 
of Nat Turner and question his ability and reasons for writing from the perspective of a 
slave while never having experienced the affects of racism towards himself. In contrast, 
Styron’s account of his personal experience with depression created a sense of both 
validation and identification with depressives. Up to that point, other than literary works, 
accounts of depression usually originated from professional observers.  
Interestingly, although words and speech are often on the front line of depression, 
many writers suffer from depression and many depressives write about their experience 
with depression. Could it be the case that language-loss is most recognizable in 
individuals with a highly developed discursive agency and with a high degree of 
symbolic mastery? Many of the authors of depression memoirs and first-person accounts 
of depression do have highly cultivated linguistic capacities as well as a highly developed 
personal relationship with language. Several of the authors of the memoirs had 
occupations prior to depression as writers. It makes sense that individuals who spend a lot 
of time thinking about words would have a profound visceral experience of the disruption 
of language in depression. The estrangement from language could simply be an 
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expression of a particular depressed individual’s alienation from her particular world – a 
world of words, journals, literature, philosophy, etc. While it is likely the case that the 
highly literate depressive feels and notices the effects of depression on language more 
than the depressive who does not have a highly developed linguistic capacity, linguistic 
retardation is nevertheless common among depressives with varying levels of education 
and various occupations. Accounts of linguistic retardation and confusion are recurrent 
throughout the narratives. I pay particular attention to descriptions of the disruption of 
language and meaning. I evaluate the repetition of particular words, phrases, and 
grammatical structures, while also attending to what is not being said.  
By speaking of the memoirs in terms of a first-person account of depression, I do 
not want to give the reader the wrong idea that a first-person account means a 
contemporaneous record of the depressed person’s experience of depression during a 
depressive episode. The act of writing almost never takes place during a depressive 
episode. One of the writers, John Bentley Mays, acknowledges the incongruity inherent 
in a depression memoir: “To be chronically depressed and to tell of it is, in one sense, a 
contradiction.”34 Most of the authors admit to not being able to undertake the task of 
writing about depression during the suffocating days of depression, and for many of 
them, the simple tasks of reading and writing anything while depressed proved 
formidable. In addition, many of the authors write their accounts after dealing with 
depression over a long period of time, often years after the initial experience. While 
neither I, nor the authors for that matter, are in a place to judge mental stability, it is 
significant to note that the authors considered themselves to have arrived at what they felt 
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as being a more stable condition when they wrote their account of depression. For 
example, Mays describes writing in a “clearing”:  
This book is a life with the black dogs of depression. I have written it in a clearing 
bounded by thickets roamed by the killing dogs, sometimes, wondering, in the 
writing, whether I would complete it before they returned on silent paws to snatch 
the text away.
35
 
 
In this clearing and reprieve from depression’s morbid grasp, the authors of the memoirs 
give us a picture of, and even an acting out, of the depressive experience. 
Even though the memoirs were not written when the authors’ were in the deepest 
throes of depression, they need not be written during a depressive episode in order to 
provide a meaningful testament to the depressive experience. These self-narratives do, 
however, pose a few philosophical problems. The first problem comes from the false 
appearance of narrative unity. Memoirs often rely on rhetorical devices like a unifying 
theme or image, which only come to be realized in the writing itself. This sense of unity 
gives the wrong impression of closure, although the author, all-the-while, is still living 
that life. This form of unity is reinforced by the impression that many of the authors give 
of their stories taking place in a time past, when they were depressed. However, as 
indicated by Kristeva, the trace of depression never really leaves and can be noticed in 
the speech of the depressive between episodes.
36
 The way that depression alters one’s 
form of life cannot be erased, and depression continues to speak through the depressive 
authors’ writing even if they are not in a deep depressive episode as they write.  
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The second concern arises from the author’s tendency to reframe and forget the 
past. In addition to the function of reframing that exists in the dynamic of reflection itself, 
because the written accounts occur from the standpoint of a self-described, relative 
mental stability, the experience of depression is subject to revisions. The writer not only 
remembers the experiences for herself, but also forms it in such a way as to be accepted 
by a reader. Radden addresses the methodological difficulties in providing a 
philosophical analysis of first-person accounts of mental illness: “…we must alert to the 
inevitable reconfigurations imposed on all self narratives in their retelling, but very often 
heightened, here, by efforts to explain or excuse states so extreme, unsought, unwelcome, 
and stigmatized.”37  While Radden expresses concern that the authors attempt to “excuse 
states,” it is important to note that the authors presented in this dissertation give neither a 
glorified view of depression nor a glorified view of themselves. Their descriptions are 
raw and emerge from the pain of the depression and the pain of trying to make sense of it. 
Narrative reframing, for Radden, poses the problem of “epistemic 
indeterminacy.”38  However, this self-redaction only poses a problem if we read the 
depression memoirs as purely descriptive self-observations and make the false 
assumption that the authors had a pure, direct, and therefore accurate picture of their own 
depressive experience. Even if we had a direct line into the mind of the depressed during 
a depressive episode we would not have epistemic clarity; similarly, neither can the 
depressed. Self-observation is not an unmediated ‘knowing.’ The act of describing 
depression, as one does in writing the first-person account, does not introduce the 
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problem of epistemological indeterminacy that was not already there from the beginning, 
that is, in the depressive episode. Although the main difference between a 
contemporaneous account and an after-the-fact reflection on depression dwells in the 
passage of time and forgetting, the problem of narrative reframing can take place at any 
moment, not just in the act of writing.  
The objective of this dissertation does not depend on complete and accurate 
reporting on the part of the writers, as if the initial inner-thoughts themselves could be the 
standard. That being said, I proceed with trust rather than skepticism with regard to the 
authors’ intent of giving an honest view of the experience of depression. The reflective 
description given in a firsthand account, which in the case of depression is made possible 
by recovering from the initial experience, provides an epistemological viewpoint as 
informative as the experience of the depressive episode itself.  
While no individual’s experience of depression can be said to be prototypical, 
throughout the dissertation I do use the expressions “the depressive,” “the depressed,” 
and “the depressive experience,” etc. The perceptive of “the depressive,” if not in 
reference to a particular person, is constructed from the common experiences shared by 
depressives. Where I do not explicitly preface statements about “the depressed” with the 
conditionals like “typically,” “usually,” or “more often than not,” these qualifications are 
always implied. Epistemologically speaking, there is no prototypical standpoint of the 
depressive, so I admit to the inevitable oversimplification of the diverse and divergent 
perspectives of depression by my use of the term “the depressive.” Where I have found 
evidence to contradict a claim I make about “the depressive,” I do make that known. I am 
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well aware that there are exceptions to what I attribute to “the depressive experience,” 
and one might even characterize the experience of depression as necessarily exceptional 
and irreducible to theorization. Even if I abandoned the use of a singular “depressive,” 
the plural form does not resolve the problem or presumption of homogeneity and unity 
assumed in the label “depressives.” 
Even though individuals who suffer a debilitating depressive episode can come to 
appreciate their particular orientation to the world, this appreciation does not make 
depression an asset. While some cultures and individuals may praise those afflicted by 
mental anguish for their insight and creativity, these attributes do not make depression 
inherently valuable. Suicide, self-inflicted wounds, terror, panic, unyielding grief – these 
are just a few of the negative effects of major depression and other mental illnesses. 
Depression steals and destroys relationships, talents, dreams, and even language. It is my 
position that major depression is a malady to be treated and prevented. All of the first-
person accounts that I have encountered testify to the fact that depression is a malevolent, 
deleterious condition with no intrinsic benefit. Major depression does serious and often 
irreparable harm to a person’s ability to thrive and function. Mays describes depression as 
“the most obstinate experience this side of malignancy and death, a deadly presence in 
language and thought as inextricable as an inoperable tumor.”39 John Head, author of 
Standing in the Shadows: Understanding and Overcoming Depression in Black Men, 
writes: “Untreated clinical depression is modern-day slavery. It robs people of their 
freedom and limits their choices as effectively as the ‘peculiar institution’ ever did.”40 For 
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this reason, it is my position that while we can celebrate the lives and work of people 
suffering from depression, as a culture we should strive to find depression's causes and 
cure as well as striving to ameliorate its symptoms.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
A FORM OF LIFE AND ITS DISRUPTION 
 
Introduction 
 
Major depression changes a person’s perception and judgment of the world. The 
prereflective agreement that undergirds the meanings made possible through a form of 
life no longer holds true for the depressive. This disruption of a form of life does not 
cause the dislocation of agency; it occurs along with it. In this chapter I look at 
depression as a general disruption of a form of life and a loss of familiarity. In the first 
part of the chapter I evaluate Wittgenstein’s conceptualization of a ‘form of life’ as a 
“pragmatic contextualism”41 and examine its relation to agency and affectivity.  In the 
second part of the chapter I argue that, in the case of the depressive, the disruption of a 
form of life is first and foremost an expression of the decontextualization of the 
depressive individual and can be expressed in terms of a loss of familiarity. I contend that 
Wittgenstein uses a ‘form of life’ to qualify the way that language and judgments are 
situated in a broader context of shared practices and shared attitudes. The concept ‘form 
of life’ helps me to advance the idea of the situatedness of agency and language in a 
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social environment. By establishing the pragmatic contextuality of agency and language 
in a form of life, I can then show how major depression disrupts the sense of familiarity 
and the meanings previously made possible through a form of life. A ‘form of life,’ with 
an emphasis on life, helps elucidate the pervasiveness of depression as it severs the 
depressive’s social relations and shared meanings. Ultimately, depression disrupts the 
lived meaning of a form of life. 
 
‘Form of life’ 
 
Wittgenstein’s use of ‘form of life’ 
Lebensform, traditionally translated as “form of life,”42 only occurs a handful of 
times
43
 in Wittgenstein’s writings.44  Wittgenstein even seems to express his 
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 One of the disagreements over how to interpret ‘form of life’ begins with how to translate it. Some 
scholars have blamed the translation of the German “Lebensform” into the English “form of life” as being 
the reason for the concept’s ambiguity and therefore the source of incongruent interpretations. Sharrock and 
Anderson argue in favor of the translation “ways of life” to be used in place of “form of life” (Sharrock, 
1985) and E.F. Thompkins asserts that there should be no philosophical confusion over ‘forms of life’ 
because Wittgenstein never actually used the term, that is, the English term “form of life” (Thompkins, 
1990). Thompkins insists that philosophical problems only develop from a poor translation of 
Wittgenstein’s “Lebensform” and asserts: “Wittgenstein says nothing about ‘form of life’ and that 
consequently the problem of what he means by it does not exist…What he means by ‘Lebensform’ is a 
different problem but since what he means is quite clear from what he says, that is no problem” (Ibid, p. 
197).  Thompkins proposes to dissolve any philosophical problems with the concept ‘form of life’ by 
translating ‘Lebensform’ into “pattern of living.” He asserts that this translation avoids the overly biological 
connotation of life-form and thus averts the wrong-headed implication that a form of life has a particular 
referent. Also, he alleges that his translation of ‘Lebensform’ into “pattern of living” makes Wittgenstein’s 
remarks remarkably clear and, evidently, self-evident. One specific problem with the translation “pattern of 
living” is that Wittgenstein refers to the numerous “patterns in the weave of life,” which suggests that 
patterns tend to occur within a form of life, rather than being equivalent to a form of life (PI, p. 174 and Z, 
§569) 
The main difficulty with the attempt to clarify the concept ‘Lebensform’ with a different English 
translation alone is that ‘Lebensform’ is not a simplistic concept and its conceptual ambiguity does not 
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dissatisfaction with the concept ‘form of life’ in a parenthetical remark he makes on the 
inadequate expression and conceptualization of the role that certainty plays within a form 
of life. He remarks, “Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to 
hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life. (That is very badly expressed and 
probably badly thought as well.)”45 Even though Wittgenstein does not use “form of life” 
often, its repetition by Wittgenstein scholars – as well as in this dissertation – can give it 
a misleading sense of autonomy and discreteness that Wittgenstein attempts to avoid. In 
Wittgenstein’s use of “form of life,” form does not refer to an immutable shape and life 
does not imply a universal concept of human life. A “form of life” does not have a 
                                                                                                                                                 
solely arise in the problem of translation. Secondly, the problem with changing the traditional translation of 
“Lebensform” into “form of life” is that Wittgenstein does in fact use “form” (‘-form’) and not “pattern” (‘-
musters’) in these passages. Nevertheless, the idea of relating ‘life-form’ to ‘pattern of living’ is helpful and 
Wittgenstein does actually use “patterns of life” (‘Lebensmusters’) in several other passages in a similar 
way to his use of ‘form of life’ ( LWI, §206 [‘Lebensschablone’ – also “pattern of life”], 211, 365; LWII, 
26 & 40; RPPII, §652). However, Wittgenstein’s use of “patterns of life” (“Lebensmusters”) in other 
passages does not confirm that it is a correct translation of ‘Lebensform.’ In fact, by not using 
“Lebensmusters” (patterns of life) in these passages and using “Lebensform” instead, this choice shows that 
there is some significance to his use of “-form,” even if only literary, and that the traditional translation  
should stand. Likewise, while it might be helpful to conceive of forms of life as ‘ways of life,’ as argued by 
Sharrock and Anderson, which is also the translation used in Last Writings on the Philosophy of 
Psychology, Volume II (translated by C.G. Luckhardt and Maximilian A.E. Aue), Wittgenstein does not use 
this term “Lebensweise” (“way of living”) in these particular passages, although “Lebensweise” is used in 
other places (“Lebensweise” occurs twice in LWII, pp. 43-4; “Art de Lebens,” occurs three times in Culture 
and Value, pp. 31, 69,  and 73,  and once in Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, VI, §34). While I 
contend that “Lebensform” should be translated as “form of life,” the main philosophical significance 
dwells in how the concept is used. Also, I argue that the philosophical emphasis should be placed on 
Wittgenstein’s use of “Lebens” (life) rather than on the terms that accompany it: “-musters,” “-form,” “-
weise,” etc.  
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 “Lebensform” occurs five times in the Philosophical Investigations and once in each of the following: 
On Certainty, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Philosophical Occasions, and Last Writings on 
the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume II. “Form of life” can also be found once in Lectures and 
Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief. 
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 When I refer to Wittgenstein’s “writings” I include all of his published works translated into English and 
exclude any Conversations, Lectures, and Letters, unless otherwise specified. The writings that I include 
and their abbreviations are as follows: Notebooks 1914-1916 (NB), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP) , 
The Blue and Brown Books (BBB),  Philosophical Remarks (PR), Philosophical Grammar (PG), Remarks 
on the Foundations of Mathematics, Revised Edition (RFM), Philosophical Investigations (PI), Zettel (Z), 
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volumes I and II (RPPI and RPPII), Last Writings on the 
Philosophy of Psychology, Volumes I and II (LWI and LWII), On Certainty (OC), Remarks on Color (RC), 
Culture and Value, Revised Edition (CVre), and Philosophical Occasions (PO). 
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singular referent. “It” is neither a thing nor is it an identifiable and repeatable form; 
rather, a form of life is the living community. A form of life refers to numerous, 
overlapping, and sometimes incongruent practices shared by a community. “It” is lived 
out and lived through in shared practices. Despite the fact that a form of life is not an 
identifiable entity, I do use the term “form of life” as a substantive throughout this 
dissertation to refer to the shared practices and attitudes of a particular culture.
46
 In one 
sense to use ‘form of life’ as a central concept of this dissertation, as well as my attempt 
to describe it, alters the way Wittgenstein uses it. Yet the very diffuseness of the concept 
captures the tacit interconnectedness that infuses a way of living, a way of acting, a way 
of communicating, relating, perceiving, feeling, and interacting. In this dissertation I am 
trying to encapsulate the pervasiveness of depression’s disruption, not just to a person’s 
life, but to a person’s entire way of living. I invoke Wittgenstein’s idea of a form of life 
in order to speak to the layers of relations that are implicated and disrupted in major 
depression. 
I interpret Wittgenstein’s use of “form of life” and other related terms (see below) 
to demonstrate that linguistic and social practices are embedded in the interrelated 
elements that constitute and are constituted by the individual’s and a community’s 
relation to its social, historical, and biological environment. It is significant that 
Wittgenstein does use other terms in similar ways to “form of life” such as “weave of 
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Wittgenstein’s writing. Lastly, I place form of life in single quotation marks in order to indicate the concept 
‘form of life.’  
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life” (Lebensteppich),47 “stream of life” (Fluß des Lebens),48 “way of living” 
(Lebensweise/Art des Lebens),
49
 and “facts of life” (Tatsachen de Lebens ).50 Also 
Wittgenstein often uses “our life,” “life that is like ours,” “life of these people,” “human 
life,” and “our whole life.” Given the fact that the common element to all of these 
concepts is “Lebens” (life/living),51 more philosophical emphasis should be placed on 
what Wittgenstein means by ‘life’ and ‘living’ rather than ‘form’ or ‘way’ or ‘pattern.’52 
The focus on life and living draws attention to the fact that a form of life is not a single, 
monolithic entity; rather, it is temporally embedded, pragmatically constructed, and 
heterogeneous. A form of life is expressed in what we do, how we do it, and what we 
believe. It is also infused in the way we see and the way we feel. Wittgenstein shows that 
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 “So we are talking about patterns in the weave of life” (LWII, 42); “‘Grief’ describes a pattern which 
recurs in the weave of our life” (LWI, §406); and “For pretence is a (certain) pattern within the weave of 
life. It is repeated in an infinite number of variations” (Ibid, §862). 
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 “(Only in the stream of thought and life do words have meaning.)” (Z, § 173); and “The stream of life, or 
the stream of the world, flows on and our propositions are so to speak verified only at instants” (PR, §48). 
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 “Language, I should like to say, relates to a way of living” (RFM, VI, §34); “Should I say: Our concepts 
are determined by our interest, and therefore by our way of living?...The basic concepts are interwoven so 
closely with what is most fundamental in our way of living that they are therefore unassailable” (LWII, 43-
4); and “Hence although it's belief, it is really a way of living, or a way of judging life” (CVre, 73). “Way 
of living” also appears in LWII, 95; CVre, 31and 69-70. 
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life”) in the same context where he uses “Lebensform” (“form of life”) in the Philosophical Investigations: 
“What has to be accepted, the given—it might be said—are facts of living [Tatsachen de Lebens]” (RPPI, 
§630) and “What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – forms of life [Lebensform]” (PI, p. 
192). 
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 G.E.M Anscombe almost always translates “Lebens” as “life,” except in the cases of “ways of living” 
and “facts of living” (PI, OC, and RFM). C.G. Luckhardt and M. Aue translated “Lebensform” as a “way 
of living” (LWII) and P. Winch also translated “Lebensformen” as “ways of living” (PO). Thus, it would 
seem that “life” and “living” are equally acceptable translations.  
52
 In his later writings, those post-dating Part I of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein does lean 
towards the term “pattern” more than “form.” Four of the eight occurrences of “Lebensform” occur in his 
writings that date prior to 1945. While “form of life” only occurs four times after Part I of the 
Investigations, “pattern of life” occurs eight times (LWI, §§206, 211 - twice, and 365; LWII, 40 – twice, 
and 42; RPPII, §652); “stream of life” appears six times (Z, §173; PR, §48; LWI, §913; LWII, 30; RPPII, 
§§504 and 687); “weave of life” also appears six times (LWII, 42; LWI, §§406 & 862; RPPII, §672; PI, 
174 and 228-9); and “way of living” occurs five times (LWII, 43-4 - twice; CV, 69 and 73). “Way of 
living” also appears twice prior to 1945 (RFM, VI, §34 and CV, 31). In each of these cases the term refers 
to similar ideas, all of which can be applied to the concept of ‘form of life.’ 
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it is only in the context of a form of life that words have meaning, emotional and mental 
states are recognized, types of behavior are learned and expressed, social agreement of 
attitudes are forged, and correctness/rightness/truth of concepts are justified. While all of 
the aforementioned ideas reflect the dependence of various elements on a form of life, it 
should be said that all of these elements help to make up the very form of life to which 
they belong.  
Wittgenstein does not introduce the concept ‘form of life’ in order to explain what 
a form of life is and how it functions. Wittgenstein always uses ‘form of life’ in order to 
qualify something else. He uses the concept ‘form of life’ as a means for explaining the 
contextualization and mutual embeddedness of language and meaning along with the 
interrelation of judgments, attitudes, and social practices. Wittgenstein first uses “form of 
life” in the Philosophical Investigations in order to draw attention to the interconnection 
of language-use with a form of life. He writes, “…to imagine a language means to 
imagine a life-form.”53 In this remark, form of life qualifies what he means by language, 
and throughout his writings form of life functions more as a role player than a central 
concept. In other words, Wittgenstein does not develop a theory of a form of life, and 
‘form of life’ is not the central concept of his investigation. A ‘form of life’ also does not 
play a structural role and is not an organizing idea for Wittgenstein. Despite its 
ambiguity, I insist on appealing to a form of life because the notion of ‘life’ is central to 
the concept ‘form of life.’ The idea of a disruption of a form of life best captures the way 
that depression does not merely disrupt a particular social context, but the very life of the 
depressed individual. 
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As hard as one might try or wish to glean a clearly definable concept from 
Wittgenstein’s use of the term “form of life,” the best way to understand what 
Wittgenstein meant by a form of life, and consequently how it will be used in this 
dissertation, is to understand what he wanted to accomplish with the concept. Part of 
what Wittgenstein achieves with his notion of a form of life is a critique of philosophies 
of language that limit ‘sense’ to atomic names and simples, sentence units, 
speaker/authorial intention, background theories, and speech-acts limited to a specific 
time, space, and audience, etc. He replaces these contexts that are limited to a few 
primary constructs with the idea of a ‘form of life.’ Rather than appealing to meaning as 
it is constructed within a limited context, Wittgenstein’s use of form of life shows that 
meaning belongs to a multidimensional and heterogeneous context of shared social 
practices. What the concept ‘form of life’ helps to advance in this dissertation is an 
understanding of how the disruption of meaning and language in depression belongs to an 
overall disruption of a form of life.  
José Medina refers to Wittgenstein’s expanded context of meaning as an “action 
oriented holism”54 and a “pragmatic contextualism.”55 Wittgenstein’s “pragmatic 
contextualism” does not exclusively pertain to the role of a form of life in language-use 
and vice-versa. Rather than asserting the primacy of language, Wittgenstein emphasizes 
the centrality of social action and interaction in the formation of meaning. In the context 
of a remark on foundational propositions, Wittgenstein notes Goethe’s riposte to John 
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1:1
56
 – “In the beginning was the deed.” 57 With this comment, Wittgenstein highlights 
the foundational role of action in the formation of meaning rather than language (Logos).  
In the second appearance of “form of life” in the Philosophical Investigations, 
Wittgenstein emphasizes the dynamic nature of a life-form by connecting it to a practice. 
He writes, “Here the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact 
that the speaking of a language is part of an activity, or a life-form.”58 In this comment 
Wittgenstein compares a form of life to an activity. A form of life is characterized by an 
active and living quality in contrast to having a static and uniform nature.  
The concept ‘form of life’ points to the normative context of meaning and 
practice. While a form of life is not static and homogenous, it does reinforce regularities. 
The regularities of a form of life concern behavior, emotion, perception, cognition, and 
language-use. They are constituted by the forms of agreement and truth that are 
contextually embedded in shared practices. A form of life pertains to the shared 
judgments and attitudes that make meaningful communication possible. Wittgenstein 
writes, “If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only 
in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments” and this agreement is not 
“in opinions but in form of life.”59 According to Wittgenstein, judgments are not 
grounded in presuppositions and beliefs; rather, they are grounded in a “way of acting.”60 
The pragmatic agreement within a form of life does presuppose but cannot guarantee or 
secure individual assent. On this point Wittgenstein writes, “‘We are quite sure of it’ does 
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not mean just that every single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community 
which is bound together by science and education.”61 By highlighting science and 
education as (re)producers of accepted judgments, Wittgenstein introduces the historical 
and material embeddedness of a form of life in a particular culture, which contradicts 
interpretations of Wittgenstein’s use of ‘form of life’ as referring to a single, human form 
of life.
62
 Thus, when Wittgenstein writes that “What has to be accepted, the given, is – so 
one could say – forms of life,”63 the status of the “has to be accepted” does not refer to an 
ontological necessity; it refers to the normative regularity of a community.  
Naomi Scheman notes that Wittgenstein’s “emphasis on agreement can mislead 
us into thinking of Wittgensteinian forms of life as internally homogenous.” 64 In contrast, 
she claims that a form of life is heterogeneous. I interpret this internal heterogeneity as 
applying to both the structure and content of a form of life. The structural heterogeneity 
refers to the different elements that make shared meaning possible, and the heterogeneity 
of content refers to the possibility of disagreement within a form of life. Related to the 
idea of internal heterogeneity, José Medina uses Meredith Williams’ concept 
‘heterogeneous holism’ to explain the qualitative difference between the context of 
language-use and its component elements.
65
 However, it can be misleading to use the 
terms “internal” and “holism” in reference to the heterogeneity of a form of life, given 
that there are no distinct and static boundaries between multiple forms of life. Likewise, 
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the individual elements which constitute and are constituted by a form of life can change 
or dissipate over time, and new ones can emerge. 
In this dissertation I highlight a few elements of social agreement that function in 
a form of life such as temporalization, spatialization, and language. While the elements of 
a form of life are interconnected, that does not mean that they are harmoniously 
connected. The weave of life can have holes, loose ends, and knots. These knots can 
develop from multiplicity, overlapping forms of life, and from areas of a form of life that 
are more-or-less undefined or under-defined. A form of life not only reinforces the 
meaningfulness of practices and the intelligibility of its practitioners, it also defines 
meaninglessness and unintelligibility. Likewise, silence, incommunication, and confusion 
are constituted by a form of life. A context defines by what it excludes as well as what it 
includes. What is unintelligible in one form of life could be meaningful in another.  
The aforementioned remark in On Certainty about social agreement, “we are 
quite sure of it,” calls attention to the “we” – the game players. The recurrence of the 
“we” in Wittgenstein’s writings raises the question of who Wittgenstein assumed belongs 
to the “we,” or if he overlooked this question altogether. Sarah Lucia Hoagland argues 
that Wittgenstein fails to “address questions of power” and “he never asks who is this 
‘we’ who distinguishes sense and nonsense.”66 While she correctly assesses 
Wittgenstein’s lack of direct engagement with “questions of power” and politics, 
Wittgenstein’s challenges to various forms of foundationalism do indirectly implicate the 
role of social systems in defining meaning, as well the role of social structures in defining 
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the ‘we.’ In contrast to Hoagland’s critique of Wittgenstein, Wendy Lee-Lampshire 
argues that Wittgenstein calls into question the epistemological status of the speaker and 
knower. Wittgenstein does not overtly shift the focus from shared meaning to communal 
identity, but Lee-Lampshire points out that many of his examples do “raise important 
questions about what it means to be in a position to know, to name, to command, to 
instruct, and so forth…”67 She claims that the questions about the position of the knower 
“in turn raise questions concerning the possible disparities of power legitimated by and 
reinforced through the play of such games.”68 Furthermore, by invoking the roles of 
science and education, as well as the teacher and the apprentice, in the reproduction of 
meaning, Wittgenstein indirectly exposes the roles of the practitioners as well as the 
practices of a form of life. 
While Wittgenstein does not articulate a theory of selfhood (or any of its variants, 
personal identity and agency, etc.), Wittgenstein’s method of inquiry and topics of 
investigation do gesture towards some of the conditions under which meaning, agency, 
and practices are produced and reproduced in the individual and the community. 
Although Wittgenstein does not systematically address the objective and subjective 
conditions through which agency is constructed and organized, Lee-Lampshire points out 
that he does give us the tools for reassessing “relationships and identities.”69 The closest 
Wittgenstein comes to accounting for how a form of life is incorporated in the life of an 
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individual is in his remarks on teaching.
70
 Likewise, he only occasionally points out 
modes of individuation, such as temperament.
71
 Wittgenstein does not view the 
relationship between a form of life and agency as a causal one. Just as a context plays a 
defining role rather than a causal role, a form of life has a defining relationship with 
meaning and identity.  
A form of life is the familiar way that people participate in, define, understand, 
perceive, and emotionally encounter their shared environment. A form of life is the way 
one moves about one’s environment. Different cultures have different forms of life. 
People both shape and live in a form of life. Material conditions, geography, and history 
all have an effect on a form of life. Cultural institutions such as science, education, 
religion, and government perpetuate a form of life. A life-form pertains to the relations 
among people and people’s intersubjective relationship to the many elements of life. A 
form of life pertains to the familiarity and knowability of the world. A form of life 
pertains to a way of understanding, both reflectively and pre-reflectively, the things and 
beings of a world. A form of life is a way of acting and a way of being an actor. It is a 
way of seeing oneself and other people. A form of life plays a defining role in how one 
finds herself in the world, how one participates in practices, and how one uses her body.  
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Affective agreement and affective disruption 
A form of life, like language, is first and foremost shared. Just as there can be no 
private language, one also cannot have a private form of life. The social agreement that 
coalesces in a form of life is not exclusively an intellectual agreement; practices are also 
predicated upon certain forms of emotional agreement and shared attitudes. Agreement 
operates on varying levels of consciousness such as habitual ways of moving one’s body, 
sensory perception, one’s emotional responses, and so forth. Wittgenstein refers to the 
meaningfulness of emotions as being understood within a way of living. In the context of 
remarks on pain and pretense, Wittgenstein comments, “What goes on within also has 
meaning only in the stream of life.”72  How one processes, identifies, and expresses 
emotions have meaning only in so far as they participate in a way of living. Shared 
practices give meaning to emotions and emotions also participate in the meaningfulness 
of practices. That fact that emotional and mental states are recognized as such is 
dependent on their place within a form of life. Wittgenstein contends that what we take to 
be fundamental human emotions, such as grief and hope, can only be identified and 
understood within a “weave of life.” He writes, “‘Grief’ describes a pattern which recurs 
in the weave of our life”73 and “phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form 
of life.”74 In the passage that precedes his comments on hope, Wittgenstein addresses the 
various emotional responses one can imagine an animal to have (i.e. anger, fright, and 
happiness) and contrasts those with the capacity for hopefulness. Hope, he claims, can 
only have purchase for speaking beings. That is not to say, however, that hope belongs to 
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a single human form of life, but rather that hope belongs to a complicated form of life 
that can only occur where complex linguistic practices are in place. He asserts that the 
form of life (in which hope has meaning) can only belong to human beings (leaving open 
the possibility that some human beings may not have the capacity for hopefulness); 
however, he does not assert that there is a single human form of life in which hope is an 
essential element. 
Emotions participate in the normative structures of a form of life. Normative 
judgments operate in what is considered to be an appropriate expression of an emotion, as 
well as what are considered to be appropriate emotions for a particular circumstance. 
Emotions are interpreted, named, distinguished, analyzed, tamed, encouraged, 
suppressed, and ignored. Merleau-Ponty describes emotions and emotional behavior as 
cultural products. He writes, “It is no more natural, and no less conventional, to shout in 
anger and kiss in love than to call a table ‘a table’. Feelings and passional conduct are 
invented like words.”75 A person’s inability to conform his or her emotions to social 
expectations can have serious consequences, both social and psychological. Certain 
emotional responses and emotional dispositions can secure one’s place in a practice or 
exclude one as an unsuitable practitioner. In her research on depression among Flathead 
Indians in North America, Theresa O’Nell refers to the work of the anthropologists Lutz 
and Abu-Lughod who speak to the way that “power relations determine what can, cannot, 
or must be said about self and emotion, what is taken to be true or false about them, and 
what only some individuals can say about them.”76 For example, in some communities 
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anger is not viewed as an acceptable emotion and if someone reacts in anger it would not 
simply be imprudent; it would not make sense. Also, some people are considered to be 
entitled to anger while other people are not.  
While Wittgenstein remarks that joy and grief are not “kinds of behavior,” 
emotions are nevertheless bound up with behavioral regularities.
77
 A form of life is 
infused in the so-called “outward” expression of emotions as well as the “inner” emotions 
themselves. Children are taught which emotions are acceptable in which circumstances, 
and the circumstances have as much to do with who is present as what the practice is. 
Social norms guide who should and should not express this or that emotion, and to 
whom. Consider the ways that children are trained to restrain or show emotion: “Don’t 
you get angry with me!” “Tell your sister you are sorry.” “You may be upset, but you still 
have to go to school.” “If you’re lonely and bored why don’t you just go outside and 
play?” Later in life similar tropes persist, although they are usually less direct: “I know 
you’re upset about losing your job, but it’s at times like these that we need to be grateful 
for what we do have.” “Don’t let your ex’ get you down, he’s not worth it.” “Look at 
those people rioting, why do they think they have the right to destroy other people’s 
property?”  
Despite the pervasive enculturation of affectivity, social agreement cannot always 
quell emotions, foster emotions, or make sense of emotions. In particular, social norms 
cannot control the depressive affect of the severely depressed. The depressive affect 
exceeds the normative limitations embedded in a form of life. Depressive emotions are 
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deemed abnormal in their intensity, duration, lack of a clear object, and/or negativity. Not 
only can the depressive affect overwhelm a deeply inculcated way of living, it can also 
trigger suicide. If affectivity has the power to disrupt an individual’s form of life, then 
what relation do emotions and emotional disorders have with meaning and identity? 
Depression opens up a window through which we can assess the relationship between 
intra-personal, affective, and bodily changes of the depressed individual with the 
disruption of a form of life. If a form of life can be disrupted by an affective disorder, 
then the functioning and health of one’s emotions is also interconnected with the 
coherence, as well as the disruption, of a form of life. Depression calls attention to the 
fact that not only language and a form of life subtend emotions, but also emotions 
subtend a form of life and language-use.  
While a form of life defines emotions, emotions also inform and define a form of 
life. How one feels affects how one sees and acts. O’Nell remarks that “emotion not only 
depicts a particular vision of the self and its relation to the world, but its usage actually 
defines or redefines that social reality.”78 Similarly, Heidegger remarks that mood 
“determines what and how one ‘sees.’”79 Rather than clarifying “what and how one 
‘sees’” depression appears to obscure the world.80 The intensity, duration, and negativity 
of the emotions that accompany depression disrupt a form of life. They do not flow 
within the stream of life; they disrupt meaning. Depressive affect can block a person’s 
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ability to give meaningful expression to emotions as well as understand them as having 
meaning.  
Depression ultimately has two main sources of affective disruption. The first 
source pertains to the presence of emotions and the second source refers to the absence of 
emotional connection. I call the first source of disruption “affective disordering.” I use 
affective disordering in a specialized way to indicate the presence of unwanted and 
deleterious emotional states, which can exist independent of any identifiable intentional 
objects. I label the second sphere of disruption “affective disconnection,” which refers to 
the depressive’s disengagement from her natural and social environment. Depressive 
affective disordering refers to the exaggerated intensity and duration of unwanted and 
uncontrollable emotional states that inhibit one’s ability to act and think, and disturb 
physiological processes. Depressive affective disordering is characterized by emotional 
and physical suffering. Affective disordering can also pertain to the absence of 
identifiable intentional objects of emotions. In this case, the depressive’s affect, mood, or 
emotion does not connect with and is not directed at a clearly identifiable object (‘object’ 
here means situation, person, task, ideal, etc.). Often the depressive emotion is not about 
or over something; depressive affect is disordered because it can be unattached. For 
instance, depressives often experience an inexplicable and sudden onslaught of deep grief 
or penetrating anger without an identifiable trigger. Along with the presence of unwanted, 
unwieldy, and unattached emotions, depression is also accompanied by a loss of affective 
connection. The depressive’s affective disconnection manifests itself in the depressive’s 
estrangement from objects, projects, practices, ideals, other people, language, and 
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oneself. These two horns of depression exist in a feedback loop and neither one appears 
to have temporal or causal priority.  
While depression is capable of disrupting a form of life, it does not develop into a 
new form of life. A form of life belongs to shared practices, whereas depression disrupts 
those practices. Given the depressive tendency towards withdrawal, suicidal ideation, and 
self-consuming feelings of grief and pain, the depressive position is isolating and the 
depressive person is overwhelmingly alone. While the depressive lacks the psychological 
resources to develop a new form of life, a new form of life and its practices cannot be 
created privately regardless of an individual’s mental “health.” An individual’s disrupted 
form of life does not constitute a different form of life, because a form of life is not 
merely a subjective, intrapsychic formation. Depression brings about a disjunction 
between the individual and her form of life that does not intrinsically lead to a different 
form of life. In other words, depression is not a counter form of life; rather, it is counter 
to life. Whether a depressed individual at some point either enters into a new form of life 
or is eventually resituated within a form of life depends on how his or her community 
assesses depression and whether she has access to a language game that makes 
depression intelligible.
81
  
 
Familiarity and “feeling at home” in a form of life 
For the most part, one’s form of life constitutes and is constituted by a sense of 
familiarity and ordinariness. The way in which a person can move about her environment 
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unquestioningly – seeing objects, performing tasks, conversing with friends – belongs to 
the overall sense of familiarity that a life-form entails. Wittgenstein describes familiarity 
as consisting in “things like our feeling at home in what we see.”82 This at homeness 
highlights a level of ease and proficiency that accompanies a long-familiar acquaintance 
with something. Wittgenstein likens familiarity and at homeness to “the feeling of well-
being.”83 However, being in one’s actual home may not conjure feelings of well-being 
and ease for everyone. For many people, home is the site of discomfort, violence, and 
strategic rather than effortless behavior. The phrase “feeling at home” means and is used 
by Wittgenstein to indicate familiarity and well-being. Well-being, however, does not 
exclusively pertain to states of comfort and happiness; it pertains to the appropriateness 
of things, the way that things appear to be in their place, and a familiar way of taking to 
things.
 
Wittgenstein characterizes this at homeness as being an uninterpreted, unthinking, 
and unnoticeable way of seeing familiar things. He remarks, “No one will say that every 
time I enter my room, my long-familiar surroundings, there is enacted a recognition of all 
that I see and have seen hundreds of times before.”84 The feeling of being at home is one 
in which “as we should say, we do not think.”85 In another sense one could say that we do 
not respond or react to the impression of familiarity; we merely continue on with what we 
were doing. A form of life entails a more-or-less automatic way of behaving and 
Wittgenstein compares the effortlessness of performing daily tasks with the almost 
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passive way that something can strike one as familiar. For example, Wittgenstein remarks 
that it is not the case that one “ordinarily tries to move one’s mouth as one eats, or aims at 
moving it.”86 He points out that “While I’m writing, walking, eating, talking, gazing here 
and there (normally), I no more try to perform these actions than the face of an old friend 
‘strikes me as familiar.’”87 Here we see that one performs many everyday actions in an 
unthinking manner and that these actions are performed successfully. By stating that he 
does not “try to perform these actions,” Wittgenstein also intimates that without trying, 
he does not fail to perform these actions. The very performance of these actions means a 
successful performance; if I eat, I do not fail to eat. However, Wittgenstein also 
parenthetically remarks that these actions are perfunctory under normal conditions. While 
“normally” he walks and eats successfully without aiming at doing these things, 
Wittgenstein suggests that there are times when, abnormally, he does in fact try to do 
these things, and perhaps in his trying he actually fails. One could think of various 
examples when a person tries to do these basic things in a certain way and fails (trying to 
eat spaghetti without slurping, trying to walk on a wet floor without slipping). It is rare, 
however, to try to eat and fail to eat (this is not a matter of wanting to find food and not 
finding it). In other words, the rarity comes from the mental act of aiming at, as well as 
the possibility of failing. The types of conditions that turn walking, eating, and talking 
into tasks that require effort and thought are those that prevent these actions from being 
automatic, such as illness and injury. That is not to say that all illnesses and injuries, 
which complicate previously habitual ways of functioning in the world, lead to a 
disruption of a form of life. A form of life is infused in one’s habitual bodily acts, and 
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when a form of life is disrupted one’s ease of functioning is also disrupted. In depression, 
both a prereflective sense of familiarity with one’s surroundings and an automatic ease of 
functioning dissipate. The depressive does not feel at home in a form of life or in her own 
body. 
 
The disruption of a form of life 
 
Loss of ease 
The claim ‘depression disrupts a person’s form of life’ means that depression 
invades the most banal as well as the most profound aspects of one’s way of living. For 
the depressive, the disrupted form of life is often accompanied by a loss of basic 
functioning and deepens into a profound estrangement from life itself. It is important to 
keep in mind that while the effects of depression that garner the most attention relate to 
mental disturbances, depression is a malady that affects the entire body. The body cannot 
be isolated from a form of life and vice versa. 
Wittgenstein touches on two of the fundamental losses that occur in depression, 
although he does not formulate them as such: the loss of basic functioning and the loss of 
familiarity. The loss of functioning involves the physicality of depression. He writes, 
“Yet still I mustn’t forget that joy goes along with physical well-being, and sadness, or at 
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least depression, often with being physically out of sorts.”88 Being “physically out of 
sorts” in depression involves a wide array of somatic symptoms. Martha Manning 
describes the physicality of depression in her memoir. She writes, “Every inch of me 
aches. I can’t believe that a person can hurt this bad and still breathe.”89 Similarly, in 
Shoot the Damn Dog: a Memoir of Depression, Sally Brampton writes, “Why do they 
call it a ‘mental’ illness? The pain isn’t just in my head; it’s everywhere, but mainly at 
my throat and in my heart.”90 Depression not only affects how the body feels, it also 
impinges on what the body can accomplish. The depressive is unable to count on herself 
to perform simple everyday tasks. Her body no longer functions in a reliable and 
predictable way. The simple tasks of caring for oneself such as getting out of bed, 
showering, and talking prove to be challenging if not insurmountable for the depressive. 
Manning recounts her inability to perform these basic and life-sustaining acts in 
depression: “I can’t sleep. I can’t eat. I can’t read or talk or concentrate for more than 
several seconds.”91  Depressives describe this loss of functioning as ensuing from a 
paralyzing depletion of energy.  Brampton, for example, describes the arduous task of 
eating. She writes, “I must eat, I know, but it seems such a laborious process, to pick up 
the sandwich, to bite, to chew, to swallow.”92 William Styron describes the sudden loss of 
his ability to perform these perfunctory acts while he attended an award ceremony 
honoring his writing. He refers to his lost abilities in terms of a failure, a “failure to have 
an appetite for the grand plateau de fruits de mer placed before me, failure of even forced 
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laughter and, at last, virtually total failure of speech.”93 Here we see examples of 
depressives who aim at tasks that used to be automatic and fail to accomplish them. 
Unremarkable acts suddenly become remarkable in their broken form. In Manning’s 
words, “What was once so smooth, so automatic, is now forced and effortful and 
unpredictable.”94 
With regards to language specifically, depressives struggle with the mental and 
physical aspects of speech, reading, listening, and concentrating. Andrew Solomon 
recalls the frightening experience of being unable to talk: “I lay very still and thought 
about speaking, trying to figure out how to do it. I moved my tongue but there were no 
sounds. I had forgotten how to talk.”95 In Solomon’s description of his painstaking 
attempt and subsequent failure to speak, we must keep in mind the fact that linguistic 
disruption does not exclusively pertain to a cognitive failure. In his example of being 
unable to speak, we see Solomon’s loss of the sheer familiarity of feeling at home in his 
movements and abilities. The loss of language in depression is not limited to a loss of 
speech; depression affects a person’s ability to process meaning and language in all 
forms. John Bentley Mays speaks of his inability to read while depressed, “The words 
seemed to blur, or burn themselves painfully into the back of my eyes. I could write 
nothing, keep no notes in class, because I could not hear.”96 Sally Brampton describes the 
experience of words becoming nothing “more than patterns on a page.”97 Similarly, Kay 
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Redfield Jamison points out in An Unquiet Mind: a Memoir of Moods and Madness that 
one of her most distressing symptoms of depression was her sudden inability to read.
98
  
 
Defamiliarization  
Depression functions as a decontextualizing force. It dislodges meaning from its 
familiar environment. Depression disturbs the depressed individual’s relationship with 
the things and beings of her world. The journalist John Faulk details the sudden 
defamiliarization that occurred with his first experience of depression as a twelve year 
old boy: 
I recognized everything in my room, but at the same time it was foreign to 
me…my friendly cockatoo, was now just another bird. I knew he was mine. 
Intellectually I knew I owned him and that we had a history, but I no longer felt 
connected to him. Or any of the other crap in my room, living or otherwise. It was 
all somehow outside me. The intimate familiarity I had with everything the night 
before, the warm-blooded sense of belonging here, was gone. Feelings so ordinary 
that I never realized they could change were missing. I had become a stranger in 
my own room, like I had been banished into some nether land outside and was 
now looking back in on my life through a very thick window.
99
 
Faulk’s memory of depression as an adolescent captures the nuances of depressive 
decontextualization. For Faulk, everything appeared different, unfamiliar, and distant. His 
perception changed, but it was not primarily or exclusively an intellectual change. In fact, 
he begins the description of the experience by stating “I recognized everything” and 
“Intellectually I knew.” So what can account for the sudden flattening and exsanguination 
of his surroundings? What does it mean to recognize one’s familiar belongings, yet no 
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longer recognize them as being familiar? The form of unrecognizability for the 
depressive is a matter of no longer recognizing something as it had previously been 
recognized – as familiar and imbued with personal significance. As a depressed boy, 
Faulk lost a sense of history and belongingness with his environment. Such an 
unrecognizable thing, “living or otherwise,” is one that was previously meaningful and in 
depression is conspicuously lacking significance and emotional connection for the 
depressive. The familiar taking on an unrecognizable dimension occurs when the 
affective connection to the familiar is lost.  
The loss of familiarity for Faulk and other depressives can best be understood by 
Faulk’s expression, “I no longer felt connected.”  The significance of a loss of familiarity 
is the absence of feeling and the inability to ever feel at home. Here we see that meaning 
has as much to do with affective recognition as it does with intellectual recognition. As 
mentioned earlier, Wittgenstein describes the feeling of being at home as one in which 
“as we should say, we do not think.”100 The association of familiarity with a prereflective 
quality does not necessarily mean that the feeling of not being at home is one in which 
we do think. The feeling of not being at home is first and foremost a feeling of 
discomfort. In this case, unfamiliarity is not the contrary of familiarity. Something can be 
not unfamiliar and still not give an impression of familiarity. The shift in affective 
connectivity fosters a lack of agreement between the depressed person’s perception and 
the ways of perceiving embedded in a form of life. In addition, a psychological 
discontinuity develops between how a person sees things when she is depressed and how 
she saw things before depression, including how she perceived herself. In Kay Redfield 
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Jamison’s words, “Nothing once familiar to me was familiar.”101 The depressive’s 
perception of her environment no longer stands in agreement with the form of life in 
which she once felt at home. It is in the context of this mental homelessness, so to speak, 
that depressives lose meaning, speech wanes, and communication dwindles.  
The lack of agreement between the depressive and her form of life is neither the 
initial cause nor the reason for the continuation of depression; it is a symptom. Also, even 
if it were possible, a reversal of the lack of agreement would in no way end depression. In 
other words, a lack of agreement does not cause depression and the realignment of 
agreement would not resolve depression. Since the lack of agreement is only one among 
many symptoms of depression, a realignment of agreement could not, on its own, 
completely ameliorate all of the symptoms of depression. Depression disrupts the weave 
of life, no matter how it is woven. 
Depression does not have a unique claim on the disruption of a way of living. In 
fact, some people aim at disrupting life by intentionally causing a sense of dislocation 
and fostering a feeling of unfamiliarity through art or use of intoxicants. In these cases 
the effect is often transitory and uncanny. Individuals and groups of people can also 
undergo trauma, illness, violence, and war, experiences that can dislodge a deeply 
entrenched way of functioning in the world. However, not all losses, even significant 
losses, precipitate the disruption of a form of life. Even when everyday life is unraveled 
by the death of a loved one, the destruction of a home, or loss of a job, often a person still 
relies on familiar structures of meaning to cope with the loss. The places and things 
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around her are still familiar, although imbued with feelings of grief and sadness. In a case 
of bereavement, a kitchen chair can become more than a chair; it becomes a reminder of 
the person who used to sit there. The chair has taken on a new aspect, yet it has not lost 
its familiarity. It is no longer merely present and familiar; it is a marker of time and 
especially of a time past. For most people the death of a loved one does not lead to a 
disrupted form of life. That is not to say, however, that it does not utterly disrupt a 
person’s life and fill a person with a sense of meaningless and grief. While there are 
many situations in which the death of a loved does in fact lead to a disrupted form of life, 
it is simply not the case that it always, or even usually, does so. A person’s life can be 
deeply disrupted without disrupting his or her form of life. Not all life disruptions lead to 
estrangement from the familiar way of functioning within a life-form. 
Let’s consider two categories of disruptions and losses, the first type of 
disruption/loss (with all the pain and grief that it encompasses) does not lead to a 
disrupted form of life, and the second type of disruption/loss does lead to a disrupted 
form of life. I contend that severe depression belongs to the latter category; it necessarily 
leads to a disrupted life-form. Depression is not, however, the sole occupier of the second 
category and there are no static forms of loss in the first category that cannot possibly 
shift into the latter.  So in reference to the first category – losses that do not lead to a 
disrupted form of life – in these cases the objects surrounding the bereaved can take on 
new aspects while still remaining familiar. In depression, however, the objects 
surrounding the depressive lose their meaning and their familiarity without gaining any 
newly familiar significance. In the first category, objects can take on a new significance 
because the original familiarity has not been lost even though the circumstances have 
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changed (e.g. a loved one has died). For example, the chair in which the person now 
deceased typically sat used to be just an ordinary chair among other similar chairs that 
got dirty and scratched the floor. It is in light of these previous aspects that the chair takes 
on the new aspect; it becomes the chair that will never again be used by the deceased.  
 
Marginalization in a form of life 
The familiarity and feeling of being at home in one's form of life does not mean 
that one experiences the positive feelings one might associate with the feeling of being at 
home. Something can feel familiar and also feel wrong. People can feel uncomfortable 
and out of place in their form of life prior to its disruption in depression. In addition, 
depression can develop in an already disrupted form of life. Take for example refugees 
experiencing major depression after a civil war. In this case, depression can deepen and 
compound an already disturbed existence and would not be the initial or sole disruption 
of a person’s form of life. In addition, some depressives recall being depressed 
throughout their entire lives. In the case in which a person cannot remember a time when 
he or she was not severely depressed, then it would suffice to say that she never felt at 
home in a form of life. 
It is not the case that a person or group of people who do not feel at home in one 
form of life necessarily operate outside of any form of life. First, a form of life is not a 
consistent and coherently constructed schema; it is a way of living that often involves 
contradictions and ambiguities. Secondly, multifarious forms of life can overlap each 
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other. Wittgenstein gives an example of a group of people using coins in a seemingly 
meaningless exchange, which results in the shopkeepers accepting whatever coins the 
customers decide to give. While the normal observer might find the actions of these 
people to be nonsensical, Wittgenstein cautions, “And yet we don’t call everyone insane 
who acts similarly within the forms of our culture…”102 In this retort, Wittgenstein 
highlights the fact that some practices are simply accepted “within the forms of our 
culture,” while others are not. This example can be interpreted as indicating that there are 
heterogeneous meanings and practices happening within a form of life, as well as 
marginal forms of life operating within a more widespread form of life.  
In the essay “Forms of life: Mapping the rough ground,” Naomi Scheman 
addresses the misconception that the concept ‘form of life’ fails to account for social 
marginalization. While most interpretations of Wittgenstein paint a picture of a person 
securely at the center of a life-form, Scheman points out that many people who are 
“neither stranger nor native, who for the widest range of reasons, within and beyond their 
own choosing, live somewhere other than at the centers of the forms of life they 
inhabit.”103 Many of the people who inhabit the borders of a form of life face a threat of 
unintelligibility. Scheman uses the example from the film Torch Song Trilogy in which a 
mother and her gay son Arnold are in the cemetery visiting the graves of both Arnold’s 
father and Arnold’s lover. Arnold’s mother is “furious at what she (correctly) perceives 
as his sense of commonality in their losses.”104 Scheman points out that Arnold’s mother 
feels that she, a heterosexual, has the right to her grief and love and that ‘grief’ and ‘love’ 
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do not appropriately fit the context of a homosexual relationship. Even though both the 
mother and son share a form of life – for instance, they are both reciting a Jewish prayer 
for the deceased – the mother feels that only she is sanctioned (by God, the state, and 
society) to feel at home in this form of life. Arnold’s love is rendered unintelligible to his 
mother due to his sexual marginality.  
While social marginalization can trigger severe depression for some people, the 
unintelligibility that accompanies the disruption of a form of life is not the same as the 
unintelligibility associated with marginalization in a form of life. Depression 
defamiliarizes and desynchronizes an entire way of living. It does not affect only a few 
features; it disrupts language-use, sociality, temporalization, sense of self, and perception 
of one’s surroundings.105 Brampton explains, “You are, quite literally, broken down. To 
me it felt like the total disintegration of everything I had ever known about myself.”106 
“Disintegration” aptly describes the disruption of a form of life, in that one is no longer 
integrated into her familiar environment. Regardless of one’s sense of being at home in 
one’s form of life prior to depression, depression obscures the meanings and familiarity 
previously made possible by a form of life. While the mentally ill are generally 
marginalized in most cultures, the depressive experiences a marginalization that does not 
exclusively pertain to social positions and power structures. Depression damages the 
depressive’s ability to find the world around her, as well as herself, intelligible. 
Depression alienates the depressive from her social and natural environment by 
disordering her capacity to affectively engage with life. 
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Conclusion 
 
By looking at depression in terms of a disruption of form of life, one runs the risk 
of assessing depression only in terms of its deviation from normalcy and not seeing the 
experience in and of itself. In a remark on color-blindness, Wittgenstein addresses the 
problem of only understanding something in terms of what it is not:  “Someone who 
describes the ‘phenomena of colour-blindness’ describes only the ways in which the 
colour-blind person deviates from the normal, not his vision in general?”107 Unlike the 
color-blind person and the normally sighted person, who both typically retain their way 
of seeing color, most depressives experience what it is like to be depressed as well as 
what it is like not to be depressed. Also, the depressive assesses depression in terms of 
how it deviates from normalcy, whereas the color-blind person cannot make this 
assessment based only on the experience of being color-blind. John Bentley Mays 
describes his onset of mental illness as the breaking of “one’s fidelity to a set of social 
codes and behaviors defined as ‘normal’, ‘natural.’”108 Depression is marked by what one 
used to be able to do and feel and what one no longer can do or feel. In the “The 
Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life,” Matthew Ratcliffe describes 
depression as a “shift in the kinds of significant possibility that shape experience of self, 
other people, and the surrounding world.”109 He characterizes the depressive’s 
disconnection as an “invisible but impenetrable barrier.”110 This metaphor aptly depicts 
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the depressive’s loss of affective connectivity that normally undergirds a person’s 
relation to others, herself, time, and language as meaningful and familiar.  
The lack of affective connection to one’s previously familiar surroundings 
impacts the depressed person’s perception such as the perception of time as standing still, 
the impression that everything looks grey and removed, and the feeling that social 
interaction is threatening. In the next chapter I will look at the relationship between affect 
and perception and how this relationship plays out in depression. In addition, I will 
examine the depressive’s deviation from familiar modes of time and space. In the 
following chapters, I will further explore how the estrangement from a form of life 
unfolds in the depressed person’s relation to herself and other people, and how depression 
diminishes a person’s ability to find meaning. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
DEPRESSIVE PERCEPTION 
 
Introduction 
 
The view of depression as a disruption of a form of life forms the background for 
my account of the depressive’s estrangement from language, meaning, and herself. In 
spite of this background, however, I will not explicitly dwell on the concept ‘form of life’ 
in the next three chapters. In the remaining chapters I will look at specific phenomenal 
domains and how they are altered in depression. Many of the meaning structures that 
buttress a form of life are implicated in the depressive’s orientation to time, space, others, 
and oneself. In this chapter I look at depressive perception, temporality, and spatiality. In 
the next chapter I address the depressive’s agency, loss of self, and intersubjective 
relations. In the final chapter I focus on the depressive’s linguistic disturbances, which 
emerge from an affective disconnection from and disordering of meaning. While I refer 
to these phenomenological dimensions as differentiated domains (‘time,’ ‘space,’ 
‘intersubjectivity,’ etc.), it is important to keep in mind that they are interconnected with 
each other and interdependent with a form of life. These domains are divided for heuristic 
purposes and not because they are experientially and ontologically separable spheres. 
71 
 
This chapter focuses on the depressive’s altered perception of her surroundings, in 
particular her altered perception of time and space. The changes that take place in 
depression to perception, temporalization, and spatialization can be understood in terms 
of affective disengagement and affective disordering. Based on various descriptions, 
analyses, and reports from depressed individuals, we discover that in depression physical 
objects appear different, familiar spaces feel strange, and time itself seems to stand still. 
The distinctions that I highlight are based on the depressive’s articulation of the 
differences that occur between one’s perception while depressed and the ways in which 
perception typically functions outside of a depressive episode.   
In the first part of the chapter I look at how depression alters perception and what 
the status of altered perception is for the depressive. In this section I draw on the 
Wittgensteinian discussion of ‘seeing’ and ‘seeing-as,’ and introduce the idea of affective 
seeing to show how emotion can condition how one perceives. In the second part of the 
chapter I evaluate a depressive spatiality and use Merleau-Ponty’s idea of the spatiality of 
a phenomenal body as a template for understanding normal spatialization. In the third 
part of the chapter I evaluate depressive temporality as a desynchronization from 
ordinary, directed, and shared time. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the 
depressive’s relation to death and experience of being trapped in a living-death. 
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Seeing-through depression 
 
Depression and problems of perception 
Perception is on the front line of a person’s relation to the world. As Merleau-
Ponty notes, “All knowledge takes its place within the horizons opened up by 
perception.”111 A person’s involvement in the world is opened up through various forms 
of sensory perception that function as a unified and typically pre-reflective engagement 
with the world. Perception functions within and through a person’s habitual absorption of 
her environment. Perception is imbued with shared meanings and is a person’s primary 
means of entry into a meaningful world.  
The crux of the philosophical ‘problem of perception’ pertains to the subjective 
indistinguishability of illusions and hallucinations from veridical perception. In an 
illusion one mistakenly takes something, X, for something, Y, and in a hallucination one 
takes something to be X, when X does not exist. Depression, however, poses problems 
pertaining to perception that cannot be adequately characterized as illusions or 
hallucinations. In depression one’s perception is significantly altered by depressive affect 
and depressive withdrawal. While perception is altered in depression, depressives 
typically do not perceive something that doesn’t exist or chronically misperceive 
something as something else. The incomplete answer to the problem of depressive 
perception is to say that the changes take place in the depressive’s experience of her 
surroundings. However, I will show that it is not simply the case that the phenomenal 
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character of the depressive’s experiences changes. This section will address the 
depressive’s altered perception of her environment in terms of: a) its conceptual relation 
to and difference from illusion, and b) Wittgenstein’s distinction between ‘seeing’ and 
‘seeing-as.’ This investigation into depressive perception can help to illuminate problems 
with philosophical conceptualizations of perception by pointing out the heterogeneity in 
the functioning and functions of perception.  
In depression the quality of a thing appears to have changed and the change 
appears as if it is taking place in the object itself. Let us look at an example that involves 
the common impression that in depression the world looks cloudy. This example is not 
merely hypothetical; many depressives describe their surroundings as appearing duller 
and greyer.  Van den Berg had a depressed patient that “went so far as to buy stronger 
light bulbs because the light in his room had become less bright.”112 If a depressive can 
look at the sky and see grey when non-depressives look at the sky and see blue, should 
the depressive’s (mis)perception be characterized as an illusion? In the case of a visual 
illusion one sees X when in fact the object or quality is Y. The problem with designating 
van den Berg’s patient or other depressive’s perception as illusory is that altered visual 
perception in depression does not simply involve a visual error. A perceptual illusion in 
general occurs when certain environmental conditions and/or problems with the 
perceiver's physiology make an object appear to the viewer other than it is. For example, 
environmental conditions can cause a straight stick to appear crooked under water and 
near-sightedness can cause a person to take a stick for a snake. In some cases, a thing can 
remain illusory even if the person knows it to be otherwise. The discrepancy between 
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depressive and non-depressive perception, however, is not simply a matter of a visual 
confusion. 
Wittgenstein’s concepts of ‘seeing-as’ and ‘aspect-seeing’ can be helpful in the 
attempt to articulate the depressive’s altered way of seeing, especially in terms of how 
these concepts differ from depressive visual perception. Wittgenstein writes:  
‘Seeing the figure as…’ has something occult, something ungraspable about it. 
One would like to say: “Something has altered, and nothing has altered.”113  
 
At first glance, this particular description of ‘seeing-as’ appears congruent with the 
changes that take place in depressive perception. In a sense, depressive perception also 
has a hidden and abstruse quality about it. The depressive notices a change in her 
surroundings, yet she can also recognize the fact that nothing concrete has changed. 
Consider Faulk’s description: “I recognized everything in my room, but at the same time 
it was foreign to me.”114 Faulk experiences a discrepancy between what he knows to be 
the case and what he sees. He knows that nothing has changed and yet he perceives a 
difference.  If the room has not changed, then as Wittgenstein asks, “what is different: 
[his] impression? [his] point of view?”115 Can Faulk explain what the difference is? What 
does something look like when it no longer looks familiar? Would Faulk not describe his 
pet bird, for example, in the same way as before – with the same colors, shape, features, 
and so forth? Perhaps the difference could only be detected in his tone of voice or the 
lack of personal anecdotes.  
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While Faulk did perceive a difference, is it correct to say that Faulk saw his room 
as unfamiliar? Let’s consider the differences between Faulk’s perception and 
Wittgenstein’s analysis of Jastrow’s ‘duck-rabbit’ picture.116 In the case of the duck-
rabbit picture, one can actually see different images in the same picture – now a duck and 
now a rabbit. Wittgenstein calls this type of perception ‘aspect-seeing.’ In contrast, Faulk 
does not see different images; he takes to the visual field in a different manner. Another 
difference between Faulk’s perception and the duck-rabbit picture is that once someone 
has seen both the images of a duck and a rabbit, she can then go back-and-forth 
voluntarily between the two aspects. In contrast, Faulk cannot see his room as a familiar 
intimate space at one moment and later see it as foreign. In fact, one does not see Y as X; 
one simply sees X. That is, one does not see the familiar room as foreign; one simply 
sees the foreign room. ‘Seeing as’ typically pertains to the subject’s realization of 
veridical perception. For example, if when walking my dog I look down the street and 
take Pete for Joe, I am not consciously seeing Pete as Joe. It is not until I get close 
enough to Pete to recognize him, or something happens to bring the discrepancy to my 
attention, that I can realize that I saw Pete as Joe. ‘Seeing-as’ is usually not a 
phenomenon of immediate visual perception; it requires reflective thought. Though it's 
reasonable for Van den Berg to say that his patient sees his own room as less bright, the 
patient simply sees a dim room.  
Norman Malcolm maintains that not all seeing is ‘seeing-as’ and characterizes 
‘seeing’ in terms of prereflective sense-perception.117 Consider Wittgenstein’s example of 
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how we take to eating utensils. He comments that it would not make sense to say “Now I 
am seeing this as a knife and fork.” He continues, “One doesn't ‘take’ what one knows as 
the cutlery of a meal for cutlery; any more than one ordinarily tries to move one’s mouth 
as one eats, or aims at moving it.”118 In this example Wittgenstein shows that we do not 
see the thing as a fork; rather, we simply see a fork and use it. In contrast to the 
unreflective act of seeing a fork, ‘seeing-as’ refers to the ability to see the likeness of at 
least two things in the same image. Consider Anscombe’s example of the man who saw 
his father’s hat as a deer. One would not say during the act of seeing “I am seeing my 
dad’s hat as a deer.” In such a case, the person would no longer be referring to sense-
perception. “I am seeing my dad’s hat as a deer” is an expression based on one’s use of 
one’s imagination, not only one’s sight. Likewise, if a depressive says “I saw the world 
as grey,” she would say this typically after a depressive episode. 
The distinction being outlined between ‘seeing-as’ and ‘seeing’ in terms of an 
intellectual and unreflective perception respectively does not mean that all ‘seeing’ is 
therefore uninterpreted or that the “recognition of aspects [is] always self-conscious.”119 
In fact, some scholars read Wittgenstein as actually blurring the distinction between 
‘seeing-as’ and ‘seeing’ in order to draw attention to the aspect of visual perception that 
is conditioned by a way of seeing things as they are habitually seen, and yet not 
consciously apprehended as such. The cutlery example need not be interpreted as 
highlighting a consistent Wittgensteinian theory of the difference between the specific 
concepts ‘seeing’ and ‘seeing-as;’ instead one can take from the example the idea that 
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when one looks at a fork one does not first see an object and then see the object as a fork. 
While the fact that I see a fork depends on a habitual and learned way of seeing and using 
utensils, there is nevertheless a direct taking up of the fork through one’s perception. 
Regardless, of how one interprets Wittgenstein’s intention towards these two specific 
concepts, it would seem that most visual perception does in fact have mixed qualities of a 
particular way of seeing and an unreflective seeing.  
 
Seeing-through 
Returning to depressive visual perception specifically, it could be helpful to 
introduce a new term that not only speaks to the unreflective, habitual way of seeing, but 
that also speaks to the way that affect can condition and alter what one sees and how one 
sees it. I refer to this affective seeing as ‘seeing-through.’ By ‘seeing-through,’ I mean 
seeing through a particular lens; I do not mean seeing-through in terms of seeing-into or 
seeing-beyond. In 1790, the poet Anne Finch speaks to the idea of seeing-through 
melancholia: “Thro’ thy black Jaundice I all Objects see,/ As Dark, and Terrible as 
Thee.”120 The greyness of the sky, the darkness of objects, and the unfamiliarity of one’s 
surroundings reflect the depressive’s affective seeing. ‘Affective seeing,’ or ‘seeing-
through,’ differs from ‘aspect-seeing.’ The impression of a lack of familiarity is not the 
same as the dawning of an aspect. Unlike the example of the duck-rabbit picture, Faulk 
notices that something is missing, but not added.  
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In depressive visual perception there is often an absence of color, vibrancy, 
distinction, and light. The depressive fails to see details and features that give a “warm-
blooded sense of belonging.”121 Van den Berg interprets depressive perception as an 
expression of what it is to be depressed: “The patient is ill; this means that his world is ill, 
literally that his objects are ill.”122 Wittgenstein highlights the fact that in grief, a 
pervasive affective state, “the whole world looks grey” and not just the sky or this or that 
particular thing.
123
 The fact that Faulk’s room appears different to him does not mean that 
change takes place in a single visual image or collection of visual images; the change 
occurs in his lack of affective connection to the things of his world.  
In the essay “Depression, Depth, and the Imagination,” Jennifer Church provides 
a insightful phenomenological account of depression. She argues that a phenomenology 
of depression should provide an account of the “correspondence between what is being 
felt and what is being perceived.”124 While this task is similar to my own, I do take issue 
with the idea of ‘correspondence.’ The construction of the relation in terms of two 
separable spheres, “what is being felt and what is perceived,” gives a misleading picture 
of the relationship between perception and emotion. Church sets up the problem of affect 
and perception in terms of the “correspondence” between (the object(s) of) feeling and 
perception. The idea of ‘correspondence,’ echoed by G. Graham below, leads to a 
problematic way of understanding the structural and functional relationship of affect and 
perception. The use of ‘correspondence’ in this context is problematic for two reasons. 
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First, both Church and Graham use it to express the congruency between the quality of 
emotion and perception, even though there can also be a disjunction between the two. 
Second, the structural relationship of emotion and perception implied in ‘correspondence’ 
presumes a (phenomenological) distinction between the two.  Regarding the first concern, 
Graham uses Church’s example of an Ingmar Bergman character in Scenes from a 
Marriage to depict this congruency between emotion and perception:  
[Mrs. Jacobi’s] conscious Intentional states of depression, for example, were part 
of her experience of self and world – a self and world that had particular 
depressing qualities or objects for her and that, to use Church’s apt term, 
corresponded to her depressed mood or feelings.
125
   
 
While the depressive affect and objects of depressive perception can at times appear to 
take on the same qualities such as dull affect and the appearance of a dimly lit room, both 
Graham and Church overlook the disjunction that often occurs between the depressive 
affective state and her perceived surroundings. For example, pathological sadness does 
not always present with the appearance of a bleak and grey world.  Sally Brampton 
recounts her experience of going out in public and finding that the features of things were 
accentuated rather than dulled. She writes, “The people in the supermarket look strange, 
as if they have been recast into bigger proportions, painted in stronger colours…and noise 
is overwhelming.”126 She experienced the disjunction between her withdrawn, isolated, 
and silent way of being with the busyness and liveliness of her surroundings. She 
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experienced friction between her affective state and her impression of the world around 
her rather than experiencing a congruency between them. This friction primarily arises 
from an affective, rather than an intellectual, disjunction for the depressive. The 
depressive’s perception of the world as busy and lively, features at odds with her affective 
state, is experienced by the depressive as being threatening, invasive, and overwhelming. 
Due to the negative nature of the affective state, the depressive typically experiences the 
incongruency between her affective state and the perceived mood of her surroundings as 
being painful and unwanted. In Brampton’s case, the perceived liveliness of her 
surroundings painfully contrasts with the sadness and emptiness of her depressed state. 
The primary problem with the idea of a correspondence between affect and 
perception is the presumption of two distinct and separable acts. Both affect and 
perception are embodied, belong to the same organism, and operate in interconnected 
neural circuits. Merleau-Ponty notes that perception is “achieve[d] with our whole body 
all at once”127 and that it “brings together our sensory experiences into a single world.”128 
In everyday language, words like “feeling” and “sense” point to the blending of affect 
and perception. ‘Feelings’ can refer to bodily sensations, emotional states, or attitudes. 
‘Sense’ can be used to indicate both an inclination and sensory perception at the same 
time (e.g. “I sense a storm is coming”). Concepts like proprioception, egoreception, and 
exteroception – perception of our bodies, our feelings, and our surroundings respectively 
– are used to differentiate among perceptions based on the directedness of perception. 
Nevertheless, these spheres of sensation and perception do not occur in isolation. If a 
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branch pokes me in the eye, I immediately feel the sharp pain while at the same time I 
close and grab my eye, get angry, and think, “Where did that come from and how did I 
not see it?” Sensory-perception involves the bodily mechanisms through which we access 
the world and our place in it. Furthermore, how we act and react to stimuli and how we 
intellectually and physically process phenomena are essentially embedded in affect. 
Affect not only impacts how one sees something, it also participates in what one 
perceives and whether one perceives. For the depressive, her perception does not simply 
correspond to an emotional state; rather, she sees-through it.  
Perception is not monolithic in how it functions for non-depressed as well as 
depressed individuals. Perception need not be only one kind of mental state. In some 
cases perception can be mediated by a particular reflective interpretation and in other 
situations it is pre-reflectively direct. Some perception is heavily weighted by affect, 
whereas at times special training can help tone down the role of feeling in perception. In 
addition, the quality and intensity of sensory perception can change in different social 
contexts and can be experienced differently based on different forms of life. For example, 
sometimes when I look at the Royal Poinciana tree in my yard I might see it through my 
nostalgia for the first time I visited the Florida Keys. Other times, I look at the tree and 
simply perceive “tree greenly.” Yet frequently when I look at the tree I see it through my 
responsibility for fertilizing it and cleaning up the fallen twigs. As it is with perception in 
general, depressive perception is not monolithic and is impacted by feelings, concerns, 
habits, and so forth. The difference between depressive and non-depressive perception 
primarily lies with the quality and intensity of the affective dimension.  
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Attunement 
The meaning and meaningfulness of phenomena are always affected, or to appeal 
to Heidegger, they are always attuned. Heidegger’s conception of ‘attunement’ and 
‘mood’ provides a way for understanding the phenomenological interconnection of 
perception and affect. Attunement refers to one’s affective situatedness; how one is 
affectively tuned in to her environment. According to Heidegger, moods are not inner 
conditions that color an objectively given world and attunement does not manipulate 
what would be an otherwise pure perception of one’s surroundings. Both understanding 
and perception are always attuned. Even the “purest theōria” is not exempt from affective 
attunement.
129
 Attunement can be understood as an inconspicuous affective connection to 
our surroundings and the “background sense of belonging to a meaningful world.”130 
Attunement is a matter of being entangled in the world. It not only provides the 
background for one’s personal connection to her environment, it also provides the 
background for a social connection. Moods can have a social character and can be shared. 
Attunement is not solely a matter of seeing-through; it also involves seeing-with others. 
While the idea of meaningfulness is understood in an everyday way as referring to 
something significant and important – something valued – meaning does not exclusively 
pertain to phenomena experienced as positive. Both the presence of negative affective 
states (e.g. grief) and the absence of positive affective states (e.g. happiness) also 
compose the background for signification. Mood participates in how phenomena are 
experienced. For instance, Heidegger points to fear as a precursor to encountering things 
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in the world as threatening. Alternatively, in grief one might experience things as fleeting 
and fragile, and in anger one might encounter things as problematic and infuriating. How 
we treat, respond to, and encounter things is already intertwined with mood and affect. 
On the other hand, sometimes one’s encounter with things (as well as situations, people, 
ideas, etc.) can be an occasion to change one’s mood or to become aware of one’s mood. 
Heidegger notes that the ability for moods to “be spoiled and change” points to one’s 
being “always already in a mood.”131 Person A can feel energetic and content but when 
her car fails to start she might become immediately frustrated and overwhelmed by the 
thought of being late to work. It is also possible that if Person A is energetic and content 
that she will respond to the broken-down car in a measured way rather than feeling upset 
and worried.  
No simple formula such as circumstances + personal history + temperament + 
form of life + whom one is with + neurological functioning = perception can reflect or 
predict the way that perception, cognition, and affect are interrelated. For example, for 
some people an even-temper is cultivated through practice, meditation, therapy, etc. For 
other people an even-temper arises out of a habit of problem-solving and approaching 
circumstances in a reflective and rational way. Other people may simply have always felt 
even-tempered and easy going. Others might be even-tempered because of a 
philosophical and/or religious outlook: Person B might practice stoicism, Person C might 
focus on otherworldly and spiritual matters, and Person D might live by the motto “c'est 
la vie.” One can attempt to isolate and control certain conditions in order to determine 
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how a particular element might affect one’s perception. However, one cannot be certain 
of how Person A will experience a broken-down car, not even Person A. 
Despite the element of unpredictability and the heterogeneity of perception, I 
maintain that depression does constitute perception in particular ways. I claim that the 
phenomenal quality of depressives’ experiences differs from non-depressives. Also, I 
assert that depressives experience objects, people, temporality, etc. in this way and not in 
that way. What then is the constant in depressive perception that is evidently absent in 
non-depressive perception? The constants are affective disconnection and affective 
disordering. Affective disconnection is primarily defined negatively, in terms of loss. The 
affective character of depressive perception is not homogenous among depressives and is 
not consistent throughout a depressive episode. For example, a lack of affective 
connection can present as a loss of interest, passion, focus, and so forth. The second 
constant in depressive perception, affective disordering, appeals to the abnormal 
intensity, duration, and directedness of depressive emotions. Affective disordering is 
defined in terms of a qualification of emotions rather than the particular type of emotions. 
For instance, depression is primarily experienced as deep and inexplicable grief for some 
depressives and free-floating and irrepressible anger for others. The common element 
between these two is not the actual emotion but, possibly among other things, the 
abnormal intensity and duration of the emotion, an emotion that may or may not have an 
intentional object. 
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While one’s mood is usually inconspicuous, Ratcliffe points out that in depression 
mood becomes unavoidable and dominant.
132
 Depression, however, is not itself a mood; 
rather, it is a condition characterized by deep and unassailable changes of mood. One 
does not simply go in and out of major depression as one can go in and out of a bad 
mood. A major depressive episode can span many months and even years, and even when 
a person is in recovery from depression, traces of the symptoms and experience of 
depression linger. Depression should not be confused with everyday ways of being 
attuned; it is a pervasive and destructive disruption of everyday attunement. Rather than 
being the background for signification, the disordered emotions of depression rip apart 
everyday meaning. Unlike depressed feelings which can temporarily alter perception and 
signification, a depressive disorder substantially disrupts one’s way of living. In 
depression, who one is in the world changes and the world itself changes. As 
Wittgenstein remarks in the Tractatus, “The world of the happy man is a different one 
from that of the unhappy man.”133 For the depressive the world does not cooperate; it 
pushes back at every point.
134
 It pushes back in the form of inertia and the depressive’s 
inability to physically or mentally move about her environment with a sense of ease or 
familiarity. It pushes back in the form of sensory overload and the depressive’s 
experience of her environment as overwhelming and threatening. Firsthand accounts of 
depression often describe feelings of drowning, suffocation, heaviness, and slow 
movement, which invoke the sense that the world is pushing down on the depressive. 
Suffocation and drowning are not mere metaphors for the depressive; depressives feel 
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tightness and pain in their chest and are often unable to breathe deeply. In major 
depression, a person cannot simply feel okay with her condition, because unlike a mood 
that one knows will eventually pass, the depressive does not have the benefit of seeing a 
way out of depression.
135
 
There are fundamental differences between how the depressive and non-
depressive feel the world. In fact, it is often the absence of feeling in association with 
one’s environment that stands out to many depressives. As a loss of affective connection, 
depression is often experienced as fostering a sense of meaninglessness. For the 
depressive, “Everyday world-meaning is replaced by a radically altered relationship with 
the world, characterized by irrevocable alienation, despair, futility, guilt, and the like.”136 
The things and beings in the depressive’s environment can lose their significance and 
their context. The depressive can experience things, ideas, dreams, and people as 
meaningless. These elements of the depressive’s environment have lost their relevance 
and signification in relation to her form of life prior to its disruption. While affective 
disconnection relates to the removal of emotive features, affective disordering often 
imbues things with a negative signification that was not prevalent prior to the depressive 
episode. These elements are not completely devoid of meaning, but the meanings are 
radically altered and sundered from their previous contexts, which leads to a sense of 
meaninglessness for the depressive.  
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Spatiality 
 
Non-depressive and depressive spatialization  
Up to this point, I have made reference to the ‘surrounding world’ of the 
depressive, which refers to the depressive’s sense of the things and beings, including 
herself, in her perceptible surroundings. ‘Surrounding world’ largely pertains to the 
spatialization of the depressive. In general, space is already occupied and defined by my 
body and other people, and our situatedness among objects and places. One’s orientation 
to the spatiality of the surrounding world is in part a matter of one’s sense of distance 
from and nearness to others and objects. Spatialized perception that has the character of 
distance and nearness reflects a person’s pragmatic and affective place among the things 
and beings in the environment. We see, hear, and feel space as open, crowded, ordered, 
and natural. Spaces can be conquered, cleaned, and occupied. Wars have ignited over 
spaces. Spaces are divided, possessed, and hidden. Some spaces invoke fear, religious 
fervor, or hatred. We use spatial indicators to describe interpersonal relationships and the 
differences among beliefs, familial structures, social positions, and priorities. We talk of 
“personal spaces” and “comfort zones.” “Space” is also used to reference the unknown, 
infinite, the out-there of the sky and unseen galaxies. 
Like Merleau-Ponty, my interest is in lived space as it is inter-subjectively 
defined and structured. ‘Lived space’ refers to the phenomenal space of living sentient 
beings and is a “setting for co-existence.”137 Ultimately, spatiality is defined in terms of a 
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“double horizon of external and bodily space.”138 A person not only inhabits space, she 
also takes up space. Space is not simply out there; one is situated in space and space is 
defined in accordance with the phenomenal and ‘virtual body.’  Merleau-Ponty uses the 
idea of a ‘virtual body’ to denote the body’s horizon of possible actions. A person’s pre-
reflective sense of her body’s potential movements and limitations conditions her 
perception. Perception is a “way of giving form or structure to our environment” in terms 
of what we can and cannot do.
139
 The double horizon – the horizon of one’s environment 
and the horizon of one’s body – is unified in the virtual body. It is this unification brought 
together by the realm of possible actions and interactions that constitutes the spatiality of 
the body. 
While Merleau-Ponty focuses on the limitations and possibilities of the body’s 
situatedness in lived space, the body is not the sole constraint on spatialization. Space is 
also opened up and closed off by events, social attitudes, and material conditions, to 
name a few. In addition to sensory perception, health, and illness – on which Merleau-
Ponty focuses – the body also incorporates the normative constraints of possible actions 
and interactions. My environment is not only defined by me; it is shared. Perception is 
conditioned by the virtual other as well as the virtual body. One’s pre-reflective and 
conscious sense of the possible actions of the people around one also conditions one’s 
perception and spatiality.  
Lived space is composed of places. Places are imbued with social meaning and 
personal value. Places mark the unfolding of events and are understood in terms of where 
things have happened and will happen. In Being and Time, Heidegger presents the idea of 
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‘having a place’ as being interrelated with ‘having a use.’140 Similarly, Merleau-Ponty 
characterizes a phenomenal ‘place’ as it is “defined by its task and situation.”141 ‘Place’ 
signifies something more than location; it is situatedness within a person’s intimate 
world. ‘Having a place’ indicates a structure of use that is not merely objective. It is my 
place and their place. Placement is a matter of belonging, both ‘belonging to’ and 
‘belonging together with.’ According to this view, objects lose their place when they lose 
their utility. However, objects that fall into disrepair may lose their usefulness in their 
damaged state while still retaining their demand on a person and thus holding onto their 
place. For example, someone might send a television away for repair, but the credenza 
remains the place for the television. People, relationships, languages, ideas, dreams, and 
so forth can also become damaged, displaced, and be considered irrelevant from the 
perspective of particular individuals, communities, institutions, and cultural history. Yet 
places are created to house and protect, or confine and disregard, the un-useful. The 
culturally useless nevertheless make an ethical demand. As philosophers, I, along with 
many others, contend that we have an ethical imperative to ensure that people seen as un-
useful from the perspective of society maintain a place in public discourse and policy. 
Depressives feel the effects of social displacement and feeling useless. Depression is 
even statistically conceived in terms of the average work and financial loss of depressed 
workers. As I discuss the phenomenal experience of the depressive, it is important to 
keep in mind the role that social attitudes and material conditions play in limiting the 
horizon of possibilities for depressives, which I will attend to in the next chapter. 
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Depressive spatiality 
The depressive’s relation to her perceived environment changes in ways that are 
often devastating and painful. The altered spatialization of the depressive reflects and 
saturates the disrupted form of life and most closely connects with the depressive’s 
withdrawal from social relations. The force of affective withdrawal and affective disorder 
overpowers the habits of a form of life and fosters a sense of detachment. When the 
depressive becomes estranged from intersubjective relations, she finds herself distant 
from the objects of her environment.
142
 For both depressives and non-depressives, a 
person’s relationship with the things around her is complexly infused with meaning, and 
the relationship between the individual and the things of her world is immersed in social 
signification. How one relates to objects belongs to how one relates to other people, 
perceives others to relate to objects, and perceives others relate to her. How the 
depressive takes to objects is a symptom and expression of her depression. When a 
patient complains about the strange appearance of objects, van den Berg interprets it to 
mean that the patient lacks the “right contacts with people.”143 The relationship between 
depressive withdrawal from other people and depressive estrangement from things should 
not be seen as a causal relationship. Things do not appear changed to the depressive 
because one’s social relationships have changed; both one’s perception and social 
relationships are altered because depression changes the way one thinks, feels, perceives, 
sees, listens, and participates. For example, while depressed, Martha Manning forced 
herself to read to her daughter at night, and her feeling of disconnection with reading 
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reinforced the feeling of detachment from her daughter. In this case, both Manning’s 
relationship with books and her relationship with her daughter were caught up in a self-
perpetuating downward spiral of depressive withdrawal.  
The depressive’s spatiality vacillates among different patterns of spatial 
orientation. In particular, the depressive’s spatiality has characteristics common to the 
following patterns: 1. the shrinking of personal space, 2. the weight of space, 3. the 
unreality of the depressive’s surroundings, and 4. the sense of distance from one’s 
environment. These patterns are based on depressives’ descriptions of how they 
experience spatial relations and need not be temporally distinct. 
Depressives both describe their personal space as shrinking and seek to be 
situated in confined spaces. This dual movement of contraction can be seen in John 
Head’s description of his experience in depression: “I had the sense that my personal 
space in the world was getting smaller, collapsing in on me. I was a sort of black hole. I 
needed no space.”144 Both the horizon of external space and the horizon of his bodily 
existence were experienced as disappearing. He makes the stark observation and claim 
that he “needed no space.” Depression has so drastically limited his range of possible 
actions and interactions that his inert virtual body has rendered his phenomenal body 
non-existent. He no longer makes demands on the world and his sheer physical presence 
no longer even demands space. The metaphor he uses of a black hole aptly describes, 
albeit hyperbolically, the way that depression is experienced as collapsing lived space. 
The depressive feels life caving in on her and begins to operate in increasingly smaller 
spaces, both mentally and physically. Merleau-Ponty alludes to Cassirer’s description of 
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a patient for whom “life is enclosed in narrower limits, and, compared to the normal 
subject’s perceived world, it moves in smaller and more restricted circles.”145 These 
restricted circles apply to one’s body and the physical space that one inhabits, as well as 
one’s cognitive, emotional, social, and behavioral life. Sylvia Plath captures this sense of 
limited space with the image of a bell jar: “…wherever I sat – on the deck of a ship or at 
a street café in Paris or Bangkok – I would be sitting under the same glass bell jar, 
stewing in my own sour air.”146  
The depressive physically recreates the feeling of isolation by limiting her 
movement and by limiting her contact with the outside world. The depressive not only 
feels the space around her drawing up, she also seeks out confined physical spaces, 
consciously or otherwise. Depressives often restrict themselves to their rooms and beds 
without venturing outside. Also, some curl into fetal positions as if to become physically 
smaller. Many depressives eat away at the size of their bodies through slumped posture 
and weight loss. People who are considered to be functional depressives also report 
stealing away to places such as the back seats of cars in order to cope with the mental 
pain of forced externalization. 
The second pattern of spatialization involves the feeling of heaviness and weight. 
The pattern of heaviness points to the manner in which the depressive’s materiality in 
space takes on a burdensome quality. Depressives often describe a sense of having a 
“leaden heaviness” internal to their bodies.147 For example, Timothie Bright in A Treatise 
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of Melancholy (1586) depicts the heart of the melancholy person as being “overcome 
with inward heaviness.”148 Many depressives speak of feeling a weight bearing down on 
their limbs and chest from an undefined external pressure. Martha Manning characterizes 
depression as tripling the force of gravity, such that it “takes so much effort just to lift an 
arm or take a step.”149 Jeffrey Smith quotes Emily Dickinson’s reference to this sensation 
as the ‘Hour of Lead’: 
But all this lead is not merely imaginary: these metaphors grow straight from the 
body. The melancholic’s limbs feel weighted, blood and bone and muscle alike 
gone viscid with some invisible burden.
150
 
 
 
Despite the invisibility of the burden, the weight is experienced as quite real and palpable. 
The horizon of lived space is not only shrinking for the depressive, the depressive also 
finds that her ability to maintain her place in a shared, lived space has become 
burdensome. As the depressive’s possibilities become limited by depression, the 
depressive’s body becomes more conspicuous to her. She feels the weight of herself. She 
feels herself taking up space. Simply existing feels heavy.  
The third pattern of depressive spatiality involves the depressive’s environment 
taking on an air of unreality. Wittgenstein mentions many people have noticed this sense 
of unreality emerging before the onset of mental illness. He writes, “Everything seems 
somehow not real; but not as if one saw things unclear or blurred; everything looks quite 
as usual.”151 One can recognize that one’s surroundings have not changed and that one’s 
vision is clear; nevertheless, everything appears unreal. The look of the depressive’s 
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surroundings is dominated by the impression of unreality. While Wittgenstein notes that 
this impression sometimes precedes the onset of mental illness, depressives also refer to 
this sense of unreality as lingering throughout a depressive episode. Karen Armstrong 
describes her surroundings as taking on a “nightmarish unfamiliarity”152 in her personal 
account of depression. In the essay “One Cheer for Melancholy,” the writer Susanna 
Kaysen describes depression as a “trip to the country of nothingness.” She writes that in 
this country “reality loses its substance and becomes ghostly, transparent, 
unbelievable…depressed people feel they aren’t ‘there.’”153 ‘There’ refers to the space of 
shared reality, and the feeling of ‘not being there’ points to a recognition of one’s 
position outside of it.  
Depression erects a veil of unreality that creates a sense of distance, the fourth 
pattern of depressive spatiality. Unreality is experienced as a feeling of being out of place 
and being above or outside of oneself. Head explains: 
…there remained a sense of unreality about what was happening to me. Not that I 
imagined that the things transpiring in that office weren’t truly taking place. 
Rather, I felt I was outside of what was happening, at a vantage point from which 
I could look down at myself.
154
 
 
For Head it was as if he haunted places “instead of experiencing them.”155 The depressive 
loses touch with the things and beings in her environment, and lacks the wherewithal to 
take care of herself and care for the increasingly irrelevant things and beings of her 
world. Rather than being enveloped in a familiar nearness, the depressive’s affective 
disconnection creates a sense of distance between the depressive and the world.  
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The shrinking of one’s personal space, heaviness and unreality of one’s 
surroundings, and distanciation all point to a general sense of being out of place and not 
fitting. When a person no longer sees an object as her own (whether as a possession 
and/or responsibility), she no longer takes to it in a caring manner. She no longer cares 
for it, and thus fails to take care of it. Because depression attacks one’s ability to care, 
engage, and even need, one’s nearness to the objects of one’s world disintegrates and 
objects lose their usefulness. Books sit unread, desks collect dust, and assignments pile 
up. The structure of the relationships among ‘place,’ ‘utility,’ and ‘care’ do not 
fundamentally change in depression; what changes is the way the depressive takes to 
things. The depressed feels that neither the various things of her world, nor her own being 
in the world, have a ‘place.’ 
Utility and a loss of usefulness do not characterize the depressive’s dislocation in 
relation to all things, beings, and situations. Ratcliffe points out that “potential practical 
utility is not the only kind of significance that things have for us.”156 In particular, we 
relate to people and experiences as being significant in a variety of ways (e.g. as boring 
or threatening). Emotions open us up to many forms of signification, including negative 
ones (fear, grief, etc.). In some cases the depressive wants to be able to care for 
something or someone but is not able to because she experiences a collapse of the 
capacity to externalize and reach out.  For example, some depressives describe having an 
abiding sense of duty to a son or daughter, yet depression disabled them emotionally and 
physically to the point that they neglected their children. Regarding spatiality, it is also 
not the case that the things in the depressive’s environment uniformly lose their use and 
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place. In fact, depressives are often more drawn to some things during a depressive 
episode than they were drawn to those things prior to the onset of depression. Things can 
be suffused with a newfound sense of attachment and can function as instruments for 
coping with – and in some instances can become instruments for sustaining – the 
depressive cycle. In many of the memoirs on depression that I consider, writers speak of 
their dependence on particular items, such as a bed, alcohol, television, a bath tub, and so 
forth. Even in one’s recovery from depression these items are perceived as places of 
depression and depressive things. Some of the writers also mention that when they were 
not in the grasp of a depressive episode, if they noticed an intensification of their desire 
for these depressive things, they would interpret their turning towards the depressive 
thing as a signal that they were entering into another depressive episode.  
 
Temporality 
 
 
Non-depressive and depressive temporalization 
In the ordinary Western way of talking about time, we speak of having time, 
wanting time, wasting time, and losing time. We qualify time as too much, not enough, 
long, and slow. In other words, we see time in terms of when things happen and how long 
they last. Similar to the way that space is structured according to its usefulness and 
relevance to practices, temporality unfolds in its relation to events and activities. 
Everyday temporalization is a matter of participating in, planning, and remembering 
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activities and events in a given environment. Duration is measured in terms of the 
minutes, days, and years of a particular happening. Merleau-Ponty writes, “Time 
presupposes a view of time…It arises from my relation to things.”157 Merleau-Ponty 
privileges time as it is lived. He contends that one’s experience unfolds as a given unity, 
not as a series of discreet moments. He explains: 
The synthesis of horizons is essentially a temporal process, which means, not that 
it is subject to time, nor that it is passive in relation to time, nor that it has to 
prevail over time, but that it merges with the very movement whereby time 
passes…all these perspectives together form a single temporal wave…I am 
present to my present, to all the preceding past and to a future.
158
 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, time is a matter of one’s co-existence. Temporality pertains to one’s 
being present and things being present to one’s perception. Our perception has this 
unified character because we inhabit a lived world as it is conditioned by our bodily, 
affective, social, and practical involvement with it. One’s involvement in the world 
always depends on one’s intervolvement with a past and a future. Merleau-Ponty claims 
that what we do and the decisions we make reflect a commitment to the future and a 
directedness towards our existence in the future. Who I am is matter of who I am 
becoming. Merleau-Ponty’s focus on lived and embodied time allows for a prereflective 
being present to and within a world. Time is not simply consciously grasped; it is 
experienced by the body’s habitual movements and perceptions. Nevertheless, for 
Merleau-Ponty the body’s relation to what is presently given is always involved in the 
prereflective, as well as conscious, sense of possible actions and interactions; i.e. the 
future.  
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An everyday practical orientation to time encompasses a host of often incongruent 
value systems, which in spite of their disparities typically have at their core a concern for 
the temporality of happenings, actions, and events. The measurement of time depends on 
values as much as it does on the instruments of measurement. Values of temporality can 
be expressed ethically, politically, and ontologically. An ontological valuation might 
privilege the unity of time. A political orientation to time might focus on historicity, and 
an ethical understanding of time might center on futurity.  In the Deconstruction of Time, 
David Wood speaks to the interrelation of “temporal valuations” with “ways of thinking 
of and relating to time.”159 Time can be experienced in many different ways, and Wood 
points to the multiple pairs of contraries that make up the different kinds of time: 
“subjective/objective, existential/cosmic, qualitative/quantitative, time as 
experienced/time as measured, and so on.”160 These different kinds of time operate within 
different language games and have different rules of engagement. 
Ultimately, time is intersubjective. The everyday use of time points to the 
temporalization of a form of life. How one experiences and understands time is structured 
according to shared practices. Bourdieu addresses the “social structuring of temporality” 
as a form of social synchronicity and conformity.
161
 Social synchronicity begins, as 
Thomas Fuchs points out, at infancy and is manifested on a biological level.
162
 From the 
classroom to the church bell, from daylight savings to the eight hour work day, from 
primetime to tornado sirens, we are thoroughly enmeshed in social rhythms. Keeping 
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social order is, according to Bourdieu, “fundamentally a question of respecting rhythms, 
keeping pace, not falling out of line.”163 Nonconformity and social disorder are also 
characterized by temporal metaphors, such as marching to the beat of his own drum and 
being out of synch. However, the disruption of social rhythms is not confined to eccentric 
individuals; events can also have the effect of destabilizing social synchronicity. 
While for the most part people operate in and according to the modes of 
temporality expressed in and through a form of life, individuals and social groups can 
encounter various types of jarring experiences that derail the prevailing orientation to 
time. There are a variety of phenomena that have overlapping features with depressive 
desynchronization, particularly experiences that take a person out of her everyday 
participation with her environment. For instance, certain mystical experiences can be 
categorized by what Fuchs labels an “asynchrony.”164 Mystical asceticism and meditation 
interrupt normal ways of experiencing, sharing, and using time. However, the 
individual’s experience of a mystical “asynchrony” differs from depressive 
desynchronization. Some of the differences between the depressive’s experience of time 
standing still and mystical meditation are that the experience for the depressive is not 
sought after, and it is painful and cognitively limiting. In a mystical or transcendental 
experience a person can feel like she is outside of time and tapped into the infinite. In 
depression, however, the depressive feels trapped in the present. Mystical 
desynchronization is experienced as liberating, whereas depressive desynchronization is 
experienced as oppressive. Both experiences lead to a desynchronization of social time, 
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yet mystical temporality transcends and overcomes one’s entanglement in everyday ways 
of being tied down and affectively engaged in happenings. In contrast, the depressive 
does not achieve a sense of transcendence but finds herself confined to the present and 
unable to engage in lived time.  
 
Depressive temporality  
The changes to both temporality and spatiality in depression are interconnected 
with the depressive’s social estrangement and alienation from a form of life.165 As is the 
case with the depressive’s altered spatial orientation, the depressive’s temporalization can 
be interpreted according to a few dominant patterns. The alteration of the depressive’s 
temporality hinges on two key temporal elements: the passage of time and the 
directedness of time. This section will demonstrate how the depressed individual’s lack 
of engagement with her environment is echoed in the sense of time standing still and the 
impression that death is both ever-present and yet beyond one’s reach.  
 
Omnipresence of the present 
In Black Sun, Kristeva blends psychoanalytic theory, therapeutic practice, and 
poetic self-narrative in her examination of melancholia. She describes depressives as 
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having a “skewed sense” of time that is warped by a bloated and sorrow-filled present 
and cut off from the future. In Kristeva’s words, time 
…does not pass by, the before/after notion does not rule it, does not direct it from a 
past toward a goal. Massive, weighty, doubtless traumatic because laden with too 
much sorrow
166…a moment blocks the horizon of depressive temporality or rather 
removes any horizon, any perspective.
167
 
 
Kristeva paints a picture of the depressed individual being confined to the moment and 
not being directed towards a future. According to Kristeva, time does not move through 
the depressive because the depressive is overwhelmed by sorrow. Jeffrey Smith refers to 
this experience of constrained time in depression as an “endless loop of now.”168 For the 
depressive, the present moment can feel heavy and unyielding. The pain of depression 
repeats itself endlessly throughout the day, such that each moment feels like a repetition 
of the same. The affective life of the depressive constrains her sense of movement and 
becoming, and the present becomes affectively omnipresent. Sorrow disrupts the 
temporal horizons of having been and moving towards. The depressive moment is a time 
without change, movement, or relief; that is, a time without a future.  
Similar to Kristeva, Merleau-Ponty highlights the feeling of time as an unmovable 
present in his discussion of a young girl with hysterical symptoms. He writes, “For the 
patient, nothing further happens, nothing assumes meaning and form in life, or more 
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precisely there occurs only a recurrent and always identical ‘now.’”169 In this brief 
description, Merleau-Ponty touches on the collapse of both the past and the future into a 
present that lacks meaning. The mention of “nothing further happens” is an indication of 
life coming to a halt. The idea that “nothing assumes meaning and form” represents the 
disruption of the patient’s life as structured by a meaningful past. The depressive 
disengages from the practices that make spaces and things meaningful and relevant. To 
be depressed is to be functionally uninvited, never in the right place, never in the right 
time, and always off. Thomas Fuchs explains melancholia as a form of desynchronization 
that leads to the “break-down of coherence and resonance with his environment.”170 The 
depressive is out of synch with the temporality of the social environment and no longer 
answers to the same clock. Brampton describes losing the meaning of time and trying to 
“remember what ten in the morning means, how it feels.”171 In “Melancholy Man,” 
Samuel Butler writes, “His Sleeps and his Wakings are so much the same, that he knows 
not how to distinguish them.”172 Different times of day and days of the week are no 
longer broken down into activities or plans. There is no dinner time or weekend. There is 
no date night or me time. There is no time off or clocking in. For the depressive, time 
primarily becomes something to use up and get through. Yalom writes that for his 
patients, “‘Passing time’ became a conscious and serious proposition” and something to 
get “over with as painlessly as possible.”173  
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The depressive is no longer directed towards a horizon that gives meaning to the 
present moment. The weight of the moment, according to Kristeva removes “any 
perspective.”174 Blocked from the future, the depressed is cut off from meaningful 
repetition. While the past might provide the conditions for meaning, the future provides 
the possibility of relevance. Binswanger explains that when existence “‘is cut off from 
the future,’ the world in which it exists sinks into insignificance, loses its character of 
relevance, and becomes nonreferential.”175 For a person who is not directed towards the 
future, meaningfulness cannot take hold. While time is a precondition for a meaningful 
and intelligible world, the desynchronization of the depressive is not the cause of her 
estrangement from meaning. Depressive temporality unfolds along with and because of 
affective disordering and affective disconnection. 
How one measures and deals with duration shifts in a depressive episode. The 
depressive merely endures time, and the experience of depression is often unendurable. 
Fuchs characterizes the slowing down of temporal movement as a “time dilation,” and he 
says that depressives “estimate time intervals to be longer than the actual objectively 
measured time.”176 This time dilation can be seen in the descriptions that depressives give 
about how they experience the passage of time. Manning describes her experience of 
enduring her depressive days: “I never knew the days could stretch out so endlessly. 
Stretch so far I think they’ll break, but they only heave and sag. The weight of them bears 
down on me mercilessly.”177 In Brampton’s words, time moves “like treacle, running 
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thick and heavy through my days.”178 Even though many depressives have the experience 
of not being able to feel time moving along at a normal speed and cannot conceive of a 
time outside of the present pain, they nevertheless continue to have a sense of time. With 
the heavy knowledge of no end in sight, time becomes the enemy. Recognizing the 
unendurability of time in depression, Terrie Williams recalls thinking “Tomorrow? 
Tomorrow was a million years from now. I wasn’t going to make it to the next hour, 
forget about tomorrow!”179 Days “sag” in depression because time is no longer the 
staging of activities; rather, it is the unfolding expanse of mental pain and pain keeps one 
wedded to the present. 
In depression time appears to mirror the weariness of the depressive’s body. 
Deceleration of motor functioning commonly accompanies depression. For example, one 
woman recalled watching her depressed friend crossing a parking lot in such a slow 
manner that she wondered if her friend would ever make it to the other side. The 
temporality of the depressive becomes, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, “arrested in a bodily 
symptom.”180 In depression, the bodily symptoms take over one’s experience and inhibit 
one’s ability to experience anything other than the symptoms. Consider the feeling of 
burning your finger on the stove. At that moment nothing else matters. You are neither 
reflecting on the past nor planning for the future. You are caught in the immediate act of 
tending to the pain. Pain has the effect of stopping time and it can prevent one from 
moving around, socializing, and working. It can stifle one’s ability to concentrate, sleep, 
and eat. Pain can inhibit happiness and induce despair. Mental pain in depression also 
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functions in this way. In addition to being in pain, the depressive also lives with the 
feeling that somehow she is the source of her pain. Mental pain is directed at one’s self 
and one’s very existence in the world, which qualitatively deepens the inescapable 
presence of pain.  
In one sense, the depressive’s lack of futurity originates in an enervated 
imagination. The depressive appears to be unable to imagine a place or time free of 
debilitating mental pain and isolation. She is unable to think beyond the present moment 
and to transcend the pain through an ability to conceive of a future different from the 
present. In severe moments of major depression, the depressive’s consciousness and 
imagination become enslaved by affective disordering and affective disconnection. With 
affective disordering, negative emotions and mental pain can overwhelm the depressive’s 
ability to intellectually anticipate a future and can constrain the depressive’s prereflective 
and conscious sense of her possibilities. The depressive’s affective disconnection leads to 
resignation and an inability to commit to the future. Being cut off from the future is 
experienced as an inability to anticipate situations, make plans, and count on things to 
happen. The depressed individual becomes an unwitting skeptic for whom past empirical 
conditions are no longer sufficient grounds for securing the expectation of future 
repetition. While the depressive can remember a past before depression, at times the 
severity of the moment obstructs the depressive’s memory of a time before pain. It is not 
that the depressive doubts the possibility of a past or a future different from the present, 
but the severity of the depressive ‘now’ impedes the cognitive move towards a future, the 
move outward, and the move away from herself.     
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A living-death 
The depressive is often unable to be directed-towards-the-future. While at first 
glance not-being-directed-towards-a-future appears to have the same existential structure 
as being-directed-towards-death, a closer look at the depressive’s constrained temporality 
reveals that the depressive’s experience of not-being-directed-towards-a-future has a 
different phenomenal character from the experience of being-directed-towards-death for 
non-depressives. Also, being-directed-towards-death for non-depressives has a different 
relation to meaning than the depressive’s lack of futurity.  The anticipation of death for a 
non-depressive typically alters one’s sense of significance, relevance, and one’s 
perspective. For instance, the prospect of dying for some people heightens a sense of self 
and significance, whereas for others it obstructs meaning. Even for the person who is near 
death, it is not essential to her temporalization that the present moment blocks a sense of 
being directed towards. In the process of dying one can maintain a sense of being 
directed towards - towards others, towards a cause, towards a legacy, towards an 
afterlife, and even towards one’s own demise. Unlike a lack of futurity, death always 
looms in the future; it has no ‘now.’ From a psychological standpoint – as opposed to an 
ontological perspective – the impending loss of life is not necessarily bound up with a 
loss of futurity.  Being directed-towards-a-future is not merely a directedness of one’s 
self towards one’s own personal future. Being directed-towards-a-future is a way of 
being, an attitude, and an expression of one’s relatedness to others. People in the process 
of dying or in anticipation of death make all sorts of plans for a time that will occur after 
their death. One can even face one’s own demise with a sense of hope – a hope based in 
progeny, legacy, or faith, for example. If it is possible for one to face the end of one’s life 
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with hope, and if being-near-death can entail being directed towards a future, what 
makes depressive temporalization hopeless and what brings about the depressive’s loss of 
futurity?  
In part, the hopelessness of depressive temporalization stems from the 
depressive’s premature loss of self.181  According to Binswanger, in depression the world 
becomes “nonreferential,” and the person “no longer finds anything there from which and 
by which it could understand itself.”182 Another way to say that the world becomes 
nonreferential is to say that the world of the depressive loses its reference point. A loss of 
self is a loss of self-referentiality and a loss of agential vitality. Rollo May speaks to the 
idea of a lack of futurity as a missing axis for self-understanding: “Personality can be 
understood only as we see it on a trajectory toward its future; a man can understand 
himself only as he projects himself forward.”183 One’s orientation to one’s surroundings 
is mutually situated with one’s understanding of oneself, and a disrupted temporalization 
feeds the cycle of a disrupted form of life and a loss of self.  
The depressive’s lack of being-directed-towards-the-future fosters inertia and 
blocks hope for change. Kierkegaard’s melancholy aesthete in Either/Or describes the 
inertia that affects both one’s sense of time and one’s sense of self. He writes, “Time 
stands still, and I with it.”184 If time “stands still,” then time is nothing and nowhere, in 
which case I too have no place. The stillness and nothingness of the depressive is 
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characterized by Kristeva as a “living death.”185  The depressive lives a living-death and 
experiences life as though she were outside of it, watching her lifeless body moving 
among the living. A living-death is akin to the experience that Binswanger’s patient 
described as “being like a corpse among people.”186 This idea of a living-death haunts 
writings on melancholy throughout history. Hildegard of Bingen (ca. 1151-58 C.E.) 
claims that melancholy “neither completely kills nor fully empowers, just as happens to a 
prisoner who is neither killed nor set free.”187 Kristeva points out that in the Inferno the 
punishment of the melancholy godless sect is to have “no hope of death.”188 Similarly, 
Timothie Burton writes that people with melancholy “cannot dye, they will not live.”189 
Teresa of Avila describes melancholy as being even worse than death. She writes:  
…in the case of other illnesses it happens that either one is cured or one dies; with 
this illness, very seldom are the afflicted cured, nor do they die from it but they come 
to lose their minds completely…They suffer more than death...”190  
 
Death sits at the center of the depressive’s disrupted form of life, not as an end but as a 
way of living.  
A living-death gives the depressive, in Jamison’s words, a premature experience 
of “how it must be to be old, to be old and sick, to be dying; slow of mind.”191 Despite her 
rapid aging, the depressive, unlike the non-depressive, does not experience time as 
moving quickly. The depressive, unlike the aging non-depressive, does not function in 
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terms of how little time she has left. Aging and the prospect of death typically set up time 
as the enemy. The adversarial role between time and aging plays out in what is perceived 
to be (by non-depressives) the limited nature of time. Regarding a person who glimpses 
his own mortality, Camus writes: “He admits that he stands at a certain point on a curve 
that he acknowledges having to travel to its end. He belongs to time, and by the horror 
that seizes him, he recognizes his worst enemy.”192 Time is also the enemy of the 
depressive; however, this antagonism springs from the depressive’s sense of time’s 
expanse rather than its scarcity. 
 The depressive’s proximity to death is multidimensional and her experience of 
death functions in many different ways throughout the course of depression. The 
depressive lives in close relation to death and with an ever-present awareness of her 
finitude. She also lives with the relentless presence of the possibility of suicide. The 
depressive can live with the urgent desire for death, while nevertheless fearing her own 
longing for it. Galen (ca. 165 C.E.) points out that those afflicted with black bile (melaina 
chole) appear “quite bizarre” because they both “dread death and desire to die at the same 
time.”193 On one level, depressive withdrawal can be seen as the response to a profound 
fear of death. The depressed individual might withdraw from life in order to escape death 
(consciously and/or unconsciously). Karl Abraham claims that “Every neurotic state of 
depression…contains a tendency to deny life,”194 and to deny life is to deny the 
possibility of dying. From the perspective of the depressive experience, the consoling 
thought of death does not stem from a life-denying drive, self-hatred, or hatred of the 
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introjected other.
 
Rather, death is seen as relief from and an end to the living-death of 
depression.
195
 Manning explains: “I don’t want to die because I hate myself. I want to die 
because, on some level, I love myself enough to have compassion for this suffering and 
to want to see it end.”196 In Manning’s case, fear is directed towards life, not death. A 
living-death is fundamentally a prolonged separation from others and the feeling of not 
being at home in life. Karl Abraham recounted a suicidal manic-depressive patient who 
would often mumble to himself, “I do not belong to the world.”197 As Abraham noted, the 
patient “felt non-existent,” and the weight of this feeling can be more terrifying than the 
thought of not existing after death.
198
  
Although it might seem counter-intuitive, death can appear to the depressed as a 
resolution of isolation. Death resolves isolation not simply by putting an end to it; it can 
also be viewed as a form of being together with non-being. John Bentley Mays wrote in 
his journal that death would bring about a “union of unestranged reality,” whereas his life 
was dominated by an estrangement from reality.
199
 Similarly, Kristeva accounts for 
melancholy as a longing for non-being – a return to the womb, the chora – and a desire 
for undifferentiated oneness.
200
 Death can appear to the depressive as complete 
integration with the oceanic and a complete stasis. 
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The experience of a protracted closeness to and awareness of death is bound up 
with the depressive’s perception of time moving dreadfully slowly. Whether a depressive 
returns to a normal sense of time depends on the individual’s ability to recover from 
depression or the individual’s decision to put an end to time through suicide. At some 
point in a depressive episode, most depressives face the critical question of whether life is 
worth living. Describing the difference between his awareness of death before and during 
depression, William Styron writes: 
The difference now was in the sure understanding that tomorrow, when the pain 
descended once more, or the tomorrow after that – certainly on some not-too-distant 
tomorrow – I would be forced to judge that life was not worth living and thereby 
answer, for myself at least, the fundamental question of philosophy.
201
  
 
Styron alludes to the oft-quoted passage from the Myth of Sisyphus in which Camus 
expresses the urgency and significance of the problem of suicide.
202
 Although it might be 
a fundamental question of philosophy, to opt for or against suicide is not necessarily to 
give an answer to this question. Suicide is a way of making something happen and 
breaking the stalemate; it is an act against the power of time and an assertion of one’s 
attempt to control it. Yet, suicide is the “definitive act”203 that makes nothing happen for 
whoever chooses it. When the depressive reaches bedrock, so to speak, she faces the 
choice of how she will ultimately deal with time, which is simply another way of saying 
she faces the choice of how she will deal with life and death. Camus explains: “The mind, 
when it reaches its limits, must make a judgment and choose its conclusions. This is 
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where suicide and the reply stand.”204 In one sense, suicide is only able to answer the 
question of whether one can live now. With suicide the possibility of answering the 
question of whether life is worth living is foreclosed.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Depressive perception and desynchronization belong to an overall pattern of 
depressive withdrawal. Disengagement from practices, affective disconnection, and 
affective disordering are all intricately intertwined with the depressive’s experience and 
perception of her surroundings. The alterations that take place in depression, such as the 
feeling of the unreality of one’s physical space, the unfamiliarity of objects, and the lack 
of futurity are symptomatic of depressive disengagement. By looking at the expressions 
of depressed individuals’ experience of time, in particular the lack of futurity, one gains 
insight into the depressive’s diminished capacity to communicate and her loss of self. The 
depressive’s inability to be directed towards and to be together with is experienced and 
expressed as social, affective, cognitive, and biological withdrawal. Depressive isolation 
is not, however, an act of withdrawal; the depressive does not make a conscious choice to 
block out the shared reality of the community around her. A prolonged estrangement 
from the social and natural environment can lead the depressive to commit the ultimate 
act of separating herself entirely from the world by taking her life from it. The depressive 
can also fight depression. She can attempt to resist its grasp by avoiding certain 
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behaviors, ways of thinking, and social situations. Medication and psychotherapy are 
ways of countering depression.  
Depressive temporality centers on the present, but as depression persists the 
depressive can experience stages of depression. An individual does not experience 
depression as a consistent whole. One cannot slice open depression, as it were, and find 
that all of its features are identical through the duration of an episode. The depressive 
experiences a shift in her sense of self and also her sense of depression. While this 
chapter briefly touched on the intrapsychic and intersubjective nature of depressive 
spatialization and temporalization, in the next chapter I will investigate the depressive’s 
altered orientation to herself and other people. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
ALTERED SENSE OF SELF AND DISRUPTED RELATIONALITY 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on depressive agency, the depressive’s sense of self, 
personal identity, and social relationality.
205
 The symptoms of depression lead to a loss of 
self and social withdrawal, and function as a constraint on agency. In Part I of this 
chapter, “The Sense of Self and Depression,” I introduce the main philosophical concepts 
and problems that emerge with the ideas of agency and depression, and address the 
distinctions between non-pathological plurality and the fracturing of personal identity in 
depression. In this section I also address the intrapsychic perspective of the self in 
depression and how one’s sense of self in relation to depression changes throughout a 
depressive episode. In Part II, “Depression and Sociality,” I transition from the personal 
to the interpersonal perspective of the relational self in depression. The fact that the first 
section focuses on intrapsychic phenomena and the second on interpersonal relations 
does not reflect a metaphysical or psychological priority or division between an inner and 
outer ‘self.’ 
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Part I, “Sense of Self and Depression,” is divided into two sections: “Loss of Self” 
and “Depressive Identification.” In “Loss of Self” I offer a heuristically structured 
developmental model of the depressive’s ‘loss of self' and the emergence of an altered 
self. These stages reflect the depressive’s general developmental process of coping with 
her depressive identity. I contend that the developmental structure of the depressive self 
challenges prevailing philosophical and folk ideas about the self as unified, and argue that 
a theory of identity as multifarious can help clarify the relationship between depression 
and identity. The reader should not interpret the stages of development that I put forth in 
this chapter as either necessary or uniform in their duration, order of appearance, and 
experiential content. In addition, I conceive of the stages of depression as often 
overlapping. The stages that I call “Loss of Self” and “Depressive Identification” are not 
discrete psychological spheres. The depressive can experience one or more stage 
concurrently and an individual can stall at any developmental stage. The depressive’s 
ability to move through the various stages largely depends on the social environment in 
which she lives and whether she knows about and/or has access to therapeutic 
intervention. A depressed individual can experience many of the developmental stages 
discussed in this chapter without identifying herself as ‘depressed.’ However, once the 
depressive identifies her disordered experience as ‘severe depression,’ the depressive’s 
experience, as well as how she frames her experience, does change. While identification 
with the category ‘major depression’ necessarily alters one’s experience of depression, 
one’s experience of herself and her disorder can be altered by other means. Depending 
primarily on one’s social support systems, the depressive can come to see her 
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identification with depression (as ‘depression’) as having a deleterious or therapeutic 
effect on her ability to cope and recover.  
In the first stage, “Loss of Self,” I address the alterations to identity in depression, 
which begin with the depressive’s recognition that she no longer feels the same and 
develop into the acceptance that she no longer is the same. “Loss of Self” is further 
divided into the following phases: “Loss of Me,” “Intrapsychic Conflict,” “Depression 
Embodied,” and “Disrupted Cognitive Attachments.” “Loss of Me” addresses questions 
about the continuity and multiplicity of personal identity as it develops in and through 
depression, a process which directly impacts one’s sense of self and engagement in the 
world. “Intrapsychic Conflict” deals with the tension that emerges from the presence of 
new feelings, thoughts, and habits, along with the loss of familiar modes of being, acting, 
and perceiving. “Depression Embodied” concerns the physical alterations that accompany 
depression and the role of mental and somatic pain in the depressive’s sense of self. 
Finally, “Disrupted Cognitive Attachments” pertains to the general loss of interest in and 
connection to one’s values, and addresses the problem of moral motivation and altered 
cognitive commitments in depression. Bear in mind that the four phases of this stage are 
divided for heuristic purposes and are not based on temporal priority. 
I call the second stage “Depressive Identification.” In this stage, the depressive 
confronts the identification of her experience as ‘severe depression’ and can come to see 
depression as an integral part of who she is. “Depressive Identification” has two key 
patterns: “Identifying ‘Depression’” and “Identification with Depression.” While I 
previously mentioned that the order of the stages is not essential, one could say that the 
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pattern that I label “Identifying ‘Depression’” occurs temporally prior to “Identification 
with Depression.” Nevertheless, these two patterns emerge as two sides of the same 
developmental process in which the identification of depression provides both a name for 
and an explanation of the depressive’s experience. The section “Identifying 
‘Depression’” specifically addresses the process of identifying one’s depressive 
experience as ‘clinical depression’ and the ways in which a theory of ‘depression’ alters 
one’s depressive experience. “Identification with Depression” focuses on the individual’s 
assimilation of the depressive position into one’s sense of self.  
In Part Two, “Depression and Sociality,” I explore the relationality of the 
depressive in terms of withdrawal, and address the social and juridical structures of 
depression that often marginalize the depressive individual from her social environment. 
In the final part of this chapter I briefly look at the overlapping categories of race, sex, 
gender, and class and how they shape the interpretation, recognition, and embodiment of 
depression. While race, gender, sex, and class do not comprise an exhaustive list of the 
social identities that shape the experience of depression, they are the most frequently 
researched in what is a generally underdeveloped field of study – the social determinants 
of major depression.  
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Part One: Sense of self and depression 
 
Illness and identity 
The depressive condition impresses upon its sufferers questions about personal 
identity: “What has happened to me?” “Why can’t I do this anymore?” “Why am I no 
longer like I used to be?” In Shoot the Damn Dog, Sally Brampton asks, “Who are you 
when you are no longer who you are? What do you do with a self that is no longer your 
self?”206 These types of questions contribute to the common characterization of 
depression as an existential illness. However, depression is not unique in its existential 
content. David Karp, a professor of sociology at Boston College, describes depression, 
“like other life altering illnesses,” as being “characterized by critical turning points in 
identity.”207 The uniqueness of depression is not that it gives rise to existential 
quandaries, but that in depression the trauma is in and to the ‘self’ itself. 208 Depression 
attacks what it is to have agency and be a self. It limits one’s ability to function and act, 
understand and perceive, relate and respond to, and connect with oneself and one’s 
environment. Depression profoundly disrupts a person’s sense of self, sense of value, and 
sense of self-control. It can deeply dislodge one’s identifications with other people, with 
one’s occupation, with a previously valued skill or talent, and with a passion or drive. 
Disrupted identifications, along with a conglomerate of depressive symptoms, have the 
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effect of dismantling one’s sense of self. While one might argue that trauma in and to the 
self is a common feature of all mental illnesses, in depression (as opposed to psychosis, 
mania, and schizoid disorders) the person typically remains acutely aware of her 
alteration during the depressive episode and actively feels the loss of self. Similar to the 
way that a neurotoxin that can paralyze a person’s body without disrupting 
consciousness, in depression the individual usually can see and feel the changes taking 
place, yet feels impotent to change their course.  
Depression gives rise to questions about how depression is experienced at the 
level of the individual and how it should be conceptualized. Because depression affects 
the self, the lines between depression as an illness and depression as a form of identity 
can easily become blurred. In the essay “Prozac Americans: Depression, Identity, and 
Selfhood,” Abigail Cheever asks whether depression should be conceptualized in terms 
of an ‘illness’ or ‘identity.’ This question comes from her reading of William Styron’s 
memoir on depression and his description of depression as a debilitating illness. Cheever 
focuses on one metaphor that Styron uses after he publicly revealed his struggle with 
depression. Styron describes feeling as though he “helped unlock a closet from which 
many souls were eager to come out.”209 Cheever claims that the juxtaposition of the 
metaphor of “coming out of the closet” and the designation of depression as an ‘illness’ 
in Styron’s writing points to an ambiguity at the core of cultural ideas about depression. 
However, she misreads Styron’s metaphor as a comparison of depression to 
homosexuality. Styron does not liken depression to homosexuality itself; rather, he only 
borrows the metaphor of self-unveiling – coming out of the closet – to highlight the 
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experience of revealing culturally stigmatized and censored aspects of oneself. She then 
uses this mistakenly framed comparison between depression and homosexuality as a 
launching pad for claiming that Americans increasingly view depression as a category of 
identity.
210
 While she does correctly identify an uncertainty about the depressive 
experience, she misdiagnoses it as a contradiction in need of resolution. Cheever writes: 
Darkness Visible represents depression as simultaneously an illness and an 
identity; it is at once a disease – like cancer – foreign to the individual and 
invasive of the self, and a way of life – like homosexuality – both essential and 
constitutive of one’s being.211  
 
Cheever conceives of identity and illness in terms of an either/or and claims to diagnose 
Styron’s characterization of illness and identity as a both/and. This simplification 
overlooks the complexity of the interconnectedness of personal identity with depression.  
In the context of a conversation about the label “illness” assigned to depression, 
Andrew Solomon writes, “There is an apparent paradox here that points to existential 
questions about what constitutes the person and what constitute his afflictions.”212 While 
one might be able to theoretically distinguish the features that constitute identity from the 
features that constitute illness and treat these two sets of features separately, the 
depressive does not necessarily experience these features as distinct. In depression, 
symptoms change the scope and nature of agency. This illness-constrained agency often 
merges with one’s identity and sense of self. Generally the types of alterations that the 
body undergoes in illness (especially in severe illnesses) can dislodge certain ways of 
living. Illnesses, and injures for that matter, often force a person to adapt to new 
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conditions and adopt new habits. Illness can also prompt self-reflection and questioning, 
which lead to a reevaluation of beliefs, values, habits, and relationships. In this way, 
illness can be the occasion for reassessing and retooling one’s personal identity. Illnesses 
that specifically impair and alter mental functioning can directly impact features that 
seem to be at the core of personal identity, in particular personality, humor, taste, 
spirituality, memory, temperament, and motivation. Mental illnesses can induce 
immediate alterations of personal identity that are not mediated by personal reflection, 
choice, and/or pragmatic coping. As van den Berg remarks, “A person whose brain 
suffers is different himself…there is nothing, really, that is not changed.”213 Major 
depression changes who a person is. It affects how others perceive the depressive and 
how she views herself. Depression can change behavior, desires, and ways of thinking 
and it can also change how one relates to others and her environment. Depression can 
fundamentally alter – and undermine – one’s identifications and sense of self.  
Depressives typically speak of the alterations of personal identity that take place 
in depression in terms of a “loss of self” rather than a transformation of self. A 
transformation or alteration implies the emergence of something new; however, in a 
depressive episode depression is experienced as destruction and disruption – a going 
under without overcoming. Many depressives speak of their lives before depression as if 
they belonged to someone else. Writers of depression memoirs sometimes speak of their 
past selves in the third person, implying a discontinuity of one’s self before, during, and 
after depression. More often than not, however, the depressive maintains the “self” as 
grammatically continuous but psychically disconnected. The depressive’s disrupted sense 
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of self leads to a semantically complicated usage of ‘I’, ‘me’, and ‘self’. Take for 
example the claim “I no longer recognize myself.” Who is the I that becomes reflectively 
distinct from myself? Also if myself is no longer recognizable, from what agency does the 
act of recognition take place? The “I” in “I no longer recognize myself” suggests that I 
can both see myself now as unrecognizable and remember what I now recognize as 
having been myself. I am separated from both myself as it appears to me now and myself 
as I have understood myself to be in the past; yet there persists this ‘I’ capable of 
adjudicating between the recognizable and unfamiliar selves. The ‘I’ points to the 
persistence of some degree of agency, however tenuous, amid the experience of 
psychological discontinuity.  
The nature of this tension among the selves in and out of, and before and after 
depression is primarily a matter of affective disconnection and disordering. The idea that 
I can no longer recognize myself in depression does not point to a cognitive failure or a 
disruption of consciousness. In fact, it is in part the persistence of consciousness and 
memory that makes it possible for the depressive to recognize a loss. The depressive’s 
claim “I no longer recognize myself,” is akin to the fact that in depression I no longer 
perceive, feel, think about, and value things the way I used to.  
The depressive’s loss of self is fostered by and fosters desynchronization. 
Typically, the question “Who am I?” also involves the questions “Who was I?” and 
“Who can I be?” The question “Who can I be?” mostly depends on the parameters of 
possibility established in and through a form of life. Depression does not only limit 
possibilities, it also erects new ones. The depressive horizon is redefined in terms of 
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death, pain, loss, failure, loneliness, and fatigue. In an in-depth study of fifty people 
diagnosed with depression, Prof. Karp received a letter from one participant who gave the 
following description of depression: “Depression steals away whoever you were, 
prevents you from seeing who you might someday be, and replaces your life with a black 
hole.”214  Confronted with a new life, a different way of seeing, a different body, 
diminished agency, and a different future, the traditional existential question “Who am 
I?” can morph into “Is this me?” Kay Redfield Jamison asks, “Which of the me’s is 
me?”215 The depressive faces the seemingly impossible task of reconciling the depressive 
self with both the memory of herself prior to depression and an altered sense of 
possibility for her future. Due in part to the discontinuity with her past and the absence of 
a sense of moving towards the future, the depressive fails to see herself as being fully 
there.  
To overcome the false binarism that juxtaposes illness with identity, we need a 
theory of the self that allows for alterations, disruptions, loss, and change – a theory that 
does not pathologize multiplicity, yet one that recognizes that a plurality of selves can in 
fact be symptomatic of a pathological condition. While fractured identity accompanies 
major depression, it does not follow that every instance of fractured identity indicates 
some form of pathology. A plurality of identity can arise in different ways and often 
reflects a tension and discontinuity with regards to who one is at different points in time 
and also who one is among different social and natural environments. This inner-conflict 
is typically rooted in the lives of people who operate within conflicting forms of life 
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and/or in ways that conflict with one’s form of life. For example, Gloria Anzaldúa points 
to the mestiza as having a “dual or multiple personality” that “is plagued by psychic 
restlessness.”216 The mestiza has to negotiate between at least two different narratives of 
history, values, style, and self-worth, which can create competing images of who she sees 
herself to be. She straddles at least two worlds in which she can feel like two different 
people; meanwhile, she may never fully identify with either one. The general difference 
between pathological plurality and non-pathological plurality is that pathological 
plurality either belongs to a condition or is itself the condition that a) substantially 
interferes with a person’s ability to function, b) causes harm to oneself and/or others, and 
c) cannot be remedied simply through a change of environment alone.
217
 
Despite discontinuity and inner-struggle, whether pathological or not, a person 
typically refers to herself in the first person singular. For instance, I maintain the use of 
“I” and continue to refer to “myself.” Conflicting personalities and discontinuous 
identities are still embodied in my body, my memory, and belong to my agency. The 
Argentinean philosopher María Lugones affirms the complicated plurality of personal 
identity as it is constituted differently in different ‘worlds’ and addresses the persistence 
of the ‘first person.’ She writes: 
The experience is one of having memory of oneself as different without any 
underlying ‘I’…I say ‘That’s me in that ‘world’’ not because I recognize myself 
in that person. Rather that person may be very different from myself in this 
‘world’ and yet I can say without inference ‘That’s me.’ I may well recognize that 
that person has abilities that I do not have and yet the having or not having of the 
abilities is always an ‘I have…’ and ‘I do not have…,’ i.e., it is always 
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experienced in the first person.
218
  
 
The grammatical persistence of “I” and “myself” need not rely on a substantialist account 
of the self, but can emerge from a messy continuity made possible in part through 
memory, practices, and the body. The structure of experience as being in the first person 
does in fact underlie the disparate ways of being in different ‘worlds’ and of being more 
than one self. 
Even if one’s identity prior to depression is characterized by tension, confusion, 
and multiplicity, depression has a way of collapsing one’s identities into a singular loss. 
Depression does not, however, exclusively emerge in individuals either with or without a 
fragmented sense of self. For some people, depression disrupts a sense of self 
characterized by wholeness and continuity, whereas for others, depression disrupts an 
already fragmented sense of self. Regardless of the continuity of identity or lack thereof 
felt by a person prior to the onset of depression, neither the diversity nor homogeneity of 
personal identity can predict or defend against the disruption that a person experiences in 
depression. The structure of the loss of self and the various components of a disrupted 
form of life can be experienced potently by both a non-white lesbian immigrant and a 
middle-class white man living in the United States. Depression is disruptive of personal 
identity regardless of one’s prior identifications. 
In this chapter I propose that one can conceptualize a way of coping with a 
disrupted form of life in depression by looking to a theory of identity that embraces 
difference, development, and change, such as José Medina’s thesis of ‘the polyphony of 
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identity.’219 Rather than appealing to a model of identity that promotes “a very 
demanding ideal of unity and harmony,” Medina’s polyphonic model asserts that “the 
tensions, conflicts, and division’s in one’s identity are not necessarily pathological and 
can be fruitful and healthy aspects of the self.”220 It might at first appear contradictory 
that I would embrace a model that de-pathologizes intrapsychic conflict given that I am 
appealing to a non-reductive medical model of depression that views major depression as 
pathological. However, Medina criticizes the idea that intrapsychic conflict is 
intrinsically pathological, which is not the same as claiming that no psychological 
pathologies contribute to intrapsychic conflict. A disrupted and disharmonious form of 
life is not intrinsically psychologically destructive and does not necessarily emerge from 
or develop into pathological mental states. Inner-conflict and tension can in fact promote 
psychological well-being, and a fragmented identity can foster a habit of adaptability 
necessary for thriving in unstable environments. On the other hand, theories of identity 
that promote unity and harmony can actually threaten one’s ability to cope with and 
understand the losses and changes to one’s sense of self and identity. A theory of 
polyphonic identity provides the hermeneutic space for self-loss and the emergence of a 
changed sense of self.  
Part of the function of this chapter is to show that the problem of depression and 
identity need not be conceived in terms of an either/or. By showing that the depressive’s 
sense of self in depression has a developmental structure, one can see how illness and 
identity are neither static concepts nor contradictories. Despite my insistence on the 
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dissolution of both the binary of illness and identity and the conceptualization of selfhood 
as continuous, at times it might be therapeutically advantageous for the depressive to 
experience depression and identity as an ‘either/or.’ Likewise, it could be pragmatic for 
the depressive to ask: “Is this experience an expression of my identity or a symptom of an 
illness?” However, this is a question that should be asked in terms of therapeutic value, 
not ontological veracity. In other words, at certain stages of depression it might be 
therapeutically valuable for the depressive to interpret depression as an illness rather than 
an integral part of her personal identity. Likewise, an individual might at some point 
benefit from seeing depression as part of who she has become. However, the value of 
these approaches should be worked out in a clinical setting.  
 
Loss of Self 
In this section I will give an expanded account of the developmental stages of the 
depressed individual’s experience of herself in depression. I begin by looking at the 
depressive’s awareness of a loss of self and how she perceives and understands (or fails 
to understand) the changes taking place. I propose that a loss of self in depression issues 
from the loss of an affective connection with a form of life, as well as the emergence of 
unfamiliar patterns of behavior, thinking, and feeling. That the loss of self is necessarily 
interconnected with the disrupted form of life does not mean that I conceive of the self 
and form of life as identical.  
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It is important to note that not all depressives report this disjunction between a 
self prior to and in depression. In fact, for some people the realization that they suffer 
from depression helps explain certain aspects of their childhood, which are consistent 
with an ongoing depressive behavior rather than discrete depressive episodes. Other 
people report a combination of these experiences, having both a distinct image of their 
selves prior to depression and having the ability to still see various characteristics and 
experiences that occurred prior to an episode of severe depression that appear typical of a 
depressive disorder. In this section, I focus on depressives who report a loss of self in 
depression – which anecdotally appears to be the typical experience of depressives. 
 
Loss of ‘me’ 
After a quadruple bypass surgery and subsequent decent into depression, Larry 
McMurtry, a prolific fiction writer and author of the Pulitzer Prize winning Lonesome 
Dove emerged from surgery in a deep depression. He describes feeling that his self 
actually died on the operating table because of the depression that ensued after the 
surgery. McMurtry explains:  
From being a living person with a distinct personality I began to feel more or less 
like an outline of that person – and then even the outline began to fade, erased by 
what had happened inside. I felt as if I was vanishing – or more accurately, had 
vanished…the self that I had once been had lost its life.221 
 
If one retains the problematic view of identity as intrinsically unified, then McMurtry’s 
claim to have outlived his self would appear logically impossible. According to this view, 
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McMurtry’s claim could only be accounted for by an error in judgment. Yet even if we 
reject substantialist accounts of subjectivity and accept the polyphony thesis, how can we 
make sense of the experience of self-loss? After all, McMurtry does not speak of self 
discontinuity, fracturing, or transformation. He does not say that his old self died and a 
new self emerged; rather, he asserts “I felt as if I was vanishing.” Furthermore, a 
multiplicity of selves cannot guard against the feeling of self-loss. It is not as if a person 
accustomed to inner-diversity experiences self-loss in depression as just one lost self 
among many – all the me’s get lost in depression. Affective disconnection and affective 
disordering pervade all modes of being because depression threatens agency, not just a 
sense of self. 
One could attempt to circumvent the problematic nature of an assertion of self-
loss by denying the fact that the description of self-loss or self-death is in fact assertorial. 
One could categorize “self-loss” as a metaphorical expression, which necessarily lacks a 
truth condition. Similarly, one could say that the ‘self’ of ‘self-loss’ is a metonym of a 
conglomerate of discrete disruptions to one’s cognitive and affective capabilities. In this 
case, “self-loss” stands in for lost linguistic confidence, lost capabilities, lost 
relationships, lost convictions, and lost familiarity. In Silencing the Self: Women and 
Depression, Dana Jack Crowley makes the point that a “loss of self becomes a verbal 
shorthand that conveys a number of things.”222 However, depressives suggest that they 
have lost more than a collection of particular attributes. Also, the metaphorical style of 
speaking about a loss of self is an attempt to articulate a fundamental and real disjunction 
between the pre-depressive and depressive selves.  
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If we take the depressive’s statement of ‘loss of self’ literally and accept that she 
does in fact experience an actual loss of self, then how are we to account for this loss? 
McMurtry provides a possible clue in the connection he makes between “being a living 
person” with having a “distinct personality.” While ‘personality’ does not have as much 
metaphysical baggage as ‘the self,’ the substitution of ‘personality’ for ‘self’ does not 
dissolve the main philosophical problems. The use of ‘personality’ does give the 
impression of resolving the question of how one can maintain self-awareness: “I am 
aware that I have lost my personality” seems less problematic than “I am aware that I 
have lost my ‘self.’” ‘Personality’ appears to circumvent the problems of distinguishing 
between ‘I,’ ‘me,’ ‘myself,’ ‘self,’ ‘self-consciousness,’ and so forth. However, once we 
proceed to define ‘personality,’ account for its relation to the ‘I,’ and how it interconnects 
with self-consciousness, we discover that we really have not resolved any problems, only 
postponed them by shuffling them around.  
Depression threatens both the sense of self – how one experiences herself and her 
relation to the social and natural environment – and the sense of being a self – one’s 
agency in the world. In the first case, ‘loss of self’ is a statement that belongs to a self-
narrative. It is temporally situated in particular narratives through which one views her 
past and envisions her future. Depressives retain an image of the self that pre-existed 
depression and speak of missing their old self and longing for its return. One can find 
examples of this nostalgia for the pre-depressive self in the following accounts: Jeffery 
Smith writes: “My ‘me’ was gone, and I wanted it back.”223 In “The Case of Ellen West,” 
Binswanger describes Ellen as feeling “merely ‘how low she has sunk’…from that which 
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formerly she really was.”224 In The Deepest Blue, Dockett interviews a woman who 
describes the desire of wanting “to go back” to her life before depression. 225 It is 
important to understand that the loss of a sense of self in depression is felt as a real loss 
and that depressives grieve over their lost self. Sally Brampton writes, “I was lost and 
that loss was catastrophic.”226 Similarly, Kay Redfield Jamison expresses, “In my case, I 
had a horrible sense of loss for who I had been and where I had been.”227 ‘Loss of self’ is 
not simply a description of an inner state; it also pertains to damaged relationships. ‘Loss 
of self’ speaks to the depressive’s altered relationship with her surroundings.  
In the second form of self-loss, the ‘I’ itself is called into question. At times 
depressives describe self-loss as feeling like being in a vacuum, or famously a ‘bell 
jar,’228 in which one disinterestedly watches one’s movements in the world from a 
distance. As mentioned in Chapter 3, depression in this case is associated with a living-
death and nothingness. The ‘I’ is no longer desiring, hoping, thinking, feeling, and 
imagining. The ‘I’ is cognitively and affectively disconnected from itself, other people, 
and its surroundings. The ‘I’ is absorbed by physical and mental pain and rendered silent, 
inert, and withdrawn. Both manifestations of self-loss typically merge into a phase of 
intra-psychic conflict in which the depressive experiences the loss of self as being 
accompanied by the appearance of new and undesirable features. Depressives describe 
experiencing sudden, overwhelming feelings of grief, anger, and anxiety. Also, they 
recount situations in which they harm themselves or want to harm themselves. In these 
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instances the self is lost and replaced by an unfamiliar, terrifying force. In other words, 
the lost self is supplanted by an unfamiliar agency that often acts in defiance of one’s 
desires. In the Noonday Demon a young depressed woman named Laura speaks about this 
inner-conflict: “I miss the Laura who would have loved to put on her bathing suit and lie 
in the sun today…She has been plucked out of me by an evil witch and replaced by a 
horrid girl!”229 What these different types of experiences and feelings suggest is that a 
loss of self can feel like an absence, as well as the presence of a ‘foreign invader.’  
 
Intrapsychic Conflict 
Depressives often give fluctuating accounts of the origins of depression. At times 
the depressive describes it as descending from outside of herself and at other times as 
emerging from an agency within herself. Depressives have described the onset of 
depression as a ‘looming dark cloud in the horizon’ and an ‘evil welling up within one’s 
mind.’ Within a single depressive episode, the depressive can both identify with 
depression and see depression as an outside force. For example, Kay Jamison Redfield 
speaks to the ambiguous nature of the source of depression: “However lodged within my 
mind and soul the darkness became, it almost always seemed an outside force that was at 
war with my natural self.”230 The image of an “outside force” dwelling in her “mind and 
soul” reveals the contradiction of depression as both familiar and unfamiliar, and both 
external and internal to oneself.  
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In the essay, “My Symptoms, Myself: Reading Mental Illness Memoirs for 
Identity Assumptions,” Jennifer Radden addresses the contradictory ways depressive’s 
symptoms are depicted in depression memoirs. She asserts that some writers describe 
mental illness “as emanating from alien, sometimes diabolical, sources of agency outside 
the self, while in others, narrators ‘identify with’ their symptoms as closely as they do 
their other experiential states.”231 While she has touched upon an important dichotomy 
that often exists in the depressives’ understanding of the origination of depression, she 
makes two problematic assumptions about these differences: 1) she presumes, through 
omission, that they do not occur within a single individual, and 2) excludes the possibility 
that they can happen both retrospectively and in the episode itself.  Radden accounts for 
the depressives’ contradictory explanations of the source of their symptoms by appealing 
to the changes that take place in retrospection in the depressives’ recovery from 
depression. She claims:  
Retrospectively, the person restored to his earlier personality and agent patterns, 
or something close to them, often regards the changes wrought in him during a 
past manic or depressed episode not simply as unsought, unwelcome, and 
unnatural but as alien.
232
 
 
While Radden explains the apparent narrative conflicts and contradictions by appealing 
to the passage of time and retrospective framing of one’s experiences, it is my view that 
this conflict emerges as an active tension with the depressive episode. The depressive 
lives the conflict. She is pulled between the poles of identification and disidentification 
with depression. Depression is both herself and not herself. One way of understanding the 
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distinction that I am drawing between Radden’s view and my own is by appealing to 
Wood’s conceptualization of ‘pluridimensionality.’233 According to Wood, because 
identity and experience are multidimensional, conflicting terms and conditions can be co-
present within a single person. It is not conceptually problematic for the depressive to 
simultaneously experience depression as both emanating from an “alien” source and 
emerging from within herself. A view of selfhood as pluridimensional reveals the 
multiple levels of experience and explanations, which does not, however, relieve the 
feeling of inner-conflict.  
In the discussion on the variations found in first person accounts of depression’s 
origins, it is important to keep in mind the status that these descriptions have for the 
depressive. Depressives frequently use the rather unclear concept ‘sense’ to refer to their 
disposition towards an experience. They speak of a sense of loss, a sense of a foreign 
presence, a sense of time standing still, etc. This use of ‘sense’ should not be mistaken 
with ‘explanation’ or even ‘interpretation.’ Sense pertains to an affect laden impression 
that coalesces into an imprecise thought. While sense contains cognitive as well as 
affective elements, it represents something less well-defined than an explanation. That is 
not to say that interpretation and explanation are not at play in the depressive’s use of 
‘sense,’ nevertheless, sense is vaguer than the beliefs and opinions operative in an 
interpretative framework. Despite the vagueness of sense, it is experienced as a strong 
and pervasive hybridization of both feelings and impressions. Depressives describe the 
sense that unfamiliar emotions and thoughts are arising from nowhere in particular and 
simply emerging from somewhere out there. It is at this stage that the depressive feels as 
                                                 
233
 See: Wood, 2001 
135 
 
though depression originates from a foreign agent. I emphasize feeling and sense here 
because the depressive does not assert or even believe that her distress comes from an 
external agent, rather she feels as though it does.  
Even though contemporary Western theories of depression tend to avoid a 
spiritualized explanation of depression, depression has historically been linked with 
demon possession. It appears to be the case that this sense of being possessed has 
outlived its spiritual explanation and persists in present-day accounts of depression. The 
depressive can still feel possessed and yet not have a way to account for the agency (e.g. 
demonic agency) responsible for the feeling of possession. The depressive’s sense of 
being taken over by an alien presence is a feeling largely related to losing control, which 
contributes to the overall feeling of self-dispossession. This feeling of being invaded or 
possessed often arises during the depressive’s bouts of uncontrollable crying and rage, 
and can also manifest itself in the sudden appearance of the desire to harm oneself. The 
depressive feels as though these unwelcome and unfamiliar feelings are from an alien 
source, although the depressive does not ascribe the feelings to the presence of an actual 
alien. That is not to say that the sense of an unfamiliar agency in depression points to a 
purely metaphorical dimension. The depressive can actually feel something akin to 
demon possession and mind control, yet never come to the conclusion that a foreign 
agent has literally invaded her mind. The loss of control and sense of unfamiliar agency 
in depression should not be confused with mental disorders involving psychosis and 
delusional states. For example, ‘thought-insertion’ in schizophrenia refers to the 
attribution of thoughts to someone else: “Persons who experience inserted 
thoughts…believe that another person’s or agent’s thoughts somehow have been inserted 
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or engendered into their mind or stream of consciousness.”234 The difference here lies in 
the individual’s mental disposition towards the experience; the person suffering from 
schizophrenia believes that the thoughts of a foreign agent are actually lodged in her own 
thoughts, whereas the depressive feels as though an external force has taken control of 
her mind.
235
  
In the essay “Corporealized and Disembodied Minds,” Thomas Fuchs contrasts 
schizophrenia with depression on this point of agential confusion and also contrasts the 
phenomenal character of the body in schizophrenia and depression. Fuchs argues that 
schizophrenia takes the pathological form of “disembodiment” while depression is a 
disorder of “corporealization.”236 The individual with schizophrenia, he contends, 
experiences a breakdown between the agencies of the self and others, and fails to locate 
the sources of her own movements, sensations, and thoughts. In contrast, the depressive 
primarily experiences an oppressive embodiment, in as much as her body becomes an 
obstacle that interferes with her ability to act and interact with her environment. Fuchs 
notes that only in “extreme cases” does the depressive experience a detachment from her 
own body and agency. He argues that depressive disembodiment (what is akin to what I 
am calling ‘depressive dis-possession’) is the exception to the rule of depressive 
corporealization and schizoid disembodiment. However, in the sampling of narratives and 
firsthand accounts of depression that I have used, the disembodied experience of the 
depressive and sense of an alien agency are actually common among cases of severe 
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depression. While it is not evident in firsthand accounts, the stage of ‘depressive 
dispossession’ might be shown to be more prevalent when the depressive is being treated 
with antidepressant medication. One could imagine that antidepressant medication’s 
effective relief of somatic symptoms might also lessen the constraining force of the body 
on agency, which creates a sense of detachment from one’s body. 
At this point it is important to distinguish between two forms of depressive 
dispossession, (both of which are distinct from the loss of self discussed in the first part 
of this section). On one side, the depressive feels the presence of an alien agency, and the 
other side the depressive feels a detachment from her own agency and body. The first 
form of dispossession is characterized as an active and violent conflict, while the second 
resembles a passive, detached observation. In the introduction to Black Sun: Depression 
and Melancholia, Kristeva poetically depicts what I refer to as the first form of 
depressive dispossession. She describes the suffering and alienation rife in depression as 
emerging from an alien agency. In her description of the unknown origins of depression, 
she rhetorically asks, “Where does this black sun come from? Out of what eerie galaxy 
do its invisible, lethargic rays reach me, pinning me down to the ground, to my bed, 
compelling me to silence, to renunciation?”237 The “black sun” in this passage represents 
both the darkness and raging fire endemic to depression and illustrates the simultaneity of 
loss and possession, i.e. dispossession. Kristeva characterizes depression as unearthly and 
emanating from an “eerie galaxy,” which suggests an entirely alien origination and an 
unknown life-form that disrupts one’s familiar form of life. While a form of life 
represents familiarity, order, meaningfulness, collaborative action, and norms of 
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sociability, depression incites confusion, anxiety, fear, meaninglessness, loss, alienation, 
disordered moods, and speechlessness. The depressive does not feel that such alarming 
unfamiliarity and profound negativity can emerge from within oneself. 
As depression progresses, the unidirectionality of self-loss develops into inner-
multiplicity and conflict. Despite the fact that depression is clinically characterized as 
unipolar – in contrast to the bipolarity of manic and depressive states of bipolar disorder 
– depression is quite conflictual in nature. While depressive people are often depicted as 
dormant and docile in their sadness, the outward appearance of a tired and haggard 
recluse conceals the mental torment and struggle the depressive experiences. In contrast 
to the outward appearance of passivity, depressives frequently use the imagery of war, 
conflict, and fire to describe their experience. Depressives portray depression as a battle 
waged in one’s mind, in one’s body, and even between one’s mind and body. For 
example, Jamison describes her illness as a “war that I waged against myself.”238 This 
imagery of strife and internal conflict speaks to the depressive’s resistance to and fear of 
depression. Solomon describes the confusing way that both the depressive self and non-
depressive self can operate within oneself and struggle against each other:  
Every morning starts off with that breathless uncertainty about who I am…It’s as 
if my self turned around and spit at me and said, don’t push it, don’t count on me 
for much…But then who is it who resists the madness or is pained by it? Who is it 
who is spit at?”239  
 
The depressive can come to see the depression as a part of her own agency and yet still 
see this depressive power as an oppressive and unyielding source of mental pain and 
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suffering. Karp describes this struggle in terms of his mind being pitted against his body: 
“As I saw it, my mind made a choice each day about how to torment my body.”240 Even 
for the people who express having periods of remission and relief from depression 
continue to characterize the intrapsychic conflict as an unwinnable battle. For example, 
Brampton writes, “All I know was that I had fought my head for a year, and I had 
lost.”241  
Many depressives use expressions such as “losing my mind,” “going over the 
edge,” and/or “slipping into madness.” The verb tense of these expressions indicates a 
present and ongoing action, unlike the previously addressed ‘loss of self,’ which speaks 
to the feeling of self-loss as a completed action. While the substantives “mind,” “edge,” 
and “madness” denote a break with normal mental functioning and familiar emotional 
patterns, the expressions “going over the edge” or “losing one’s mind” should not be 
conceived exclusively or primarily in terms of cognition. An inexplicable and sudden 
onslaught of emotions such as deep grief or penetrating anger contributes and belongs to 
the depressive’s sense of losing her mind. While some types of depression present with 
psychotic features according to the DSM-IV, the DSM-IV does not note the fact that even 
the severely depressed who are not clinically characterized by the presence of psychotic 
features often experience this slippage into madness. 
 It should come as no surprise that the disruption of a form of life accompanies 
and contributes to the feeling of ‘losing one’s mind.’ One could say that “to be at odds 
with one’s form of life is to feel mad, and to be at odds with other people’s form of life is 
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to be labeled ‘mad.’” Consider the similarity between the orienting function that a parent 
and a form of life play. The mother (parent or guardian) serves as the primary liaison 
between the infant and the world. In most scenarios the guardian protects the child from 
the chaos of a not-yet ordered and not-yet familiar world. A form of life serves a similar 
function; it guides, familiarizes, and orders the happenings and surroundings of everyday 
living. If a mother walks down a street holding her child’s hand and the child becomes 
separated from her, within a matter of seconds the child will begin to panic. Similar to the 
lost child, when the depressive is stripped of the familiarity of a way of living she finds 
herself out of synch, utterly aware of danger, fearful of her environment, wildly sad, 
panicky, unable to communicate, and unable to discern meaningful sounds – in other 
words, slipping into madness. A form of life, like the guardian, does not represent bliss 
and satiation of all desires. Just as an infant frequently screams in the arms of her 
caregiver, an individual securely operating in a form of life will still experience pain, 
confusion, doubt, unfulfilled desires, and bad moods. The mother and the form of life are 
forms of protection and order, but not always successful at preventing or mitigating 
problems. Regardless of the imperfections inherent in the organic nature of the form of 
life, a sudden loss or radical disruption of the form of life, especially a disruption that 
occurs without a discernible cause as it does with endogenous depression, can create the 
feeling of madness. 
Depression does not always present as a raging fire and tumultuous battle. In the 
second form of depressive dispossession, the depressive’s experience of herself and her 
environment is characterized by disconnection and detachment. The conflict at the heart 
of disconnection is that the depressive can feel separate from herself like a disinterested 
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observer, there but not there. Depressive disconnection is expressed in some depressive’s 
inability to remember events that took place during depression. This experience of 
separation differs from the feelings associated with self-loss. The sensation of 
disconnection typically expresses itself in terms of disinterestedness rather than grief. 
Depressives can even appear to other people as being functional all the while feeling 
profoundly disconnected from themselves and their world. This affective disconnection 
can pose a greater danger to the depressive than palpable inner-conflict. In moments of 
self-separation, the depressive often calmly and quietly engages in self-destructive 
behaviors. For example, Styron recounts watching himself with “mingled terror and 
fascination” as he made the necessary plans to commit suicide. 242 He describes this 
experience in terms of being “accompanied by a second self.” This idea of a “second 
self” should not be confused with Anzaldúa’s discussion of multiple personalities or even 
the idea of a foreign agency that I alluded to earlier. What Styron and others refer to with 
the image of a “second self” is a feeling of separation between consciousness and agency. 
The “second self” is phenomenologically closer to what people call “out of body 
experiences” than multiple personalities. John Head describes this feeling of 
disconnection in terms of a haunting: “I haunted places I went, instead of experiencing 
them. I was there, but I wasn’t there.”243 The poet Chase Twichell speaks of the 
experience of being “slightly behind myself, like a shadow, a sensation I used to call ‘the 
eyes behind the eyes.’”244 Sally Brampton describes feeling like she was part of a scene 
from a play. She writes, “I could not say that I was even engaged enough to be watching 
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it.”245 The tension at this stage of depression is not expressed in terms of competing 
desires, goals, comfort levels, personalities, habits, and the like; the friction occurs 
between the depressive’s functioning in the world and how she consciously apprehends 
it. Despite the disembodied experience of this stage of depression, in the next section I 
will discuss how depression remains a deeply physical disorder with diverse somatic 
symptoms 
 
Depression Embodied 
Depression not only changes one’s sense of self, it also changes the body. More 
precisely, depression is a change within the body that directly impinges on the self. What 
might be taken as overtly psychological or overtly physical symptoms and/or causes are 
far less distinguishable than they might appear. The DSM-IV speaks to the fact that the 
label “mental disorder” can misleadingly imply the absence of a physical dimension to 
the disorder:  
…the term mental disorder unfortunately implies a distinction between ‘mental’ 
disorders and ‘physical’ disorders that is a reductionistic anachronism of 
mind/body dualism. A compelling literature documents that there is much 
‘physical’ in ‘mental disorders’ and much ‘mental’ in ‘physical disorders.’246  
 
While it remains unclear whether exclusively physiological events can cause severe 
depression, or whether primarily psychological alterations can trigger the physiological 
changes endemic to depression – or some combination of the two – it is widely held that 
depression is both deeply physiological and psychological in both its symptomatology 
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and progression. Writing about depression, Walter Glannon asserts that the “mental and 
the physical are not independent categories, but two interdependent aspects of one 
biological system of a human organism interacting with the environment.”247 The 
neurological changes to the limbic system that occur in depression, for instance, are 
projected throughout the body and affect emotions, libido, memory, appetite, sensory 
perception, and motor function, all of which are crucial to self-preservation. Depressives 
report a wide array of physical symptoms ranging from heart pain to chronic sore throat. 
Van den Berg’s depressed patient “was continually aware of his heart, and he had to keep 
his hand on his chest to make sure that no abnormalities occurred.”248 Also it is not 
uncommon for the depressive to experience overtly physical symptoms prior to noticing 
the psychological ones. People often seek treatment for fatigue, sleep disorders, and 
digestive disturbances before they become aware of the psychological symptoms. 
Nevertheless, depression is characterized as a ‘mental disorder.’  
Many depressives express the desire to have an illness that looks and sounds more 
like an illness that is understood as and realized in terms of a physical phenomenon (e.g. 
cancer, heart disease, or a brain tumor) rather than a mental one. The character in Sylvia 
Plath’s The Bell Jar exclaims, “if only something were wrong with my body it would be 
fine, I would rather have anything wrong with my body than something wrong with my 
head.”249 Andrew Solomon concludes, through his research and his own experience with 
depression, that the desire for a “more visible illness” was “commonplace among 
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depressives.”250 He points out the fact that some depressives go so far as to “engage in 
forms of self-mutilation to bring the physical state in line with the mental.”251 In 
depression the body does not always show its illness to other people – no broken bones, 
skin lesions, or hair loss. Depression usually shows itself in the form of subtle postures, 
slow movements, and sagging facial features. Unlike someone with a cast or crutches, 
depressives often find that they have to convince others (including doctors) of the fact 
that they are in pain. Widespread misdiagnosis and dismissal often take place in the 
doctor’s office, particularly for non-white patients.252 At times, depressives have to 
convince employers or loved one’s that they really cannot physically go to work or get 
out of bed. Thus, the depressive faces not only mental and somatic pain, but also the pain 
of social stigma and suspicion.
253
  
The primary characteristic of both the so-called ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ symptoms 
of depression is the unyielding presence of pain. Pain is typically seen as an immediate 
response to damaging stimuli and appears to exemplify a relatively clear-cut cause and 
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effect process. It can be said of most people that they: a) experience pain (with the 
exception of those with neurological disorders), b) have relatively similar pain-behaviors 
(within a particular social-environment), and c) are able to verbally communicate the 
experience with others (who share a common language). Also it is generally the case that 
one can rely on the observation of another person’s behavior to determine whether she is 
experiencing pain. Folk psychology need not consult systematic clinical trials to 
determine the fact that people tend to respond to stubbing their toes by yelling, gasping, 
whimpering, or cursing. Pain typically appears to be non-reducible and experienced as a 
simple; it is what it is. If I ask someone if she is in pain, I would expect her to be able to 
answer “yes” or “no.” If she responds by saying “I am not sure” or “It is possible,” then I 
would rightly surmise that she does not grasp the question (or that she had an overly 
nuanced understanding of what it is to be in pain). Despite the seeming straightforward 
nature of pain and pain behavior, ‘pain’ does not refer to a uniformly experienced or 
uniformly generated state.  
In the mid-twentieth century a group of surgeons performing prefrontal 
lobotomies appeared to relieve the symptoms of individuals suffering from intractable 
pain. The surgeons operated with the assumption that severing the axons connecting 
higher order cortical areas with pain receptors could inhibit an individual’s ability to 
experience pain. After the surgery, patients appeared calm, relaxed, and pain-free. 
However, it came to be known that the patients did in fact continue to feel pain, but they 
simply, in one patient’s words, “didn’t care.”254 If something like the ability for a person 
to care about pain can affect the experience of pain, then how should we account for the 
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relationship between one’s cognitive and affective states with the experience of pain? In 
addition, given the depressive’s affective disconnection, what function(s) does pain have 
in depression? Pain has an affective and cognitive value for humans, aside from the sheer 
pain-sensation. It is plausible that depressives experience the cognitive and affective 
features of pain without necessarily experiencing the sensation of pain issuing from a 
nociceptive response to harmful (internal or external) stimuli. Although depressives do 
experience locatable somatic symptoms throughout the body – such as lower back pain, 
headaches, digestive problems, and a tight chest – the depressive’s experience of pain 
does not always refer to a locatable pain-sensation. For the most part, depressives tend to 
feel pain diffusely throughout their body and primarily speak of having pain in their 
mind. Familiar qualities associated with physical pain, such as being dull or sharp, 
throbbing or unyielding, and relatively locatable,
255
 tend not to apply to mental pain. 
Mental pain in part indicates painful affective states, such as grief and despair. However, 
mental pain is not quite just grief, just hopelessness, or just sadness; it is more than each 
of these and yet it is not simply all of these combined. Psychic pain not only expresses 
itself in terms of emotion, it also refers to cognitive distress. With thoughts of suicide and 
self-destruction, for example, the thoughts themselves can feel painful and exhausting. 
Yet how do we feel a thought? This question is wrongly stated, for the depressive does 
not feel her thoughts, she feels pain accompanying her thoughts. Ultimately, ‘mental 
pain’ signifies the diffuse intermingling of amorphous, negative, and painful affective 
and cognitive states. 
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The label “clinical depression” gives cohesion to otherwise disparate symptoms, 
but the diffuseness of depression can often make it unrecognizable as such. In one sense, 
somatic symptoms lose their self-evidentiary status in depression: lower back pain, 
stomach ache, fatigue, sore throat, stiff joints, etc. can all be an expression of depression. 
On one level, when the depressive complains of lower back pain, we have indeed hit 
explanatory bedrock. Whether the pain is a somatosensory percept constructed in the 
parietal lobe is irrelevant to the reality of the pain being located and experienced in the 
lower back. In other words, the fact of the matter is that she really does feel pain in her 
lower back. However, if we want to know what function the lower back pain has for the 
depressive, then it does not suffice to say that the pain “is what it is,” because the pain is 
in fact both something that it does not appear to be (an expression of psychological 
distress) and also what it is (i.e. pain in the lower back). Given that neural pathways in 
the brain appear to have a countless number of possible connections, we face the problem 
of attempting to explain one mental function by way of another, as well as the ‘chicken 
and egg’ problem if we attempt to identify an initiating neural event that set off a process 
resulting in the depressive symptom, e.g. lower back pain. Suffice it to say that even if 
the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the neurochemical processes were discovered – down to the first 
emission of a neurotransmitter by a particular axon of a single cell body in a particular 
nuclei in a specific stratum of a particular region of a particular lobe, signaling to a 
specific receptor on a particular neuron, under the particular set of conditions controlled 
in the most minute detail and so forth (bearing in mind there are around 100 billion 
neurons in the brain) – still we would not know how depressives experience pain. We 
also need to inquire into: how pain influences the depressive’s behavior, how pain factors 
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into the depressive’s relationships with the social and natural environment, what pain 
makes the depressive do and what it inhibits her from doing, how pain affects beliefs, 
values, temperament, interests, and so forth. The meaning and function of pain belongs to 
a form of life and the presence of mental pain in depression often contributes to the 
dismantling of a form of life. 
 
Disrupted Cognitive Attachments 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the disruption of a form of life in depression 
occurs as a loss of familiarity and affective disconnection. This loss of familiarity and 
affective disconnection also takes place with one’s cognitive commitments. Often in 
depression a person’s convictions and value systems undergo changes. However, 
depression does not necessarily alter the content of beliefs; instead, it typically affects the 
nature of believing. If someone has a jarring experience that runs contrary to her system 
of beliefs, one can reasonably expect that she might question the veracity of the content 
of those beliefs. In contrast, depression does not primarily incite a reevaluation of beliefs; 
in depression one simply finds that her convictions are absent (at least during the 
depressive episode). For example, Karen Armstrong, a writer and former member of a 
convent, speaks of her loss of belief: “I found only a question mark where the old 
conviction should have been.”256 She continues, “Beliefs and principles that I had taken 
so completely for granted that they seemed a part of my very being now appeared 
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strangely abstract and remote.”257 Depression affects values indirectly, in as much as the 
individual’s desires and beliefs at first do not tend to change into something else; rather, 
the affective quality of believing and desiring is substantially diminished. Instead of 
one’s beliefs no longer making sense in light of new evidence, the depressive often no 
longer has a sense of her convictions. Over time the diminished affective connection with 
previously held beliefs and values can alter the status of the cognitive commitments for 
the depressive, which may or may not return when and if she recovers from depression. 
While all beliefs, values, and desires are not uniformly affected in severe depression, it 
appears that the intentional objects that evoke the greatest emotions (in terms of depth 
and duration) prior to depression are the ones that appear to be most glaringly absent 
during depression.  
This diminished affective connection with one’s beliefs and values is often 
expressed in terms of the depressive’s inability to act in accordance with her values. 
While the content of some propositional attitudes might go unaltered, the motivational 
pull that these beliefs and values have appears to weaken in a depressive episode. A 
depressed individual may actually have the desire to do x, yet lack the ability or 
motivation to act in a way that would make x come about. In the article “Mental Illness, 
Motivation and Moral Commitment,” John Russell Roberts addresses the motivational 
role of desire and values in depression. Roberts operates with the premise that 
depressives “have all their usual normative beliefs, yet they do not act on them,” and that 
their suffering increases from their inability to pursue their values.
258
 While this premise 
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is true for some depressives some of the time, it does not correctly characterize the 
variety of changes to values, actions, and desires that the depressive experiences during a 
depressive episode. Regarding Roberts’ assumption that depressives retain “all their 
usual normative beliefs,”259 first person accounts portray a more diverse picture of the 
retention, alteration, and loss of values in depression. The assumption that the identity of 
normative beliefs remains the same simply based on the continuity of the content of those 
beliefs is problematic. Take for instance a person’s religious belief. Depression does not 
necessarily make someone no longer believe in God or continue to believe in God; 
depression can however make the belief in God feel empty. While some depressives 
might report having the same propositional attitudes in depression as she did prior to and 
after depression, what those beliefs and values mean for the depressive and how she 
incorporates them into her life can be fundamentally different in a depressive episode. In 
the skepticism of depression, unlike philosophical skepticism, the depressed individual 
neither doubts nor believes. Her skepticism is not conceptual; it is lived and felt. Kristeva 
describes the depressed as a “radical, sullen atheist,”260 and just as depressive skepticism 
is not grounded in doubt, depression’s form of atheism is not directed towards God, 
belief, or proofs. The depressive is a “sullen atheist” because she is not directed towards. 
In the second part of his thesis Roberts claims that depressives fail to act on their 
values and that values appear to lose their intrinsic motivational pull in depression. Given 
the common belief that depressives suffer from a lack of desire, Roberts seeks to 
understand how this dearth of desire can co-exist with a continued identification with 
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values and the values’ apparent lack of motivational pull. He claims to resolve this 
dilemma by asserting that depression does not actually attenuate desire itself but 
interferes with the capacity to achieve the satisfaction of desire. He then concludes that 
the lack of satisfaction of desires explains why values are not self-motivating for 
depressives. According to this view, the interconnection of desires with the lack of 
motivation to act in depression takes place as a type of trial-and-error process: The 
depressive has a desire (which Roberts uses interchangeably with a value), acts on the 
desire, does not feel the satisfaction associated with acting on desire, thus no longer acts 
on the desire, and therefore the value is no longer self-motivational. The problem with 
what I am calling a trial-and-error process is that Roberts assumes that the action is first 
performed and then met with negative feelings, which thereby prevents the repetition of 
said action. However, affective interference in depression typically takes place before this 
trial-and-error process is even initiated. Even though Roberts recognizes the “sheer 
preponderance of continuous, free-floating negative affect” that “wreaks havoc with 
motivation and action,”261 the way he formulates the problem of depressive inaction is 
that a specific action is accompanied by specific negative emotional response. Roberts 
refers to Andrew Solomon’s example of the difficulty of engaging in the simple task of 
taking a shower, which Solomon compares to the “Stations of the Cross,”262 to 
demonstrate the incongruity of action and desire. However, it is not as if Solomon’s 
reflection on a previous negative experience of taking a shower recreates the sense of 
pain and strife. For the severely depressed, it is not merely a matter of not being able to 
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experience the satisfaction of acting on one’s desires; depressives claim not to be able to 
act at all.   
While it might be true that in depression one lacks the capacity to feel or achieve 
the satisfaction of various desires, this lack of satisfaction alone does not fully account 
for the apparent disjunction between valuation, action, and motivation. In the article, 
“Depression and Motivation,” Benedict Smith points to Iain Law’s account of the lack of 
motivation and inaction in depression as resulting from the presence of an “aspect of 
impossibility.”263 The ‘aspect of impossibility’ refers to the depressive’s perception of an 
act as insurmountable or unduly difficult. According to Law, while the depressive may 
still have the motivation to do x, a counter and more persuasive motivation prevents the 
person from doing x. Consistent with this explanation, “the failure to act is not accounted 
for by citing a loss of relevant propositional attitudes;” rather, it is “the content of 
particular mental states” that impedes action.264 However, a lack of motivation and 
inaction does not exclusively emerge from cognitive changes. A theory of cognitive 
attachments and motivation in depression cannot be complete without recognizing the 
driving force of the depressive’s attempts to avoid, abate, and live with pain, as well as 
recognizing the role that affective disordering and disconnection plays. The depressive 
lacks the affective connection that opens up the world as meaningful. The world itself 
appears to lose its motivational pull and no longer holds the same value that it did prior to 
depression. Over time, embodied affective disconnection and disordering can alter one’s 
evaluative commitments and propositional attitudes. Depressives experience an 
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interruption of cognitive and affective fidelity with their mind and world. Given the 
variability of emotions and thoughts, the depressive loses self-trust. Likewise, the 
depressive does not find the world to be reliable and predictable. 
B. Smith points out that both Roberts and Law focus on a psychological 
explanation of inaction and fail to take into account the role of the body. For the most 
part, the adult body is habitualized to perform tasks and respond to situations in an 
unnoticeable and unremarkable way. However, these habitual movements become 
effortful and painful in depression. In a malaise one might not get out of bed because one 
feels that “there is no point,” whereas in depression, one can feel physically incapable of 
getting out of bed. Due to the alterations of depressive perception and depressive 
desynchronization, regardless of belief and desire, the world is no longer accessible in the 
same way. The body retreats from health-sustaining acts. It is repulsed by food, 
threatened by social contact, and resistant to physical activity. Depressives describe 
having heavy, tired limbs, and severe fatigue to the point of near paralysis. The mere 
thought of getting out of bed can even be terrifying for some depressives. In Black Pain, 
Terrie Williams describes her experience with depressive immobility, which she suffered 
while she was the head of a successful marketing and public relation firm: “It was less 
like I didn’t want to wake up, and more like I couldn’t…I had the sensation of a huge 
weight, invisible but gigantic, pressing down on me, almost crushing me into the bed and 
pinning me there.”265 This description of the weight and immobility of Williams’ body 
hearkens to Fuchs characterization of depression as process in which the materiality of 
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the body comes to the fore.
 266
 He explains that in depressed individuals, “drive, impulse, 
appetite, and libido are reduced or lost,” which results in the depressive’s “sense of the 
possible” failing to “generate future goals and plans, leaving the self confined to the 
present state of pure bodily restrictions.”267 In depression, the body becomes a limitation 
on the world, rather than its access point.  
An explanation of depressive inaction and loss of motivation needs to address 
some of the key points of all three views: the roles of countervailing desires and emotions 
(Law), the inability to find satisfaction of desires (Roberts), and the body’s interference 
in action (Smith and Fuchs). The depressive’s inability to act in accordance with her most 
pressing desires and values, as well as the intermingling of competing desires and the 
attenuation of values, belong to the overall loss of agential vitality that results from 
affective disconnection and disordering. Furthermore, the depressive’s alienation from a 
meaningful and compelling form of life can cause the depressive’s cognitive and 
emotional attachments to become murky, weak, and remote, which contributes to her 
overall sense of self-loss and self-dispossession. 
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Depressive Identification 
Identifying ‘Depression’ 
All of the first-person accounts used in this chapter appeal to a basic medical 
model of severe depression. However, each of the authors speaks of a period of time in 
which he or she experienced the symptoms of depression without understanding the 
symptoms in terms of a ‘depressive disorder.’ Even in contemporary Western cultures 
dominated by psychiatric models of depression and the commercialization of 
antidepressants, people still often report experiencing a delay between the advent of 
symptoms and a diagnosis of depression.
 268
 Karp describes his experience of depression 
as “the beginning of a long pilgrimage” to “figure out what was wrong with me, what to 
name it, what to do about it, and how to live with it.”269  Similarly, John Head writes that 
his experience of depression was a part of his life for “more than twenty tortured years” 
before he had a name or an explanation for it.
270
 The identification of one’s experience as 
‘depression’ is often experienced as a defining moment, whether one chooses to accept, 
ignore, or reject such an identification. 
 In the essay “Saying It,” David Pugmire discusses the impact of giving verbal 
articulation to apparently “indescribable” emotions. Pugmire endeavors to identify the 
changes to personal level thinking and feeling of an individual in relation to the 
articulation of an emotional experience. While depression is an affective disorder and not 
a single intentional affect, Pugmire’s analysis of the subjective effect of articulation as a 
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form of affirmation can still shed light on the way in which the depressive’s awareness of 
her experience as ‘depression’ shapes her experience of depression and of herself. 
Pugmire points to five forms of articulation, which he categorizes as types of affirmation: 
‘identification,’ ‘consolidation,’ ‘reorientation,’ ‘initiation,’ and ‘transfiguration.’271 
Pugmire understands ‘identification’ as the verbal avowal of a previously unnamed or 
unarticulated emotion and conceptualizes articulation as bridging the lacuna between the 
person and her alleged “indescribable” emotion. According to this picture of verbal 
affirmation, one can become more connected to an experience through naming it and 
identifying it as something. For the depressive, this identification means seeing one’s ill-
health and disordered mood as depression rather than as a mysterious deterioration of 
one’s mind. Many depressives find it relieving to be able to give an explanation to their 
mental distress and to be able to attribute it to a known disorder. For example, while 
working in the office of psychologists, Glenn Townes began to understand his own 
experience in terms of ‘depression’:  
It was only through [the patients] that I learned that insomnia, irritability, crying 
spells and mood swings were symptoms of depression. It seemed odd, but in 
getting to know some of the patients, I began to understand myself. It was like 
looking into a mirror or listening to a tape recording of my own thoughts.
272
  
 
Sally Brampton also felt relief when she was diagnosed with depression. She recalls her 
psychiatrist insisting to her, “You are ill…You are very, very ill,” which to her “felt like 
the nicest thing anybody had ever said.”273 While people generally tend to associate the 
diagnosis of a severe illness with terrifying news, Sekyiwa (“Set”) Shakur, like Townes 
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and Brampton, felt a profound sense of relief when first diagnosed with severe 
depression. She writes, “…it was such a relief when I was finally diagnosed. I wasn’t just 
a ‘bitch’ or ‘crazy,’ there was a reason for all these painful feelings.”274 For many 
depressives, the identification of ‘depression’ provides clarity and order, moderates self-
blame, lessens the sense of isolation, helps the depressive to feel less alone, and gives the 
hope of treatment.  
Recognizing one’s experience as ‘depression’ can be a drawn out process for 
many individuals and not everyone responds to the idea of ‘clinical depression’ with 
relief and acceptance. Some people deny that they are depressed and others become even 
more deeply symptomatic when they realize they are suffering from ‘clinical depression.’ 
Especially given ‘depression’s’ status as a mental disorder, no matter how disordered one 
might already feel, admitting to mental illness poses personal and social challenges. Also, 
in the early stages of depression, characterized by frequent crying, mild dysphoria, and 
sometimes even exclusively by severe somatic symptoms, a person's identification of her 
ill-health with ‘depression’ can propel her from feeling generally unwell to experiencing 
full-blown severe depression. In the latter case, identification with ‘depression’ brings 
about a realization that unleashes psychological pain previously experienced as somatic 
symptoms.  
For many depressives, the identification of one’s experience as ‘depression’ 
serves to erect a theoretical schism between the individual and the disorder. A dualism of 
illness and self provides a way of explaining and coping with intrapsychic conflict. For 
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example, Solomon recalls, “At the worst stage of major depression, I had moods that I 
knew were not my moods: they belonged to the depression.”275 Alternatively the 
individual’s identification with ‘clinical depression’ can have a paradoxical effect in 
which the individual gives in to the control that depression already has over her. In 
another sense, identification can affirm integration rather than sustain a dualism between 
identity and illness. Rather than asserting that the individual is a separate, distinct agent 
who is threatened by a discrete disease entity, according to a model of integration the 
depressive can affirm the fact that depression has emerged within her brain, developed 
out of her experiences, and has altered her ‘self.’ In this sense, identification is an 
affirmation of depression being a part of me.  
The second form of affirmation that Pugmire addresses is ‘consolidation.’ 
Consolidation through verbal affirmation helps one “to settle on a state” and thereby “to 
suspend openness to change and to ambivalence.”276 For the most part, when the 
depressive identifies with ‘clinical depression’ it might clarify and consolidate her 
understanding of her depressive experience, yet the verbal avowal does not function as a 
hermeneutic seal. To “settle” on one’s experience as being that of depression leaves many 
questions unanswered and raises new ambiguities. As Karp points out, the struggle is not 
only to find a name for one’s disorder; one must also figure out what to do about it and 
how to live with it.  
Pugmire conceptualizes the third form of affirmation as ‘reorientation.’ According 
to the process of reorientation, “I see myself as related to the world in the appropriate 
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way…Suddenly things fall into place in a new way.”277 This idea of things falling into 
place relates to the sense of relief that many depressives claim to have when they 
understand their mental distress as belonging to depression. However, the relief can be 
fleeting. When a person first states “I am depressed,” it can be a meaningful avowal and 
can even have some immediate affective changes, but the significance, particularly the 
ongoing significance, primarily depends on what one does with the identification and 
with whom one shares it. Also, the ‘reorientation’ that accompanies naming one’s 
disorder and finding an explanation for it is not an embodied and full reorientation if the 
depressive is still deep in the mire of a depressive episode. Because affective changes 
often lag behind cognitive changes, an intellectual understanding of one’s experience as 
‘depression’ cannot undo the grip of affective disconnection and affective disordering. 
Take the simple hypothetical example of someone misunderstanding another person: 
Asher thinks that Sophie insulted his work behind his back and then becomes enraged. 
Even though Asher comes to realize that Sophie actually praised his work instead of 
insulting it, Asher continues to feel a tinge of resentment whenever he sees Sophie. 
Contrarily, if Asher finds incontrovertible evidence that Carrie, for whom he has 
romantic feelings, actually insulted his work to colleagues, this information might not 
change his attraction to Carrie. He can even interpret Carrie’s insult as an endearing act 
rather than an occasion for anger. It is difficult to instantaneously reform and/or form 
emotional attachments to ideas, people, and experiences. Emotions belong to patterns of 
behaviors and neural networks that require time and repetition to rewire. Considering a 
mental state as affectively pervasive as severe depression, both on a personal and 
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neurochemical level, ‘reorientation’ is unlikely to immediately unfold along with 
‘identification.’  
The first three forms of affirmation highlighted by Pugmire refer to cognitive 
changes that take place in naming, but for the depressive, the cognitive changes alone are 
not transformational. Due to the destructive effect that depression has on one’s form of 
life and sense of self, the transformational potential of identifying ‘depression’ primarily 
depends on how one acts on this new form of identification. Finding a new vocabulary 
cannot on its own bring about substantial changes; one must also discover and adopt new 
practices and new ways of relating to others. While the explanatory role that a diagnosis 
has can be relieving or frightening, therapeutically advantageous or harmful, confounding 
or penetrating, the effect of the psychiatric framing of one’s symptoms primarily depends 
on the course of action the depressive chooses to take and what she does with the medical 
explanation. This need for more than knowledge and ‘identification’ brings us to 
Pugmire’s last two types of affirmation: ‘initiation’ and ‘transfiguration.’ With 
‘initiation,’ Pugmire explains, “I may join myself to a larger cultural system (which, in 
my avowing, I endorse);”278 and ‘transfiguration’ is a matter of affirming the experience 
poetically.
279
 
Despite the variety of changes that the depressive can experience by identifying 
her mental distress with ‘depression,’ the depressive can nevertheless undergo all the 
developmental alterations previously mentioned in this chapter regardless of whether she 
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identifies her experience with ‘depression.’ In other words, no matter what she calls her 
experience or how she explains it to herself, she still feels a loss of self, an alienation 
from others, an alteration of values and beliefs, a loss of control, and a sense of an 
external agency at war with her mind. For the individuals that do identify their experience 
as ‘depression,’ many of them, especially those who experience chronic depression, move 
beyond the identification of depression to an identification with depression. Particularly 
in a long-lasting, non-reactive depressive episode and/or recurring depressive episodes, 
the depressive cannot simply affirm a binary model of personal identity and illness. The 
binary opposition can wear down, both in terms of the depressive’s cognitive assessment 
of her depressive experience as binary and her feeling towards it as foreign. Depression 
itself becomes too familiar. The alterations that depression wreaks on one’s personality 
become too enduring. The old self remains distant and depression becomes a part of 
one’s sense of self and identity.  
 
Identifying with depression 
Just as one’s sense of self in depression has a developmental structure, so too does 
one’s identification with depression. The early stages of the depressive’s identification 
with depression as ‘depression’ often involve the recognition that the ‘I’ itself is 
implicated in mental illness. The meaning of one’s identification with depression is that 
“I am depressed.” While the truth of this realization might appear to be self-evident, its 
simplicity hides the painful awareness that undergirds this admission. The fact that ‘I’ am 
depressed means that depression is not simply done to me; rather, it belongs to me and is 
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a part of who I am. To identify with depression and to recognize that “I am depressed” 
assumes some degree of acceptance of one’s condition as depressed. The recognition that 
I am depressed involves the admission that I have changed and that I am in fact different 
from how I used to be. This acceptance should not be mistaken as an alleviation of 
tension and inner-conflict. Likewise, the identification with depression does not establish 
a unified depressive self. The acceptance that I am depressed is phenomenologically 
similar to the process of mourning. For some depressives the proper response to the loss 
of the pre-depressive self is to let it go. For others the past self never quite disappears but 
only goes into hibernation and comes out older, weaker, and thinner. Larry McMurtry 
came to the conclusion that he must grieve rather than strive to regain his lost self. He 
writes: 
I wasn’t quite myself, but I hadn’t started grieving either, for the self or the 
personality that had been lost during the process…I did not feel like my old self at 
all, and had no idea where the old self had gone. But I did know that it, he, me 
was gone, and that I missed him…I mourned its loss but soon concluded that gone 
is gone – I was never really going to recover that sense of wholeness, of the 
integrity of the self.
280
 
 
In some cases it might be possible for the loss of an essentialist understanding of the self 
– what in McMurty's case was a self that had “a sense of wholeness,” a self whose loss 
felt like the “integrity of the self” had slipped away – to be experienced as liberating. 
However, due to the negative and painful conditions intrinsic to depression, the 
depressive’s loss of self is typically experienced as quite devastating. It is only after the 
depressive recovers from major depression that she can greet the changes with a sense of 
freedom and starting anew (although this response is neither essential to depression, nor 
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typical). For McMurtry and other depressives, the identification with depression is a 
painful identification and a farewell to a former way of living.  
Unlike McMurtry, Solomon’s experience with depression led him to insist on the 
persistence of some aspects of his personality, which he claims depression cannot fully 
undo. Even though Solomon affirms the continuation of various features of one’s self 
throughout depression, he also affirms a “multifarious identity”281 and eventually comes 
to regard depression as an essential aspect of who he has become. He writes, “To regret 
my depression now would be to regret the most fundamental part of myself.”282 Solomon 
embraces depression as a part of his self and not as an alien agency. Not only has he 
incorporated it into his sense of self, but for Solomon it is the most “fundamental” part. 
Whether the recovering depressive interprets the depressive self as being continuous with 
the pre-depressive self like Solomon, or discontinuous like McMurtry, the recovering 
depressive emerges from depression with an altered sense of self and a disrupted form of 
life. Depression is not in itself a form of life (see chapter 2); it runs counter to a form of 
life and is in many ways counter to life itself. The ability of the recovering depressive to 
(re)constitute a vital personal identity largely depends on her ability to reconcile herself 
to the form of life that depression has disrupted. ‘Ability’ in this context does not 
exclusively or primarily apply to personal capacities; it also refers to the conditions of 
possibility given with a form of life. One’s ability to reconcile her new sense of self with 
the disrupted form of life depends as much on the social practices and discursive 
opportunities available within a form of life – however disrupted it has become – as it 
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does on the depressed individual’s desires and skills. Alternatively, the recovering 
depressive can help to resist and/or expand the practices of her form of life or seek out 
alternative forms of life that are more accepting of a depressive identity.  
Some of the aspects of a form of life that depression disrupts, such as the 
synchronicity of the depressive’s temporalization with her social environment and the 
familiarity of her surroundings, can be salvaged in recovery from depression. A recovery 
from depression in part involves the restoration of one’s affective connection to her 
environment. However, the reestablishment of affective connectivity does not mean that 
the recovering depressive relates to herself, others, and her social and natural 
environment in the same way she did prior to depression. Who she is during, prior to, and 
recovering from depression are different persons; therefore, how she interacts with a form 
of life also changes. While depression does not quite fit into Lugones’ characterization of 
‘world’ mentioned earlier in this chapter, it is nevertheless helpful to apply Lugones’ 
ideas about the multifariousness of identities and worlds to an understanding of 
depression. Like Medina’s theory of polyphonic identity, Lugones provides a non-
pathological view of the plurality of personal identity that can potentially help the 
depressive to reconcile the pathological (depressive) self with her other selves. Without 
the intellectual mandate to see the self as unified and harmonious, it seems theoretically 
plausible that the depressive would have a better chance of recovery. 
The depressive’s response to self-loss and identification with depression are not 
final acts or decisions; they are only part of the ongoing negotiation of personal identity 
and depression. Ultimately, personal identity in depression cannot be explained 
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exclusively in psychological terms. While alienation from other people and estrangement 
from meaning dominate the depressive experience, in a sense the depressive is never 
alone in depression. Depression is socially structured and the depressive can never fully 
withdraw from a form of life. Although the affective connection to one’s form of life is 
disrupted, a form of life can continue to set limits on the ways the depressive can 
understand depression and influence whether she understands it as such. In addition, a 
form of life is bound up with all the social complexities that constitute personal identity. 
Social categories of identity, such as race, ethnicity, gender, and class, can affect an 
individual’s understanding and treatment of depression. Also, how the developmental 
stages of depression unfold in part depends on the depressive’s social environment and 
the individual’s ability to recover from depression largely depends on her social support 
systems. In Part II of this chapter, in which I address the sociality of the depressive and 
the social structuring of ‘depression,’ I plan to further develop an understanding of 
personal identity in depression as multifarious and interconnected with a form of life.  
        
Part Two: Depression and sociality 
 
 Too often traditional philosophical discourse allows one to appeal to the idea of 
‘the social’ and even to the idea of ‘the particularity of social contexts’ without ever 
invoking actual social phenomena. Referring primarily to Austin and Wittgenstein, 
Shusterman remarks that “it seems reasonable that philosophies which explicitly affirm 
the crucial role of ‘the social’ should themselves take the actual study of society far more 
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seriously.”283 So how should one go about an investigation into the social structures of 
depression? I plan to start with the following basic premises about the social structuring 
of depression: a) a host of cultural values are implicated in depression; b) a depressive 
identification has social ramifications; c) social categories of identity are at play in the 
diagnostic act and impact the nature and availability of treatment; d) social structures and 
systems factor into the complex causal mechanisms at play in each episode of depression 
for each individual. These four aspects of the social structuring of depression require an 
in-depth analysis; however, I will only briefly touch on each one. Also, I aim to briefly 
identify some of the types of ideologies, social structures, and vocabularies that 
perpetuate the marginalization of depression and the ones that can best create the space 
for dialogue. The main picture that I want to provide is that the social elements involved 
in depression are as diverse, complex, numerous, and deep as the elements at play in 
agency itself.  
 
Depressive Identity  
In the last section I introduced the ideas of depressive identification and the 
integration of ‘depression’ within personal identity. This idea of a ‘depressive identity’ is 
conceptually and phenomenally problematic on various fronts and shares many pragmatic 
and conceptual problems common to social categories of identity: problems such as 
essentialism, separatism, group solidarity, the voluntariness of membership, definition, 
and whether the social group is erected by oppressors for the purpose of subjugation or 
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reclaimed and redescribed by the group members. However, depressive identity does 
have a few unique problems. First, how can one’s sense of self merge with the very thing 
that destroys a sense of self? Furthermore, how can group identification be forged when 
depression leads to social withdraw? In this section I will address how depression 
interacts with social categories of identity and the problems associated with the social 
formation of a depressive identity.  
 
Depressive Withdrawal 
When one identifies with a particular explanation of identity and behavior, one 
becomes integrated with a community and a larger narrative. To identify and to be 
identified involves active and passive forms of identification with others, regardless of 
how precarious and reluctant the association might be. That is not to say that each person 
labeled A necessarily identifies with all other A’s; however, who is identified as A is not 
always up to the person labeled A. Given that social interaction grounds both personal 
and group identities, the formation of a depressive identity proves difficult in the midst of 
a depressive episode. The affective disconnection and disordering of depression that leads 
to the disruption of a form of life and the attenuation of agency – exemplified by 
desynchronization, loss of futurity, shrinking of personal space, disrupted cognitive 
attachments, etc. – contribute to the deterioration of the depressive’s capacity to be with 
others. The depressive not only physically withdraws from social relations and public 
spaces, she also becomes cognitively and affectively isolated from a meaningful world. 
Withdrawal from other people characterizes the primary loss of affective connection for 
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most depressives, and withdrawal from social practices contributes to the depressive’s 
withering sense of self. Karp explains depressive withdrawal in terms of a “vicious 
feedback loop,” in which the elements of depression – “hopelessness, withdrawal, and the 
erosion of the self” – deepens the severity of each other.284 Karp writes: “…when the pain 
of human association leads to withdrawal and isolation, the self loses its social 
foundation, begins to wither, and in that process the social world comes to appear even 
more alien.”285 While Karp speaks to the idea that personal identity both develops and is 
sustained through social relations, his reference to a “social foundation” of identity paints 
a misleading picture of the social as the ground floor on top of which the self is 
constructed. While identity can be said to be grounded in the social, the social is not a 
homogenous, solid, and stable structure. Personal identity has an organic and osmotic 
relationship with the various elements of social structures and interpersonal relations. 
Depression is one among many illnesses, traumas, and events that can disturb seemingly 
impervious social bonds and structures. Depression can also push through the cracks of 
already vulnerable identities and social connections. The loss of self, described in the first 
part of this chapter, both feeds and feeds off of the depressive’s decaying social 
connectivity.  
Karp highlights the fact that the “pain of human association” in depression results 
in withdrawal. The presence of somatic symptoms, the unpredictability of mood, the 
dizzying pace of public life, the persistence of mental confusion, the difficulty of 
communication, and the feeling of extreme alienation all contribute to the pain of social 
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interaction. While non-depressives frequently prescribe “going out and being around 
people” to alleviate depressive symptoms, for people experiencing major depression, both 
the thought and the act of socializing can intensify the symptoms of depression. Faulk 
recalls that being “alone was somehow just better than being around people.”286 Often a 
depressive’s attempt to remedy isolation through socialization does not combat the 
inwardness of the pain but can actually deepen it. Karp notes that “Much of depression’s 
pain arises out of the recognition that what might make one feel better – human 
connection – seems impossible in the midst of a paralyzing episode of depression.”287 
The disparity between the depressive’s disrupted life and what appears to her as the 
seamless activity and movement around her has a way of heightening the depressive’s 
sense of separation from others. At the level of the depressive’s experience, the 
avoidance of others does not emerge from a combination of particular symptoms. The 
depressive feels the pain as a whole, as all-encompassing.  
The pain of social interaction often takes the form of an intense fear of social 
contact. For instance, Brampton writes, “I would like to leave this room, but I can’t. I feel 
safe in here. Or, as safe as I feel anywhere, which is not very.”288 The comparative safety 
of self-confinement raises questions about the nature of the threat and painfulness of 
social interaction. One might be tempted to explain away depressive withdrawal as a fear 
of uncertainty and a fear of losing control. Brampton’s description of her fear seems to 
point to those two factors. She writes: “The thought of going to a shop or making a 
decision about what to buy terrified me. Crowds frightened me, going on the Tube 
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frightened me. Being outside frightened me.”289 However, for Brampton and other 
depressives, the fear of socialization is often not a fear of what they do not know; instead, 
it is a fear of what they know will happen. Once they step out into the world they will be 
forced to respond to and interact with it. John Bentley Mays accounts for depressive 
withdrawal in terms of a “strategy of coping with the confusions of the world.”290 
However, it is typically not the case that the confusions of the world cause a sense of not 
having control; the world is confusing because the depressive has already lost control. 
She does not have the agential vitality that allows her to count on herself to be able to 
function. Her loss of agency is experienced as a loss of the ability to act and react. 
Relatively simple acts like navigating a sidewalk and ordering food can be paralyzing. 
Social situations force the depressive to do things that she no longer feels capable of 
doing, and they force her to be a certain way that she no longer feels capable of being. 
It’s like being thrown into a river without being able to swim.  
Similar to the way that the depressive’s sense of self has developmental stages, 
what withdrawal is and how it functions can change throughout the course of a depressive 
episode. Withdrawal can expressed in terms of an actual physical isolation from other 
people, an emotional and experiential distancing from others, and/or a 
compartmentalization of the depressive self, to name a few. Depressive withdrawal can 
develop in relation to various emotions associated with mental pain, such as fear, grief, 
guilt, and anger. These emotions can then trigger certain forms of withdrawal. For 
example, guilt can lead to withdrawal in the form of compartmentalization, and fear can 
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lead to physical withdrawal. As we will see later in this chapter, for some people – 
particularly male depressives – depressive distancing can even take the form of 
externalization. Violence and reckless behaviors can be symptomatic of the life-denying 
tendencies of depression. Rather than physically withdrawing from one’s surroundings, 
the depressive can sustain his social isolation by forcing others to retreat. Because a 
major depressive episode, characterized by affective disconnection and disordering, 
fosters a deep and paralyzing estrangement from other people, depressive identity cannot 
develop until the severity of depression is allayed to some degree. The identification with 
‘depression’ can be an initiating component of an eventual recovery and can provide a 
way of understanding and dealing with social isolation. 
 
Interpellation and depression 
 ‘Clinical depression’ is not a label that spontaneously evolved among 
melancholic individuals. ‘Depression’ is a category developed and influenced by medical, 
pharmaceutical, juridical, market, and other cultural forces. While the American 
Psychiatric Association (APA) has the responsibility of codifying ‘severe depression’ in 
the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM), its members take their cues from a variety of 
sources – clinicians, therapeutic practices, neuroscience, pharmaceutical trials, and 
academic research, to name a few – none of which is immune to the pressures of politics 
and the market. In particular, pharmaceutical companies have influence on the funding 
for clinical trials, grants for academic research, the organization of support groups, 
legislative oversight for insurance payment regulations, treatment and diagnosis at the 
level of the doctor, and commercial backing for news and entertainment multi-media. 
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Critics of the pharmacological approach to mental illness argue that the market drives 
diagnosis and is thereby implicated in the creation of depression and interpellation of 
depressive identities.  
David Healy, a psychiatrist and outspoken critic of the pharmaceutical 
companies’ role in American healthcare and the marketing of psychotropic drugs, notes 
in his article “Good Science or Good Business” that only fifty people for every one 
million people were considered depressed in the 1950’s, whereas now it is one hundred 
thousand people per million.
291
 He argues that the emergence of ‘depression’ coincided 
with the development of antidepressant medication, in particular selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors (SSRI’s).292 Similarly, the contemporary philosopher Carl Elliot 
points out that “Medical treatments do not simply cure or control medical conditions; 
they also create them.”293 However, both Healy and Elliot do not outright deny the 
existence of ‘depression’ or even deny that it has a physiological basis that may benefit 
from medical treatment. They speak of ‘depression’ as a condition different from and 
prior to the psychopharmacological model of depression. Healy, for example, refers to 
‘classic depression,’ which he distinguishes from many of the conditions being treated 
with antidepressant medication, including contemporary ‘depression.’ He claims that the 
pharmaceutical industry “has educated prescribers and the public to recognize many other 
kinds of cases as depression.”294 He holds a view of depression (classic depression) as a 
non-pharmaceutically produced category, yet does not in this article explain the 
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difference between the two and whether psychotropic medication can benefit the 
symptoms of “classic depression.”295  
The various critiques of depression primarily fall into three categories based on 
questions about 1) the existence of depression as an illness, 2) the adequate diagnosis of 
depression, and 3) the treatment of depression with psychotropic medication. Most 
critiques of a medical model of depression primarily focus on how depression is treated. 
The main concern seems to be less about definition than about the roles and effects of 
antidepressant medication, which Healy argues is a category of medications that 
“Modulate lifestyles rather than cure diseases.”296 However, Healy recognizes that many 
moral arguments against contemporary depression often unfairly target the use of 
antidepressants, while ignoring various forms of self-medication. Referencing Peter 
Kramer’s book Listening to Prozac, which makes the argument that antidepressants are 
being used to treat states such as alienation, Healy asks: “Would we be talking about 
alienation if it were over-the-counter tonics rather than prescription-only antidepressants 
that were involved…?”297 He accuses philosophers of willingly overlooking the 
relationship between mental health, alienation, and self-medicating, while criticizing the 
treatment of conditions such as alienation with the likes of Prozac.  
While the market plays a key role in the rising rates of the diagnosis and 
pharmacological treatment of depression, the fear and criticism over the medicalization of 
mental illness actually preceded the emergence of pharmaceutical companies. Similar to 
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belief that the medicalization of depression actually increases the frequency of 
depression, Foucault notes that in the 18
th
 century, “Already Raulin had observed that 
‘since the birth of medicine…these [mental] illnesses have multiplied, have become more 
dangerous, more complicated, more problematical and difficult to cure.’”298 One aspect 
of the resistance to the medicalization of mental illness derives from the concern over the 
pathologization of identities and personalities. There are two main categories of 
argumentation against the pathologization of identities and behaviors: on one side, the 
concern is that deviant behavior will be legitimized and thus spread, and on the other 
side, the fear is that abnormal behavior will be suppressed and controlled. Some critics 
argue that the medicalization of depression creates and rapidly reproduces the number of 
cases of depression, thereby diminishing the role of individual moral responsibility. On 
the other hand, some people contend that the medicalization of depression leads to the 
pathologization and treatment of normal human grief and/or the suppression of spiritual 
and artistic depth. The primary concern in the latter critique is that the label “mental 
illness” will undermine the uniqueness of the individual and undervalue the generative 
potential of negative mood states. According to this view depressive moods are affirmed 
as idiosyncratic personality traits, which are constitutive of personal development. Often 
this position corresponds to the belief that depression (melancholy) is a gift of the artist 
and intellectual. Some critics even go so far as to argue that the medical treatment of 
depression not only deprives the individual of artistic and spiritual achievement, but 
deprives the entire culture as well. 
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  Other critics of the medical model of depression are less concerned with the label 
itself than the appropriateness of its application. They argue that ‘severe depression’ is 
too readily applied to people for whom other, more appropriate explanations would 
suffice. In some cases this type of concern comes from people who have suffered from 
debilitating depression and fear that the seriousness of the illness will become watered 
down if applied to too many people. In fact, they argue that the sheer number of 
diagnoses of depression devalues the uniqueness of their suffering. Others, less 
concerned with the number of cases, argue that hasty diagnosis, especially by under-
qualified medical personnel, will change the perception of depression as being less severe 
than it really is. 
 Another variation of the concern over the application of ‘depression’ is based on 
the belief that depression is a part of an adaptive biological development. These critics 
argue that the physiological symptoms of depression are the body’s natural protection 
against environmental stress. According to this view, the interference in the biological 
processes taking place in depression, especially neurochemical interference, hinders the 
body’s ability to fully heal.299 Similarly, some people contend that the label will be over-
applied to people undergoing justifiable, psychological processes, such as mourning, 
grief, spiritual emptiness, and humiliation, which are a natural part of the healthy 
psychological development.
300
 Both the fear of the creation of depressive identities and 
the fear of the suppression of depressive identities are based in a moralization of 
depression. The moralization of depression is rooted in a teleological assessment of 
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human development, which in many cases affirms a view of the self in terms of 
authenticity and inauthenticity. 
Disorders of mood, cognition, and behavior provoke questions about the 
legitimacy and verifiability of diagnostic classifications. Often questions about legitimacy 
and verifiability of depression are vehicles for evaluative questions such as: Is the 
identification with depression a type of false consciousness and/or a way of taking on the 
perspective of the oppressor? Is the acceptance that I am depressed simply an attempt to 
be reintegrated into the community? Does the identification with and treatment of 
depression as an illness entail a willing complicity with cultural norms about good 
behavior and sound mental health?  Is the identification with ‘clinical depression’ a form 
of bad faith and does it reflect an escape from “all that I am”?301 These types of 
normative approaches primarily fall into three lines of questioning: Does the 
identification with depression result from a) the cultural oppression of deviance, b) the 
normativity of happiness and well-being, and c) a flight from authenticity? Perhaps the 
most revealing question is what Elliot takes to be a Wittgensteinian line of questioning 
about the existence and application of ‘depression’: “In whose interests is it to pose such 
a question?”302 Rather than addressing these critiques from the standpoint of a supposedly 
disinterested observer, it is from the standpoint of the depressives that I aim to address 
these three main categories of critique. 
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Cultural oppression of deviance and the normativity of mental health 
 Given the fact that ‘depression’ has become pragmatically and conceptually 
interconnected with antidepressants, the concerns over antidepressant medications tend to 
fuel critiques of the veracity of depression as an illness. One’s imagination does not need 
much prompting to draw a connection between the mass production and consumption of 
antidepressants with the mollifying opiates of Brave New World and the laced water 
supply of Thanatos Syndrome. Critics, or prophets (depending on one’s perspective), 
easily slip down this road of fear and conspiracy; however, these fears of conspiring 
powers waging a large scale assault on how we think and behave can detract from the 
actual complexity of the problems associated with the identification and treatment of 
depression. While I am critical of many of the critics of a medical model of depression, I 
do indeed find that many of the social elements that factor into the identification and 
treatment of depression are ethically problematic.  
A dilemma that I perceive to be at the heart of contemporary assessments and 
treatments of depression is the fact that the power of creating diagnostic categories is 
limited to the American Psychiatric Association, despite the fact that the DSM has 
widespread impact on non-medical related practices. The DSM is subject to and helps 
create policies that affect legal, economic, judicial, and social structures that have bearing 
on individuals, families, communities, and governments. While its aim is to guide 
clinicians in the diagnosis and treatment of patients, it also has immense political 
ramifications. In regards to the classification of depression in particular, Solomon points 
out that the “problem is not so much the politics of depression as our failure to recognize 
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that there is a politics of depression.”303 He explains that politics are involved in “Who 
researches depression; what is done about it; who is treated; who is not; who is blamed; 
who is coddled; what is paid for; what is ignored.”304 It is not merely the more formal 
structures of classification that are impacted by psychiatric categorization; the DSM also 
affects social and personal perception. The authority to bestow the name depressed upon 
an individual rests in the hands of doctors, the “professionals of representation.”305 A 
medical diagnosis assigns the individual to a place and position in relation to others. 
Schizophrenic, bi-polar, psychotic, chronically depressed – these are not adjectives one 
merely adds to a list of attributes. The naming of one’s problem as illness and the 
designation of one’s status as a patient both limit and produce certain types of agency.  
John Sadler, a professor of medical ethics and psychiatry, addresses the view that 
psychiatric diagnosis has widespread influence and impacts the very way we think about 
ourselves. He writes: 
…psychiatric power, embraces more than mere economic or political power; it 
takes on metaphysical power as well, influencing how we understand ourselves, 
how we think, and what the ‘nature of things’ is.306  
 
This view echoes Bourdieu’s assessment of classificatory systems, which he argues have 
the “symbolic power to make people see and believe.”307 As mentioned earlier, the 
depressed individual can come not only to identify her experience as depression, she also 
integrates depression within her very sense of self. The identification with depression 
alters the way one sees the world and one’s place in it. It is an acknowledgment of 
                                                 
303
 Solomon, 2002, 393 
304
 Ibid, 361 
305
 Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 2001, 243 
306
 Sadler, 2004, 174 
307
 Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, 2002, 480 
179 
 
difference and disability. It is an admission about the limits of one’s ability to heal 
thyself. It is a recognition of the interdependence of the self and the body, the mind and 
the brain. One can see why people resist such a designation and protest the psychiatric 
classificatory system as oppressive.                                   
Another criticism of a medical model of depression is based on the assertion that 
psychiatry presumes that health is a matter of happiness and balance. The concern is that 
psychiatric conditions are interpreted as pathological based on a normative view of well-
being. Dana Crawley Jack argues that mental health “coincides with the dominant values 
of the culture: autonomy, independence, power, wealth.”308 In Jack’s assessment, falling 
short of these values can be interpreted as pathological. Similarly, Elliott expresses the 
concern that Americans (U.S.) rely on antidepressants to heal normal human difficulty 
such as existential and social alienation. He points to the mass consumption of 
antidepressant medications as the American response to spiritual emptiness and 
restlessness. He suggests that “psychic well-being isn’t everything” and argues against 
the “therapeutic world view” that “sees every human predicament as a problem to be 
fixed.”309 Ultimately, most criticisms of ‘depression’ derive from the fear of limitations 
that mental health care places on human freedom.  
Because mental health care has a direct impact on views of the self and agency 
and lacks consistent tools for determining etiology, measuring severity, and identifying 
symptoms, it is vulnerable to criticism and skepticism. However, health and well-being in 
general are also evaluative constructs. Each act of diagnosis and treatment of any type of 
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ailment is rooted in a complex and vast matrix of value judgments that have led up to the 
moment in which such an act can be performed. The goal should not be to eliminate 
normativity from medical science and mental health care, which cannot be accomplished, 
but to make it more transparent and self-conscious of its valuations.  
Given the amount of pharmaceutical advertisements that claim to cure and treat 
depression, coupled with the large quantities of antidepressants prescribed in the U.S., it 
is easy to come to the conclusion that people are overexposed to depression and thereby 
over-diagnosed and over-medicated. The discrepancy between what mental health 
advocates call “underexposure” and critics call “overexposure” lies in the nature of the 
information given and the populations targeted to receive the information. One could 
make the argument that a population overmedicated with antidepressants could lead to 
spiritual emptiness, artistic triteness, pain intolerance, and perhaps even moral weakness 
in the culture – of course, perhaps the same could be, and has been, said about television, 
alcohol, air conditioning, and so forth. On the other hand, a population of individuals 
without adequate treatment for major depression can and has lead to higher rates of 
suicide, homicide, drug addiction, and work loss. Also, unlike depressive feelings, or 
even a melancholy temperament, which have long been associated with artistic, spiritual 
and intellectual growth and productivity, a depressive disorder impairs one’s ability to 
function on the most basic levels. The consequences of underexposure far outweigh the 
possible downside of overexposure. 
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Flight from authenticity 
The ideal of a unified self has prevailed throughout the history of Western 
philosophy and has shaped the interpretation of melancholy and similar deviant mental 
states. The view of the self as unified has lead to positions that tend to either demonize or 
romanticize melancholy. On one side we see sweet melancholy genius overflowing with 
nostalgia for simplicity, a yearning for nature, desire for truth, and an urge to create. On 
the other side we see demonic facial contortions showing weariness of life, hastened 
signs of old age, and an uncanny absence of vitality. While a negative depiction of 
melancholy resembles most contemporary perceptions of melancholy’s heir-apparent – 
depression – many cultural critics and academics have retained the romanticized view of 
melancholy and hold depression up to the same ideal. According to this view, depression 
and depressives, like the melancholy philosopher-genius, have a special relationship to 
truth, meaning, and/or contribute to a richer and more authentic life. 
The philosopher Jennifer Hansen argues that depression could be “an important 
means to self-fulfillment and self-actualization.”310 Similarly, Jennifer Radden contends 
that depression narratives emphasize a “depth of appreciation and feeling that come with 
depression” and insists that there is “great personal meaning and value” in depression.311 
The narratives that Radden cites as having an appreciative character are Styron’s 
Darkness Visible, Danquah’s Willow Weep for Me, and Jamison’s Unquiet Mind. 
However, these authors depict a much more complex and graver picture of depression 
than Radden reports. They describe their depressive episodes as periods of desperation 
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and deep pain, dominated by unrelenting thoughts of suicide. These particular authors, as 
well as many others, report that depression erodes their ability to act, communicate, and 
connect, while diminishing their desire to live. From the perspective of the depressed 
individual, the primary affective, cognitive, and social effects of depression do not lead to 
existential authenticity or special psychological insight. In convalescence, depending on 
the depressive’s social environment and personal skills and desires, the recovering 
depressive can work through the depressive experience to (re)create meaning and 
meaningfulness. However, this response is neither intrinsic to the depressive experience, 
nor does it redeem it. For example, Jamison states that her illness, manic-depressive 
disorder, contributes to a deeper experience of life and allows her to see the “limitless 
corners” of her mind. However, she also describes depression as “awful beyond 
words.”312 She continues,  
There is nothing good to be said for it except that it gives you the experience of 
how it must be to be old, to be old and sick, to be dying; slow of mind; to be 
lacking in grace, polish, and coordination; to be ugly; to have no belief in the 
possibilities of life, the pleasures of sex, the exquisiteness of music, or the ability 
to make yourself and others laugh.
313
 
 
During a depressive episode the depressive is concerned with surviving, not thriving. 
Depression itself is a destructive force and Jamison was fortunate not only to survive it, 
but to be able to find meaning in the experience.  
It is important to distinguish the meaning that depressives have gained through the 
process of recovery and their experience of depression during a depressive episode. In a 
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depressive episode, one is exhausted, estranged, lonely, grieving, and scared of one’s 
own mind. While it is possible for the depressive to develop an appreciation of 
depression after her recovery from it, it takes a great amount of work, self-knowledge, 
supportive relationships, and creative outlets to give meaning to the very experience that 
destroys meaning and meaningfulness. Martha Manning expresses her sentiment 
regarding the idea that depression reveals existential truth: 
All the romantic nonsense about depression somehow making one into a creature 
of unique sensibilities is easy to agree with when I feel good...All of this stands up 
to the light, but it’s bullshit in the shadows. I don’t care about unique sensibilities. 
All I care about is surviving. My goal in life is just to get through the days.
314
 
 
Manning draws the distinction between the value that depression has for her when she 
feels well and when she is “in the shadows.” Often memoirs and first-person accounts are 
themselves an attempt to give meaning to depression. Whether one strives for spiritual 
redemption or simply wants to bear witness to the horrors of depression, the 
meaningfulness of depression cannot be generated during the depressive episode itself 
and is certainly not intrinsic to depression. Depression does not have a direct causal 
connection to the production of meaning, philosophical insight, and/or something akin to 
an authentic self-actualization. Mike W. Martin, who attempts to provide a philosophical 
basis for promoting the moral and creative benefits that arise from depression, does not 
even go so far as to claim that these benefits make chronic depression intrinsically 
valuable. He explains, “…that is like arguing that a heart attack is not pathological if it 
motivates a person to adopt a healthier way of living.”315 He goes on to say, “Fortunately, 
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much sickness, including life-threatening depression, has positive results, beyond its 
mere cessation.”316 Regardless of whether it might be true that in order to overcome one 
must first go under,
317
 the problem is that in going under, not everyone even comes out. 
The high rate of suicide attempts among depressives alone should point to the lack of 
intrinsic creative and truth-bearing properties of depression.  
          A view of identity as multifaceted and multifarious gives us a way of 
understanding the experience of depression (whether acknowledged as ‘depression’) 
outside of the normative schema of authenticity. Struggling with questions of authenticity 
and identity, Solomon writes, “Who is the real me?...The ailing me is not a more or less 
authentic self; the therapized me is not a more or less authentic self.”318 He explains:  
Chemistry and biology are not matters that impinge on the ‘real’ self; depression 
cannot be separated from the person it affects. Treatment does not alleviate a 
disruption of identity, bringing you back to some kind of normality; it readjusts a 
multifarious identity, changing in some small degree who you are.
319
  
 
Based on the many similar testimonies of depressives, it seems that one should conclude 
that depression neither negates nor promotes authentic being. In other words, depression 
is not an existential condition or a constitutive mode of human life, even though it 
prompts existential and evaluative questions and quandaries. Depressive disengagement 
does not free oneself for a more authentic existence; rather, it draws one nearer to death – 
actual death, not theorized.  
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Depression reveals that identity is not primarily or exclusively a matter of 
consciousness and unity; it shows that identity is embodied, social, and malleable. Even if 
depression does have a special relationship to truth, authenticity, and a deeper life – 
which I claim is neither intrinsic nor even typical – it certainly seems ethically 
problematic to promote such a view, knowing full well the suffering that accompanies 
depression. Ethically speaking, if someone promotes the existential benefit of life-
negating states like depression, then I believe that they better have good evidence and 
reason for doing so. If one focuses on the possible life-enhancing aspects of depression 
(though neither common nor intrinsic), then one forgets the primary negating tendency of 
depression: the negation of life itself.  
 
 Social Structuring of Depression 
Not only do depressives withdraw from others, but other people recoil from 
depressives. Because the symptoms of depression are, according Coyne, “both 
incomprehensible and aversive to members of the social environment,” people find 
depressives often tiring and intolerable.
320
 Foucault highlights the fact that initially the 
political outrage over the imprisonment of the insane was based on the belief that sane 
prisoners should not have to be confined with the insane population. In other words, the 
imprisonment of the mad was not considered an injustice for the mentally ill, “but for 
others.”321 Unfortunately for the depressed individual, depression does not deaden a 
                                                 
320
 Coyne, 1985, 231 
321
 Foucault, 1988, 228 
186 
 
person’s awareness of the burden she imposes on those around her. As Danquah notes, 
“Depression is a very “me” disease…Most depressives find themselves – as much to their 
own disgust as to everybody else’s – annoyingly and negatively self-obsessed.”322 Some 
depressives who are fortunate enough to have a few close friends and/or family members 
prior to the onset of depression have found that these relationships serve as a life-
sustaining force. However, depression can test even the tightest social bonds, and casual 
acquaintances tend to dissociate easily. People’s repulsion from depressives is not 
necessarily due to a lack of empathy or the stigma associated with mental illness, but 
because they lack the stamina to withstand the constant onslaught of frustrations caused 
by the depressive. People cannot count on the severely depressed to do or show up for 
work. People cannot even rely on the depressive to return a phone call or respond to 
messages. On a more personal level, people also cannot expect the depressive to be able 
to carry on a conversation or take part in other people’s sorrows and joys.   
 
Diversification of the depressive experience  
Depression, from the perspective of the depressive as well as culture, is not a 
privileged marginality. I once heard depression described as “every family’s secret.” T. 
Williams assures her readers that “there is not one among us who has not been touched 
by this,” yet depressives remain marginalized and seeking mental health care is often 
viewed as shameful.
323
 The topic of ‘depression’ is shunned in workplaces, rarely 
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discussed openly within most families, and typically goes unmentioned in social 
gatherings. When people do talk about depression, it often has the feel of a clandestine 
and derisive whisper. In depression one becomes de facto marginalized regardless of 
one’s social identity prior to the onset of depression. The depressive is not merely subject 
to the cultural views of mental illness; she also embodies and reproduces the views of her 
form of life. While discrimination might be a trigger for depression, depression itself 
seems not to discriminate among its hosts. Timothie Bright, the 16
th
 century author of A 
Treatise of Melancholy, contends that melancholy is indiscriminate: “the cause respecteth 
not time nor place, nor circumstance of person, nor condition, seeketh no opportunity of 
corporal imbecillity, but breaketh through all such considerations, & beareth down all 
resistaunce.”324 Centuries later, Sally Brampton makes a similar observation after staying 
in three psychiatric units: “Nobody there looked like the sort of person who suffers from 
depression. It is no respecter of type. Or gender. Or class. Or money. Or success.”325 
While depression crosses social categories of identity, the treatment, diagnosis, and 
acceptability of depression do tend to differ based along the intersecting lines of race, 
gender, and class.  
 It is inordinately difficult to provide an adequate assessment of identity structures 
in general, much less how they interact with, inform, and affect the experience, treatment, 
and perception of depression. How social groupings function in the life of an individual 
and in the life of a social group can change over time, and what these identity markers 
mean differs among different social groups and among individuals within the same social 
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group. In addition, these categories have moving boundaries. At the level of both the 
individual and society, new social factors can emerge and others dissipate, which affect 
the nature of the social identity. Furthermore, the development of these social identities 
does not occur congruently among individuals or social groups. Race, gender, sexual 
orientation, and socioeconomic status do not all intersect at the same points with regard 
to depression. Each category of social identity impacts all the other categories and no 
single category can be considered a consistent determining factor for depression. 
Likewise, no single theory can adequately account for the interaction of social variables 
and how they function in depression. Given such a high level of indeterminacy, one 
might argue that the philosophical assessment of identity structures serves no purpose. 
However, despite the irregularities, social categories of identity do have real implications 
on a person’s experience of depression. For instance, depending on class, religion, race, 
gender, sex, education, and geographic region, a person’s possibility of recovering from 
depression varies greatly. The main factors involved in race, gender, class and sex, that 
have bearing on the diagnoses and treatment of depression center around: the availability 
of medical professionals, the medical and social background of health care providers, the 
financial ability of the depressive to access medical treatment, and the social acceptability 
of medical treatment for depression. Simply promoting awareness of the various social 
conditions affecting mental health can help promote better policies and more effective 
individual treatment. 
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Gender and sex 
If one was pressed to make a generalization about who gets depressed, the answer 
would likely be that depression is a white person’s problem. The stereotypical depressive 
is a wealthy Anglo-American woman popping Prozac like bon bons. However, this image 
actually contradicts facts about the types of social conditions that are most likely to 
contribute to depression. Several studies have shown that stress is one of the best 
predictors of depression, and chronic stressors such as poverty, discrimination, 
unemployment, and disability often lead to depression. In addition to chronic social 
pressure, acute stressors such as trauma, illness, and bereavement are also triggers for a 
depressive episode.  Studies confirm that women are almost twice as likely to experience 
depression as men, regardless of ethnicity or nationality.
326
 After thirty years of research 
scholars have not been able to identify and agree on one variable that can explain the 
cause of gender disparity in depression.
327
 It has been posited that women are more likely 
to report depressive symptoms to doctors than men, which might account for some of the 
gender disparity of depression. Others point to cross-cultural trends that increase a 
woman’s vulnerability to depression. Discrimination, increased susceptibility to violence 
and abuse, elevated levels of poverty, and the burden of child rearing all contribute to 
high levels of acute and chronic stress among women.
328
 Nolen-Hoeksema posits that 
                                                 
326
 “Diagnosable depressive disorders are extraordinarily common in women, who have a lifetime 
prevalence for major depressive disorder of 21.3%, compared with 12.7% in men (Kessler, McGonagle, 
Swartz, Blazer, & Nelson, 1993).” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2001, 173) 
327
 Ibid 
328
 While I have referenced cross-cultural trends about depression in women, there is no agreement about 
the universality of depression. For instance, Richard Shweder, a psychological anthropologist, argues that 
depression is a psychological universal transformed into culture-dependent emotion (Kleinman, 1985, 178), 
whereas Beeman, an anthropological linguist, contends that “the assumption of universality of depression 
190 
 
both “stress experiences and stress reactivity” associated with some of the 
aforementioned gender differences lead to higher rates of depression in women compared 
with men.
329
  
 Given the fact that women represent the majority of reported cases of depression, 
the common picture of depressive symptomatology reflects how depression is conveyed 
and experienced by women. Cultural patterns not only contribute to the triggering of 
depression, they also affect the experience of it. For instance, women are generally less 
encouraged than men to exhibit signs of aggression. Translated into depression, men who 
are depressed are more likely than women to express depression in terms of hostility, 
anger, and aggression. Terrence Real recognizes that while “many men are depressed in 
ways that are similar to women, there are even more men who express depression in less 
well-recognized ways.”330 He argues that the “less-well recognized” signs of depression 
belong to a “cultural cover-up about depression in men.” Real notes that undiagnosed 
depression “drives several of the problems we think of as typically male: physical illness, 
alcohol and drug abuse, domestic violence, failures in intimacy, self-sabotage in 
careers.”331 Because these patterns of behaviors do not fit the traditional model of 
depression, they are less likely to be interpreted by the primary care physician (and 
people in general) as symptomatic of an underlying depressive disorder.  
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Research on the relationship of sexual orientation and depression has a 
complicated background. Sexual orientation has historically and mistakenly been seen as 
a cause of poor mental health. Prior to 1973, the DSM categorized non-normative sexual 
behaviors and preferences as pathologies in-and-of themselves.
332
 Homosexuals have 
unfortunately been subject to various forms of pseudo-therapy aimed at correcting non-
normative sexual orientation and sexual behaviors. Another complicating factor is that 
there is a lack of agreement on how to conceptualize sexual orientation. Also, people’s 
sexual behavior and self-identification might change over time.
333
 Horowitz and 
associates note that while the “literature on depression and mental health suggests that 
differences between SORB [sexual orientation behavior] groups do exist,” the “evidence 
is equivocal.”334 He points to one study that showed that homosexuals report higher rates 
of depression and more suicide attempts than heterosexuals (Bradford et al., 1994),
335
 
whereas two other studies showed no notable differences between these two groups 
(Gonsiorek, 1991 and Zinik, 1985).
336
 With regard to the third study, Horowitz noted that 
it revealed “significantly greater depression” among bisexuals than either homosexuals or 
heterosexuals.
337
 In recent years the suicide rates among bullied gay teenagers is 
garnering national attention and outrage, along with the suicides of teenagers bullied for 
reasons other than sexual orientation.  
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Class  
Socioeconomic status certainly plays a role in the development, diagnosis, and 
treatment of depression; however, not every dimension of socioeconomic status – 
education, income, home ownership, etc. – has the same type of impact on depression. 
Home ownership, for example, is linked with lower rates of depression than household 
income.
338
 In addition, research shows that “not all resources have the same influence on 
the health of all actors.”339 For instance, while rates of depression are highest among 
black women, black women with high socioeconomic resources have the lowest levels of 
depression among black and white men and women.
340
 Roxburgh mentions that despite 
the fact that research shows that black men with low levels of economic resources are 
less depressed than white and black men and women, African American men are 
disproportionately engaged in “externalizing behavior” and “consequently pay an almost 
incalculable price for low resources in the form of higher rates of incarceration, higher 
mortality, and more substance abuse than other groups (Western, 2006).”341  
Interestingly, even though the first-person accounts surveyed in this dissertation 
spanned various social categories of identity, they all portrayed a similar experience of 
depression. The factor that most likely accounts for the convergences among the 
narratives is the high education levels among the authors. Miech and Shanahan point out 
that “poor coping resources such as an external sense of control and low social support 
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are more prevalent among respondents with less education”342 The ability to avoid or 
delay stress exposure primarily corresponds to education levels, which is often a key 
indicator of socioeconomic status. In a study evaluating the rates of depression and 
education levels, it was noted that “individuals with higher education have more health 
resources – such as a better ability to avoid chronic stressors and healthier lifestyles.”343 
Furthermore, this same study found that physical health was the leading indicator in 
accounting for the gap between education levels and rates of depressive symptoms.
344
  
 
Race 
African Americans have also been subject to oppressive categorization in terms of 
mental health. Terrie Williams points out that at “one time in this country, it was a 
accepted belief that Black people who wanted to be free were, by definition, out of their 
minds… a disease with an actual name: drapetomania.”345 Head remarks that, “blacks as 
slaves weren’t perceived as having a psyche susceptible to mental illness.”346 In addition 
to historic and ongoing prejudice, African Americans face numerous obstacles to 
receiving a correct diagnosis and adequate treatment of depression such as the stigma of 
mental illness in Black communities, the prevalence of misdiagnosis and underdiagnosis, 
distrust of the psychiatric and medical communities, and a lack of access to mental health 
care.  
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In a study evaluating the acceptability of treatment for depression among African 
Americans, Hispanics, and whites, it was discovered that African Americans were more 
prone to believe that antidepressant medications were ineffective and addictive, and 
believe that prayer could help heal depression. Both Hispanics and blacks were more 
resistant to counseling and medication than white people.
347
 Consider the following 
conclusions drawn about the acceptability of treatments among these three racially 
differentiated groups: 
African Americans are less likely than white persons to find antidepressant 
medication acceptable. Hispanics are less likely to find antidepressant medication 
acceptable, and more likely to find counseling acceptable than white 
persons…Overall, 70% of patients (n = 579) found anti-depressant medications to 
be an acceptable treatment for depression (74% of white persons, 51% of African 
Americans, 59% of Hispanics).”348 
 
If the combination of counseling and antidepressant medication is indeed the most 
effective treatment for depression, the above study shows that whites are far more likely 
to recover from severe depression than both African Americans and Hispanics. Head 
attributes the resistance to treatment among blacks as stemming from historical bias, the 
church’s stance that God is the only healer of a troubled mind, as well as “mistrust of 
‘experimental’ medicine,” a view stemming from the use and/or withholding of medicine 
in medical research in which blacks were used as “human guinea pigs.”349 In the study 
mentioned above, the results also showed that African Americans preferred to be treated 
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by a medical professional of the same race, more than white or Hispanic individuals.
350
 
Terrie Williams suggests that “Black men are even more suspicious than Black women of 
the primarily white professionals who might help them. They see these experts as being 
in part responsible for the social problems that contribute to their feelings of 
depression.”351 Ellin LaVar writes that the stigma is that “the white man messing up your 
mind.”352 
This mistrust of the medical establishment, particularly mistrust over the 
treatment of one’s mental functioning, speaks to perceived and actual racial homogeneity 
in the medical community that spans the spectrum from individuals used in research to 
the primary care physician in the clinic. Even with all the obstacles that prevent 
individuals from seeking mental health treatment in black communities, when an African 
American does make it to the doctor’s office she then faces the systematic misrecognition 
of depressive symptoms that are common among non-white people. Williams explains 
this process: 
The amazing thing is that even when we bring ourselves to ask medical 
professionals for help, there’s a risk that we won’t get it. Maybe it’s their bias, or 
maybe it’s poor research (which has been done almost exclusively on whites), 
maybe it’s human error…whatever the reason, professionals often don’t recognize 
that the signs and symptoms for depression may be different for African 
American patients than for white patients. These doctors don’t see our distress 
because they aren’t looking through the right lens. They see the effects of 
depression – broken homes, addiction, violence, anger – but not the depression 
itself.
353
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Head also comments on the behavioral effects of depression that are often viewed as 
pathologies of African American communities. Rather than addressing the root causes of 
systemic problems, Head points out that the so-called ‘treatment’ of what are perceived to 
be social ills is to “quarantine us” in prisons.354 He calls attention to the fact that “many 
African American men receive their first and only treatment for mental illness behind 
bars.”355 Unfortunately, as the United State’s most populated centers for the treatment of 
mental illness, in prisons and jails the “treatment is apt to be directed at keeping them 
under control rather than alleviating the effects of their illness.”356 
As evidenced anecdotally and in studies, the stigma around mental illness is 
higher among African Americans than among whites. For the most part, depression 
simply is not a part of the vocabulary of many black families and communities. Meri 
Nana-Ama Danquah writes: “Clinical depression simply did not exist within the realm of 
my possibilities; or, for that matter, within the realm of possibilities for any of the black 
women in my world.”357 She also writes about the negative association of people of color 
with mental illness, which she contrasts to the impression of white men and mental 
illness about whom there is often a glorified view of the relationship between mental 
illness and creativity. Similarly, Yvette Hyater-Adams’s succinctly notes, “Depression is 
what white folks do.”358   
Given the fact that labels like “insane” and “hysterical” have been used to dismiss 
and pathologize difference, politically marginalized groups are often quick to counter-
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identify with the mentally ill. There seems to be a profoundly common fear of appearing 
“crazy” in communities of color. Although mental institutions began dissolving in the 
1970’s and are scarce today, for decades eccentrics and marginalized people legitimately 
feared institutionalization. Social difference, whether in the form of gender or race or 
sexual orientation or any other non-mainstream group, has a history of punishment and 
exile. African Americans have had the legal standing of being less than human, and 
homosexuals have been associated with criminal perversion and mental illness. Today, 
prison is the institution that houses a disproportionate number of blacks and the mentally 
ill. Williams acknowledges that African Americans are “scared to death of being labeled 
mentally ill.”359 She also points to the “long legacy of secrets and lies in the Black 
family” as creating the social condition of silence about pain.360 In line with this view, 
bell hooks recounts the adult voices of her childhood warning her about 
institutionalization: “‘Little girl,’ I would be told, ‘if you don’t stop all this crazy talk and 
crazy acting you are going to end up right out there at Western State [mental 
institution]’.”361 Unfortunately, this counteridentification, even if understandable, reifies 
the insidious stereotypes about mental illness and creates a culture of exclusion and 
silence about mental illness in general. 
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 Silence and Disclosure 
While meanings, practices, and identities are primarily formed in relation to a way 
of living, a form of life does not dictate the limits of life’s possibilities. Various 
conditions that arise within a form of life can serve as challenges to what is understood as 
the given. Challenges to a form of life can come about accidentally, through events, or 
through deliberate scientific inquiry. Questioning the definiteness of one’s form of life 
can even arise from one’s body and emotions. For example, a form of life can be 
contested by the intangible sense that something is not quite right. People who have 
bodies, ideas, and/or feelings that do not accord with their form of life are, whether 
directly or indirectly, challengers to a form of life. For better or for worse, depression is 
another condition that necessarily resists a form of life. It also has the unfortunate effect 
of resisting life itself. This dissertation has thus far given an account of disrupted agency 
in terms of a disrupted form of life, as exemplified by depressive temporalization, 
spatialization, and loss of self; however, depression must also be considered in the way it 
is disruptive to a form of life. The idea of a depressive identity, which is not a contrary to 
depressive illness, can perhaps provide a way for rebuilding agency and also 
renegotiating one’s relationship with a form of life. The depressive can look to other 
deliberate and/or unwitting challengers to a form of life to shed light on what it means to 
embrace a multifarious agency.  
Many people, both before and after a depressive episode, are considered to be 
highly successful entrepreneurs, intellectuals, artists, politicians, physicians, and so forth, 
so it might seem that their cultural authority and success undermine the idea that they that 
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they have a disrupted form of life. The fact that some depressives can function in some 
settings some of the time, speaks to the fact that depression has developmental stages and 
that depressives experience a multiplicity of identities. In some stages of depression, the 
individual is able to repress depressive symptoms for a certain period of time. Williams 
characterizes this functional depressive self as “passing for normal.” This idea of 
“passing for normal” hearkens to the idea of “passing for white.” The act of passing 
suggests that one hides the truth of her identity in order to fit the norms of a particular 
community. The projected appearance of normalcy is not necessarily a betrayal of one’s 
true feelings. Passing for normal can be a means of coping with depressive symptoms 
and is often a feeble attempt to hold on and survive.  
Often the ability of depressives to function in one role, usually work related, 
belies the crippling effect of pain in depression. Brampton speaks about the fact that she 
and other depressives are “capable of smiling and talking cheerfully while at the same 
time planning our own deaths.”362 For some depressives, the attempt to pass for normal is 
experienced as an active and exhausting holding back. Passing can take on the normative 
tone of trying to pass for someone else and attempting to hide one’s identity. Williams 
repeatedly refers to the “mask” that she and other people wear in depression. She writes, 
“I had reduced myself to two modes: my game face, the soul-destroying mask I wore to 
work, and the numbed-out shell of a woman who sat alone in her apartment eating and 
sleeping.”363 In the essay “Moving to New Boroughs,” Peg O’Connor describes the 
posture of hiding one’s difference as having an active rather than a passive quality. 
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Secretiveness, she argues, is an attempt to control other people’s access to oneself.364 The 
“active” quality of what O’Connor labels ‘secretiveness’ does not necessarily originate 
from the person who is consciously withholding something. Also, secretiveness can be 
the necessary stance of the person who is in an environment that is hostile to the thing 
that is hidden. In other words, secretiveness is reactive. The depressive’s silence about 
her illness is often an unreflective defensive stance. On the other hand, for some 
depressives, an active and conscious withholding of information regarding depression 
does take place. Jamison notes that when she reaches a certain level of intimacy with 
someone she faces the discomfort of whether to mention her illness. She says that not 
talking about her depression with someone “generally consigns a friendship to a certain 
inevitable level of superficiality.”365 
The secretiveness about depression is in part a reaction to the perception that 
nobody else feels the same way. Head writes: “You don’t seek out others who are living 
the same kind of life; you’re convinced that there are no others who suffer the way you 
do.”366 However, as Williams came to find, “The more I took off my mask, the more I 
shared my story, the more folks shared back with me.”367 She speaks of “coming out” for 
the first time about her struggle with depression and the liberating effect of telling the 
truth.
368
 The acts of passing and coming out can be used as examples for the depressive’s 
attempts to respectively hide and disclose her depression. They provide models for how 
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to express and make sense of the shame and isolation of depression and the struggle for 
recognition and acceptance.  
Depressives could benefit from having their own form of what has become the 
empowering – though for many people a dangerous - cultural ritual of ‘coming out.’ 
However, one reason that the expression “coming out” inappropriately applies to the 
experience of revealing one’s experiences with depression is that coming out depressed is 
not connected with a larger ritualistic and subversive movement. Coming out about one’s 
sexuality is not simply an individual moment of disclosure; it is a performative utterance 
that celebrates one’s identity and joins one to a larger community. That is not to say that 
everyone who discloses his or her non-normative sexual orientation wants to do so or 
even that he or she is comfortable with his or her own sexuality. On an individual basis, 
coming out may not originate from feelings of pride, and some people are ‘outed’ against 
their wishes; nevertheless, from a cultural standpoint, “coming out” has become a 
ritualistic expression and assertion of one’s agency. While disclosing one’s experience 
with depression may not have the same cultural significance as ‘coming out’ and lacks 
the quality of pride and celebration, it is nevertheless a form of self-affirmation. Self-
affirmation of one’s depressive identity might seem like a misnomer, given that it is 
depression that erodes one’s sense of self. Disclosing one’s struggle with depression is a 
form of self-affirmation in as much as it reasserts the ‘I’ – “I suffer from depression” – 
and it gives voice to one’s experience with depression. 
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 A more appropriate, although less recognized, ritual of disclosure is a type of 
language game that O’Connor addresses, ‘breaking the silence.’369 “Breaking the silence” 
refers to the charge of unveiling the actions and actors involved in abuse, oppression, and 
violence. Unlike “coming out,” which implies that the person coming out is in fact 
coming out about herself, “breaking the silence” can be a collective or individual act, 
often by of a social welfare group, a bystander, a victim or group of victims, a governing 
body, and in rare cases, the perpetrator(s) of violence. Like violence, depression is 
unequivocally a form of mental and physical suffering, and the disclosure of one’s 
experience with depression is not an act that celebrates this experience. Depressives, like 
victims of violence, can celebrate surviving and overcoming, but they do not celebrate 
the pain itself. Ultimately, the act of breaking the silence about depression can be 
empowering and liberating; it is both an assertion and forging of agency. Brampton 
writes: “I have discovered that when I break the treaty of silence, I am amazed to find 
how many people will join me.”370 Unveiling one’s struggle with depression can be a 
way of rebuilding one’s connections with other people and a form of life.  
 
Conclusion 
 
A philosophical reflection on the depressive’s experience of self-loss, agential 
conflict, and attenuated cognitive attachments demands a critical engagement with 
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theories of identity. In my view, a theory of identity as multiplicitous can account for the 
alterations to identity and one’s sense of self in depression without reinforcing normative 
ideals of authenticity or unity. A philosophical investigation of the depressive’s social 
identity also raises pragmatic questions about the social structuring of depression as an 
illness and the roles that social categories of identity play in the assessment, diagnosis, 
and treatment of depression. While depression disrupts one’s agency and sense of self, 
the identification with ‘depression’ can function as an intellectually and pragmatically 
productive means for understanding one’s experience of depression, as well as establish a 
foundation for one’s recovery from it. In the next chapter I will address the disruption of 
form of life in terms of the depressive’s disrupted discursive agency. I will show how the 
symptoms related to ‘language-loss’ in depression are emblematic of the depressive’s 
sense of a loss of meaning and loss of voice.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
DISCURSIVE DISRUPTION AND THE ESTRANGEMENT FROM 
AFFECTIVE MEANING 
 
Introduction 
 
Thus far I have proposed that we understand depression within the broader 
context of its relation to a form of life. A form of life infuses temporality, spatiality, 
interpersonal relations, and one’s sense of self. Language and meaning are also defined 
by and function within a form of life. How one experiences the passage of time, one’s 
surroundings, one’s body, and other people, and how one uses language and lives in 
language, only has meaning, expression, and purpose within the wider context of a form 
of life.  When a person experiences a mental illness, it alters her relation to and 
experience within a form of life. Severe depression does not simply interfere with 
discreet elements of existence; it interferes with and alters the functions, meanings, and 
experiential aspects of an entire way of living. It is not simply that a person’s life gets 
disrupted in depression; depression disrupts her form of life. Depression erodes the 
vitality and pull of the multifarious intersubjective structures that undergird meaningful 
action, meaningful orientation, and meaningful experience.  
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In this chapter I will show how the various elements of depressive disruption are 
interconnected with the depressive’s estrangement from language. Also, I will show that 
language-loss does not result from an apparent inadequacy of language or the 
indescribability of depression. Multiple social, physiological, and psychological 
structures and systems are implicated in the depressive’s loss of language. The 
depressive’s experience of language-loss is interconnected with a breakdown of meaning 
structures, a withdrawal from interpersonal relations, an alteration in how the depressive 
perceives and judges the world, desynchronization, a lack of emotional resonance, and 
social silencing. I contend that a disruption of language and meaning in depression is not 
principally a failure of representation and cannot be reduced to an intellectual 
dysfunction. Ultimately, the depressive’s loss of language is tied to a broader 
estrangement from meaning and meaning-making. This estrangement from meaning is 
grounded in the depressive’s affective disconnection and disordering. The alterations to 
the forms, expressions, and meanings of one’s affective life in depression spread 
throughout the depressive’s entire existence and disrupt the depressive’s form of life. The 
disturbance of language and linguistic abilities constitute a surface problem – the 
depressive symptom – while the underlying problem of language-loss is the diminished 
felt-meaning of linguistic expressions. What is experienced by the depressive as 
discursive disruption belongs to a more widespread disruption of the role of affect in 
meaning-making and meaning-processing. The breakdown of the depressive’s discursive 
agency occurs as a disruption of meaning and voice. The depressive’s estrangement from 
language does not exclusively pertain to the depressive’s loss of speech. Her 
estrangement from language consists of a thoroughgoing rupture of the various linguistic 
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and non-linguistic structures that participate in meaningful communication, perception, 
feeling, thought, behavior, and interaction.  
Language-loss is relational and the breakdown of relations in depression can 
occur at the level of concepts, names, meanings, and grammar, as well as at the level of 
social relations. This disintegration of linguistic agency and structures of meaning does 
not emerge exclusively as a problem of and for the depressive. In this chapter I will also 
confront the roles that the interlocutor and the social environment play in the depressive’s 
deterioration of communication. This chapter concludes with an account of the elements 
at play in the depressive’s recovery of meaning and revitalization of voice. As is attested 
to in many of the narratives, it is through writing to and talking with an understanding 
and receptive interlocutor that depressed individuals have been able to rebuild themselves 
and recover a voice. Due to the physicality of depression, loss of futurity, proximity of 
death, and estrangement from oneself and others, depression appears to create its own 
rules, its own way of behaving and speaking – its own language-game predicated on the 
breakdown of language. A constructive language-game of depression established through 
the shared experiences of depressives potentially opens up a space for the depressive’s 
recovery of language. 
 
Part One: The Estrangement from Meaning and Language 
 
 ‘Language’ and ‘language-loss’ 
Throughout the dissertation I have used ‘language’ to refer to the coalescence of 
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various types of communicative exchanges that take place in and through linguistic 
expression. My use of ‘language’ always refers to particular living languages spoken in 
particular social, historical, and geographical contexts, which are always reproduced by 
particular speakers guided by particular grammatical and semantic regularities, 
metacommunicative styles, normative attitudes, economic conditions, etc. I contend that 
language only has meaning in a form of life; it is essentially bound up with practices, 
attitudes, habits, and styles. One’s life within language involves ways of perceiving, 
understanding, acting, and feeling. Language is not a unified structure and does not have 
a unified or homogenous grammar, use, form, medium, or presentation. While language 
is a social practice, it also functions at the level of one’s thoughts, emotions, 
subconscious states, and even in one’s physical movements. Language operates at the 
intersection of the body and mind, thought and act, understanding and feeling, and the 
self and other.  
One can gain insight into the elements and functions of language by looking at 
how language breaks down as well as how it works. Just as language is heterogeneous, 
language-loss is also multiplicitous in its sources, forms, elements, and functions. 
Historically, philosophical propositions about ‘language’ have focused on linguistic and 
semantic elements assumed to be common to most forms of language and to most 
speakers. Philosophers of language have focused on the problems associated with 
meaning, intention, sign, reference, speech acts, etc. The consideration of linguistic 
errors, such as slips of the tongue, elisions, and miscommunication are evaluated as self-
contained, linguistic anomalies. Linguistic phenomena that do not apply to “most people” 
are either relegated to the margins or dismissed altogether. Most philosophical accounts 
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that consider the contexts, embodiment, and politicization of speakers presume the 
framework of mental health. The use and disruption of language in depression bring to 
the fore philosophical problems concerning the relationships among language, meaning, 
identity, and the body. In particular, the disruption of language in depression reveals the 
often overlooked and undervalued role that affect plays in constituting meaning and 
discursive agency.  
Cesare Ripa’s 1603 engraving titled “Melancholicus” depicts the figure of a 
melancholy scholar with his mouth covered by a scarf and a man throwing himself into a 
river.
371
 In The Interior Castle, Teresa of Avilla attests to the damage done to the 
melancholy person’s ability to comprehend words: 
…if a person in this state who knows how to read well takes up a book in the 
vernacular, he will find that he understands no more of it than if he didn’t know 
how to read even one of the letters, for the intellect is incapable of 
understanding.
372
  
 
What is it about melancholy that can silence a scholar and drive a man to suicide? What 
does a malady such as depression teach us about the relationships among language, 
thought, affect, and agency? Does it speak to the content of our words, the arbitrariness of 
the signifier, or the tenuous connection between name and referent? Is it a referendum on 
the presumed primacy of language in thought? Does it reveal the power of the semiotic 
over the symbolic? Is it a protest against the symbolic or does it signal the impotency of 
the symbolic in the face of despair? Is the depressive’s estrangement from language an 
exclusively linguistic phenomenon? In the above passage, Teresa of Avilla locates the 
                                                 
371
 Radden, The Nature of Melancholy: From Aristotle to Kristeva, 2000, 11  
372
 Ibid, 114 
209 
 
melancholy person’s diminished capacity to read in the intellect. However, the 
depressive’s inability to process language accompanies an overall disengagement from 
one’s social and natural environment, which infuses every aspect of one’s way of living 
with a profound estrangement from meaning, sense, and familiarity. 
My use of ‘language-loss’ refers to the various discursive practices disrupted in 
depression, such as the disrupted capacities to read, write, speak, converse, listen, and 
communicate with oneself in thought. For the depressive, the words of a familiar book 
can appear to be written in a foreign script. The words often look empty and hollow. The 
depressive also frequently hears the speech of other people as remote and hard to follow, 
similar to what it is like to listen to someone speaking underwater. Depression has the 
effect of defamiliarizing the sights, sounds, and meanings of words and phrases. Jeffrey 
Smith recounts that depression kept him from speaking and inhibited his ability to 
understand other people's speech. He remarks, “I could not speak; and I could not 
listen...I saw his lips moving, but his words were lost on me.”373 Even when the 
depressive is able to speak, her phrasing is typically monotone, monosyllabic, and full of 
elisions. Robert Burton describes melancholics as being “of few words, and oftentimes 
wholly silent.”374 In “On the Signs of Melancholy’s Appearance,” Avicenna refers to the 
“abandonment of conversation” as one of the first signs of melancholy.375 Often the 
depressive finds herself paralyzed as she struggles to speak. The words feel somehow 
trapped inside her. However, words are not stuck like a whole piece of candy lodged in 
one’s throat. The words are not formed, not complete; they feel wedged somewhere in the 
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neural sphere. The depressive knows they exist, has used them countless times, yet they 
swirl around in a dark cloud of non-grammatically structured thought.
376
  
The disruption of speech and the disruption of linguistic confidence are the most 
prevalent and noticeable feature of the depressive’s estrangement from language. When 
depressives do speak, they tend to speak slowly and with a flat tone. They frequently 
limit expressions to single syllable words and taper off at the end of sentences. Styron 
described his attempt to speak as sounding like a “hoarse murmur.”377 Depressives’ 
verbal utterances also lack the facial expressions and bodily gestures that commonly 
accompany the speech of non-depressives. Eye contact, tonal emphasis, hand gestures, 
and the various elements that factor in to the musicality and expressive dimension of 
speech are typically missing when the depressive attempts to talk. Depressives describe 
the act of speaking as being effortful and demanding excessive energy. The energy to 
initiate and sustain communication evades the depressive, and like her body, words can 
feel heavy and hard to move. Even the act of vocalizing the initial sound of a word can 
seem to require an unfeasible surge of strength. Andrew Solomon describes the 
communication of simple linguistic expressions as feeling like a complex, intricate 
intellectual feat.
378
 Martha Manning differentiates between the difficulty of giving a 
verbal response and the inability of initiating speech. She writes, “It’s enough just to 
speak when spoken to, to give some minimal reaction to a stimulus. But to actually be the 
stimulus doesn’t even occur.”379 The generative force of one’s own discursive agency is 
severely diminished in depression. Meaning no longer feels as if it is self-generating, and 
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the depressive lacks the discursive agency from which she could play an active role in 
making sense. 
While the depressive’s experience of language-loss is powerful and real, 
depressive ‘language-loss’ nevertheless has the ‘as if’ structure that distinguishes 
depressive symptoms from other disorders. The effects of depression on language 
resemble the symptoms of other conditions that accompany brain lesions and brain 
injuries that occur in neural regions of the brain, regions that impact the motor and 
cognitive functions necessary for speech and language comprehension. Take for example 
Solomon’s claim that once “you cross over [into depression], the rules all change. 
Everything that had been written in English is now in Chinese…”380  This experience 
resembles alexia, a condition caused by brain injury or disease that impairs one’s ability 
to comprehend written and spoken language. In Solomon’s case, though depression does 
not actually cause English print to look like Chinese script, the words on a page might as 
well be written in a foreign script. The depressive can look at a word and recognize it, but 
the word holds no meaning. It is as if it is foreign because the depressive can no more 
read in her mother tongue than she can in the foreign language. Similarly, while the 
depressive’s speech might be confused and lumbering, it is not the case that the 
depressive’s arrangement of words is utterly incoherent as is the case for a patient with 
aphasia. If it is eventually shown to be the case that depressives do in fact undergo an 
alteration of the neural networks involved in the comprehension, processing, and 
articulation of language, the impairment does not appear to be permanent.
381
 In addition, 
                                                 
380
 Solomon, 2002, 49 
381
 Lesions caused by depression have yet to be detected by autopsy or brain scans. 
212 
 
the appearance of the symptoms of depressive language-loss is not static, and the 
intensity and form of language-loss can change over time. 
Language-loss can occur in the deepest throes of depression, yet the depressive 
does not undergo a single, permanent, and uniform alteration of her use of and 
relationship to language throughout the duration of a depressive episode. Like depression, 
the estrangement from language and meaning in depression is non-teleologically 
developmental. In other words, depression and its corresponding disrupted 
phenomenological domains have a developmental structure, a structure that does not have 
an intrinsic path or resolution. Language-loss in depression can be broken down into four 
main forms of loss: being at a loss to find the right words, a loss of one’s ability/desire to 
speak, a loss of content (not having anything to say), and a loss of sense. The first form of 
loss is bound to the inadequacy of language to express and represent the depressive 
experience. This form of loss pertains to the apparent failure of one’s language to 
adequately represent depression and the impotency of language to console or make sense 
of the pain. The second form of loss – the lack of interest in talking and an inability to 
speak – is the most commonly described, but perhaps hardest to explain. The third form 
of loss, loss of content, is a response to the void and emptiness that engulfs the depressed, 
rendering her silent, with nothing to say. The fourth form of loss occurs when the 
familiarity of language is lost to the depressed and the meanings of words slip away. 
From the look of a word to the performative meaning of an utterance, language 
can break down at many points. Merleau-Ponty addresses some of the complex ways that 
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language can be disrupted and avers that “linguistic deficiencies cannot be reduced to a 
unity.”382 He claims that linguistic disturbances can affect  
…the body of the word, the material instrument of verbal expression – sometimes 
the word’s physiognomy, the verbal intention…sometimes the immediate 
meaning of the word…and sometimes the structure of the whole experience, not 
merely the linguistic experience.
383
 
 
Language-loss is a pervasive disruption of a meaningfully and linguistically structured 
way of living. The sound of the depressive’s voice, which is thin, weak, quiet, broken, 
and monotone, attests to the disruption of the depressive’s discursive agency. Both the 
material voice and the concept ‘voice’ capture the interconnectedness of meaning, 
identity, and language. One can have no clearer picture of the depressive’s loss of 
meaning, identity, and language than one can by considering the depressive’s disruption 
and loss of voice. 
 
Meaning 
Language-loss involves a breakdown of verbal and non-verbal meanings, 
meanings that are interconnected with an embodied form of life. This disintegration of 
meaning can take place at any level of signification, in any instance of meaningful 
movement, in any aspect of linguistic communication, for any symbolically structured 
perception, and with any identifiable affect. The term “meaning” can be used to refer to 
the sense of a linguistic expression; it can also be used in reference to an existential 
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and/or spiritual significance of an experience, belief, feeling, etc. ‘Meaning’ can also be 
understood in terms of ‘sense,’ ‘purpose,’ and ‘significance.’ These three types of 
meaning – sense, purpose, and significance – can themselves be used in different ways. 
They can refer to the meanings of the particular elements that make up a linguistic 
expression, the overall meaning of an expression, and a range of experiences that are not 
explicitly linguistic. For instance, meaning as sense can refer to the definition, 
connotation, denotation, and intelligibility of an expression, experience, feeling, and 
practice. Meaning as purpose can be understood as the function and/or aim of an 
expression, experience, feeling, and practice. Meaning as significance can indicate the 
implication, value, and importance of an expression, experience, feeling, and practice. 
These different uses of ‘meaning’ are not exhaustive, and the differences among them are 
often indistinguishable in our everyday way of talking about them. For example, “sense” 
is often used interchangeably to refer to meaning as purpose. A person can say that 
something does not make sense, in which case the person means that it has no meaning 
(purpose) in a given context. The attempt to understand language-loss in depression can 
benefit from an investigation into the different ways that depressives are estranged from 
meanings, even if these differences are often overlapping. 
For the most part, meanings come to us ready-made. As children we are taught the 
meanings of words and how and when to use them. People tend to passively and 
unreflectively iterate and apprehend the meanings of verbal expressions. Similar to the 
way that familiar movements like brushing one’s teeth or waving one’s hand become 
habitualized and automatic, linguistic comprehension and speech often take place as if 
they occur on their own. We say things like “Pass the salt” and “Good morning” and 
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“The other day I saw the strangest thing” without effort or deliberation. While meanings 
seem to be passively handed down and repeated, each iteration of a word functions as its 
revivification. Linguistic meaning is continually reenacted. This active quality of sense-
making, while typically overlooked in our everyday practices, most often comes to the 
fore when something goes awry. Mistakes, misunderstandings, forgotten words, and 
uncomfortable verbal exchanges serve as reminders that we are not simply passive 
vehicles for speech to flow through us, but we are active participants in sense-making.  
The verb “to make” in the expression “makes sense” reflects an act of creation. Of 
course when asked “What are you making?” a person would not respond, “I am making 
sense.” Yet there can be an active construction taking place in the process of 
understanding the meaning of something. Let’s say a person reads the truism, “If you 
hoot with the owls at night, you can’t soar with the eagles in the morning.” If asked what 
it means she might say, “I cannot make sense of this expression” or “I am still trying to 
make sense of this expression.” The grammatical structure of these particular responses 
shows that the burden of sense-making is on the person reflecting on the expression (e.g. 
“I cannot make sense…”). Alternatively one can respond by saying “This expression does 
not make sense,” in which case the sense-making appears to be the task of the expression 
itself. On the one hand, the meaning of this expression appears to be the property of the 
expression. The statement is equivalent to “This expression is nonsensical.” On the other 
hand, the statement could be interpreted as if the expression is its own source of agency 
(e.g. “The expression conveys nothing”). It can appear to be the case that the sense-
making implied in the comment “This expression does not make sense” falls somewhere 
in-between being the attribute of the expression and an act of the expression. With this 
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way of looking at meaning, it seems that the expression does not quite actively make the 
meaning, yet it does not simply passively possess it.  
In addition to placing the burden of sense-making on the expression and on the 
receiver of the expression, sense-making can also be attributed to the speaker or the 
author of an expression. Let’s say that two people are in a conversation and one speaker 
says to the other, “If you hoot with the owls at night, you cannot soar with the eagles in 
the morning.” The other person can respond, “That expression does not make sense.” In 
such a case, the sense of the expression is still not related to the first speaker’s ability to 
speak meaningfully. However, if the second person remarks “You are not making any 
sense,” then the burden of sense-making is placed on the first speaker. Alternatively, 
semantic responsibility can be distributed between the two people if the second speaker 
adds “to me” to the end of the claim: “You are not making any sense to me.” This 
addition of “to me” places blame on both speakers for the unsuccessful communicative 
exchange.  
The truism can also be considered to be intelligible but nonsensical. For example, 
the second speaker might respond, “I understand the idea, but not why you said it now.” 
The expression is nonsensical to the second speaker because of the context in which it 
was said. For instance, the first speaker might have said, “If you hoot with the owls at 
night, you cannot soar with the eagles in the morning” in response to a question about 
where she was born. An expression can be said to be intelligible but not sensible if the 
expression does not resonate with one’s life. While the expression is still meaningful on 
one level, it does make sense on another level. In this case, one might say, “That used to 
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make sense to me, but now that I’ve seen eagles soaring during the day on several 
occasions, it no longer seems relevant.” Here ‘sense’ pertains to the relevance of the 
expression and how the expression matches up with one’s experience. 
If semantic responsibility can be attributed to multiple elements within a single 
utterance, how should one go about understanding where meaning breaks down for the 
depressive? For the most part, the depressive attributes the lack of meaningfulness of an 
utterance to the expression itself (“It no longer makes sense”) or to a failure on both the 
part of the expression and herself (“It no longer makes sense to me”). The depressive 
rarely seems to place the blame for a communicative failure (i.e. when sense is not 
successfully conveyed) on another person. The depressive recognizes that language is 
working fine for the people around her. The depressive reads sentences and knows they 
should make sense or listens to a friend and knows that she should understand what her 
friend is saying. Likewise, the depressive can remember when language seemed to work 
fine for her. The depressive’s claim of the unintelligibility of language is not a judgment 
on the status or legitimacy of the speaker, but a judgment on the depressive’s own 
linguistic competence. If the depressive attributes the lack of meaningfulness to herself 
and/or to the expressions she encounters, what does this say about the breakdown of 
meaning in depression?  
Even though the depressive might place the blame on herself or on language 
itself, throughout the chapter I will show ways in which both the interlocutor and the 
context play important roles in the breakdown of meaning in depression. Ultimately I 
locate the cause of the depressive’s semantic disruption on her diminished capacity for 
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affective connection. The depressive’s linguistic estrangement is symptomatic of an 
estrangement from what the contemporary philosopher Eugene Gendlin calls the “felt 
meaning” of word.384 Similar to the way that the depressive can perceive the features of 
her surroundings as bearers of depressive properties (the sky as grey, the light as dim, 
etc.), meaning can also appear to the depressive as the missing property of words. 
Depressives describe written words as appearing empty and spoken words as sounding 
distant. Often when a verbal expression no longer makes sense to the depressive, the 
depressive can nevertheless recognize the words. The depressive can know the sense of a 
word and yet feel that it no longer makes sense. In this case, the depressive does not fail 
to recognize words; nevertheless, she gets lost in the meaning of the verbal expression. 
Imagine what it would be like to see a house that has a fully intact exterior, but no floor 
or foundation. One would say that it is a house, but not a house. It looks like a house, but 
cannot function as one because it is suspended in air.
385
 Similarly, for the depressive, 
words can appear and sound intact and recognizable, yet simultaneously feel hollow and 
flimsy. It is as if the sense and familiarity drops out from under the word; it is in 
Merleau-Ponty’s characterization “modified down to its sensible aspect, it is 
emptied…”386 
Familiarity and meaning often seem to be intangible qualities of words 
themselves. Both Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty refer to words as having a particular 
“physiognomy.” Wittgenstein remarks that words can have a “familiar physiognomy,” 
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which he describes as the feeling that a word “has taken up its meaning into itself, that it 
is an actual likeness of its meaning.”387 Features of words, like the curve of an “S” or the 
rhythm of “tit for tat,” can feel as familiar as the smell of coffee or the sound of seagulls. 
Words like “slithering” and “rainbow” somehow acquire “an actual likeness of [their] 
meaning.”388 “Slithering” moves through one’s mind as if it itself is creepy and wet. 
“Rainbow” feels full of color and light. Yet familiarity is not an actual attribute of any 
particular thing. Familiarity first and foremost qualifies a relation. How we live in and 
with language imbues words with feeling, memories, familiarity, and ultimately with 
meaning. Merleau-Ponty describes this familiarity as the “near-presence of words.”389 
Merleau-Ponty understands the familiarity of language as an existential nearness. 
‘Existential’ does not refer to depth of meaning, spiritual meaning, or universal meaning; 
it is the living, social, and experiential meaning. For Merleau-Ponty, the “existential 
meaning” of a word refers to the way in which language is lived out.390 The near-
presence of language points to a pragmatic proximity between the word and the speaker. 
It speaks to the existential and felt meanings of words and the ways in which words have 
a place in one’s form of life.  
Just as meanings are created in action and interaction, the depressive’s loss of 
lived meaning is connected to her withdrawal and inaction. Objects and words lose their 
meaning in as much as they lose their pull. The depressive is no longer drawn to the 
things and beings of her world; they lose their utility, their place, their purpose, and 
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eventually fail to make sense. To borrow Merleau-Ponty’s words, the depressive “is not 
caught up in” her environment.391 She “no longer asks” of her environment and she no 
longer expects it to respond.
392
 It is not simply the case that the depressive has nothing to 
say in withdrawal; it is as if the world also has “nothing more to ‘say’” 393 to the 
depressive. As long as the depressive fails to interact with her natural and social 
environment, she remains decontextualized and meanings remain remote. 
It could be helpful to look at other ways that language can lose its familiarity in 
order to better understand what takes place in depression. Artistic expression, whether in 
the form of poetry, visual art, theater, music, and so forth, can be a means for dislodging 
the felt-meanings of words and expressions through odd juxtapositions, misuse, or the 
atypical emphasis of words. Art can draw attention to the materiality of the sign – to its 
sound or visual form – whereas in our everyday use of language it typically goes 
unnoticed. The artistic de-contextualization of language from its ordinary usage is also a 
form of re-contextualization. Art repositions language within a new context and creates 
different ways of experiencing language. Meanings can slip away and change when they 
are removed from their usual context. Similarly, the depressive’s estrangement from 
meaning can be accounted for in terms of her decontextualization. However, unlike 
aesthetic forms of decontextualization, which tend to be situation/event/form specific, the 
depressive loses a familiarity with language and meanings in general. It is not the case 
that the context has simply shifted for the depressive. The depressed individual does not 
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move out of one context and into another one; she loses the sense of being involved in 
any particular context.  
Take for example Gregor’s sense of decontextualization in Kafka’s 
Metamorphosis. In many ways Kafka’s story of Gregor’s extreme alteration of identity 
mirrors the depressive’s descent into an unrecognizable world and self. 394 Kafka’s 
Metamorphosis captures the interconnection of loss of existential-nearness with the 
experience of a disrupted form of life. In the Metamorphosis, the protagonist Gregor 
undergoes a drastic existential alteration as he suddenly awakens to his lost human form 
and encounters his new identity as a human-sized insect. Gregor unexpectedly finds 
himself with a new voice, a new body, and eventually a new sense of self.
395
 The many 
conversions of Gregor’s life all take place within the familiar setting of his room and his 
family’s flat. How Gregor perceives his surroundings and how others perceive him 
fundamentally change even though he never actually leaves his home or his family. Items 
as common and comforting as furniture no longer have use or purchase for his newly 
changed self. With an increasing sense of alienation, Gregor becomes indifferent to his 
situation and begins to lose sight of his humanity.
396
 Gregor no longer participates in the 
form of life of his family and his past. 
In a severe episode of depression, the depressive can even lack the perspective 
and situatedness from which something can appear to be relevant or irrelevant. The 
experience of relevancy only functions in a context and against an existing background of 
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other significant things (practices, acts, meanings, etc.). Depression disrupts one’s ability 
to judge or feel relevance. The difference between the depressive’s experience and other 
experiences in which language is defamiliarized (such as aesthetic experiences) is that the 
depressive’s facility for linguistic practices does not return when she ventures into the 
world. One has to live in and with language in order for it to feel familiar and full. The 
depressive’s affective capacity for familiarization is damaged and when the feelings 
associated with language dissipate, the meaning itself changes or appears to be lacking. 
The sense of being in a foreign environment stays with the depressive even when she is 
among friends and situated in a once-familiar environment. While it is true that when a 
person is removed from a certain context she is more likely to lose touch with the verbal 
and non-verbal practices of that context, simply being in a familiar place and among 
familiar people cannot resituate the depressive. A once-familiar context cannot secure the 
familiarity and roundedness of language. For meaning to take hold, a person must be a 
participant in her world and affectively engaged with it. 
 
Language and its inadequacies  
In this section I will address a few philosophical approaches to the problem of 
depressive language-loss. One can understand the source of depressive language-loss as 
being attributable to the failure of language itself, a failure of sociality, and/or a failure of 
the body.
397
 Regarding the first dimension, I will address the idea of language-loss 
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emerging from the inadequacy of language and the inadequacy of particular language-
games. Secondly, I will focus on the social dimension of language-loss by looking at the 
depressive’s alienation from the symbolic order, interpersonal relationships, and social 
practices. Thirdly, I will examine a few accounts of how the body can get in the way of 
speech. While the effects and sources of language-loss cannot be adequately explained in 
terms of any one of these dimensions, it is my contention that elements from each of 
these approaches factor into the disruption of discursive agency in depression. Even 
though these approaches help contribute to an understanding of language-loss in 
depression, it is my contention that the loss of language in depression indicates a 
problematic relation with language that is not necessarily a problem intrinsic to language. 
Language is sometimes used as the scapegoat for the linguistic failures in 
depression, and it is often deemed to be an inadequate medium for capturing the 
experience of depression. Language can be said to lack the agility, precision, depth, 
and/or emotive aptitude for something as deep and disordering as depression. For Jeffrey 
Smith, it is not that language lacks precision but that language is too concrete to describe 
the experience of depression. He describes the depressive as being a resident in “some 
parallel universe, a place inclined to resist the concrete nouns, verbs, and adjectives...”398 
Similarly, Karen Armstrong describes language as being too “neat” and orderly to depict 
the confusion and distress wrought by depression. She views language as being 
essentially antithetical to the experience of depression and depicts depression as an 
“experience that has nothing whatever to do with words or ideas and is not amenable to 
the logic of grammar and neat sentences that put things into an order that makes 
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sense.”399 Both Armstrong and Smith fault language for its orderliness and concreteness. 
It is as if language is too good for depression rather than inadequate.  
Depressives also characterize depression as being so life-negating, dark, and full 
of despair that language cannot seem to reach it. One of Kristeva’s patients would often 
say, “I speak…as if at the edge of words…but the bottom of my sorrow remains 
unreachable.”400 For the patient, depression feels too cavernous to be illuminated by the 
type of clarity that language can provide. However, the most troubling problem for the 
depressive is not that language is too weak, flimsy, and distant from the reality of 
depression to be able to adequately give voice to her sorrow; the problem is that language 
feels remote and absent. The familiarity and ease of language-use is a reality no longer 
realized for the depressive. To say that language does not reach the bottom of depression 
is a statement about the profound isolation, terror, and confusion of depression. It is not, 
however, a claim about the ontological status of language. Depression does not exist 
outside of language or at the limits of language. It is not a realm of experience or of being 
that exceeds language. First and foremost, language is not contained within a defined 
realm of knowability and sayability. That is not to say that language is thereby 
everywhere; rather, it is to say that language is not a bounded entity or limited by internal 
properties. Words are real and concrete for the depressive; it is depression that touches on 
unreality. 
What one claims that language can and cannot express is largely a matter of what 
a form of life sanctions as being unintelligible and undescribable. Social groups passively 
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and actively set limits on permissible discursive practices. Encouragement, disapproval, 
punishment, and overt censorship are just a few ways of propagating discursive attitudes. 
These attitudes in turn become the embodied habits of individuals. Bourdieu points out 
that social conditions not only mold ways of thinking and speaking, they also shape what 
is designated as unthinkable and unspeakable.
401
 Because of the normative limitations 
inculcated by individuals within a social group, a person may not have access to a 
vocabulary that could actually aid the communication and understanding of the 
depressive experience. Often, subtle and nuanced notions of class, gender, sex, and race 
influence our judgments concerning who is susceptible to depression. It also impacts who 
gets to talk about depression and who has knowledge of ‘depression.’ Given the 
prevalence of stigma associated with mental illness, it is a plausible assumption that 
social structures lead to the depressive’s loss of speech. The implicit and explicit views of 
depression as a personal weakness can become incorporated modes of self-silencing.  
Stigma presumes some degree of awareness and knowledge of that which is 
stigmatized. However, not every form of social silencing is associated with stigma. If a 
person lives in a social environment that does not give voice to the depressive experience, 
whether as ‘depression’ or as something else, then it is plausible that the absence of a 
suitable discursive framework for understanding one’s experience with depression could 
lead to a general discursive disorientation. Brampton recalls a fellow suicidal patient in 
the psychiatric hospital who could not tell people how he felt and would only utter “I 
don’t understand.”402 The inability to adequately conceptualize one’s suffering can create 
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a sense of powerlessness and lead to mental confusion and unease. In contrast, the act of 
acquiring a psychiatric vocabulary and framework often helps people regain a sense of 
control.  
In Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, Miranda Fricker argues 
that the absence of a suitable hermeneutic framework for understanding one’s situation 
constitutes, in many cases, what she calls an ‘epistemic injustice.’ The specific form of 
epistemic injustice that she refers to as ‘hermeneutic injustice’ occurs when a group’s 
“social situation is such that a collective hermeneutical gap prevents them in particular 
from making sense of an experience which it is strongly in their interests to render 
intelligible.”403 She appeals to the tradition within feminism that brings attention to the 
“way in which relations of power can constrain women’s ability to understand their own 
experience.”404 Fricker points to forums such as ‘speak outs’ in the 1960’s as means for 
raising consciousness of women’s issues and experiences. In these events the ability for 
women to share “half-formed understandings” with each other gave rise to “social 
meaning that brought clarity, cognitive confidence, and increased communicate 
facility.”405 She uses a story from Susan Brownmiller’s writings on the women’s 
liberation movement in the United States to exemplify this experience of hermeneutical 
clarity. Brownmiller refers to a young mother, Wendy Sanford, who discovered at one of 
these meetings that she, like so many others, suffered from post-partum depression. 
Sanford explains, “In that one forty-five-minute period I realized that what I’d been 
blaming myself for, and what my husband had blamed me for, wasn’t my personal 
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deficiency.”406 Fricker describes the increased awareness of a condition like post-partum 
depression as a form of overcoming epistemic injustice.  
Fricker does differentiate between hermeneutical injustice and “hermeneutical 
disadvantages.” She claims that an example of a hermeneutical disadvantage, which 
should not be confused with an epistemic injustice, is the case in which a person suffers 
from a “condition affecting their social behavior at a historical moment at which that 
condition is still misunderstood and largely undiagnosed.”407 Rather than being a case of 
injustice, she refers to it as a case of “circumstantial epistemic bad luck.”408 However, if a 
group of people are systematically denied the economic and social resources through 
which one can attain knowledge of a condition, or on the other hand if a viable 
explanation of behavior is intentionally repressed because it contradicts another epistemic 
practice (e.g. the presumption of free will), then one could say that it does constitute a 
hermeneutical injustice. For Fricker, the difference between hermeneutical injustice and 
hermeneutical disadvantage is a difference between the wrongful withholding of 
knowledge and the mere absence of knowledge. However, it is difficult to determine 
what is a historical fact – for instance, the fact that how we currently understand severe 
depression was not available to people in the early 20
th
 century – from what could have 
been a historical possibility. In other words, during many of the historical periods in 
which a condition is “misunderstood and largely undiagnosed,” the condition was 
misunderstood due to a deliberate prevention of the expansion of scientific knowledge 
and the repression of situations that would foster free-communicative exchanges. The 
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oppression and punishment of the act of congregating by people deemed to be a threat to 
a form of life is a historical constant. If, for instance, women had greater access to places 
that promote hermeneutic freedom and critical reflection on accepted interpretive 
structures sooner than the mid-twentieth century, issues of mental health might have 
come to light and become socially acceptable sooner. Nevertheless, it does make practical 
sense, as Fricker avers, to distinguish between what can be reasonably known to be a 
deliberate and wrongful withholding of knowledge by a particular group, from the 
manifold ways that material and social conditions contribute to the slow development of 
knowledge. Currently, many communities in the United States already subject to 
systemic poverty and unemployment, such as Native American Reservations and inner-
cities, are subject to what Fricker would likely claim as the hermeneutic injustice of a 
lack of access to mental health care. Furthermore, people in these situations often face 
stigma internal to their communities that silence open conversations about severe 
depression in the home, workplace, and houses of worship.   
While many social and material structures factor into the silence around 
depression, a lack of understanding about one’s depressive condition does not actually 
cause the depressive’s language-loss. It would be incorrect to conclude that one’s 
primary symptoms are the result of not understanding one’s primary symptoms. 
Furthermore, just because someone does not have a conceptual framework for 
understanding a particular experience does not mean that she has no means for talking 
about it. As Pugmire points out, “Unconceptualizable does not mean opaque or even 
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mute…”409 If one only has a foggy impression of her emotional state she can still be able 
to say something about it. Also, one can have a clear impression of what one is 
experiencing – sadness, grief, fatigue, hopelessness – and yet lack an explanation for it. 
On the other hand, if a person does have the conceptual framework in place for 
understanding depression, she can nevertheless experience language-loss. Take Manning 
for instance, a clinical psychologist who deals with depressed patients on a regular basis. 
Despite working in an environment that focuses on understanding mental illness and 
encouraging people to openly talk about mental illness, her personal struggle with 
depression severely interfered with her ability to communicate. Having both the means 
for understanding her experience and access to people who would listen to her did not 
prevent Manning from becoming estranged from language. 
That one can identify with a psychiatric model of depression does not mean that 
the psychiatric vocabulary perfectly suits the depressive experience. Many people 
complain that the very word ‘depression’ gives a dull and sterile impression of what is 
actually a deeply disturbing condition. Styron remarks:  
…for over seventy-five years the word has slithered innocuously through the 
language like a slug, leaving little trace of its intrinsic malevolence and 
preventing, by its very insipidity, a general awareness of the horrible intensity of 
the disease when out of control...
410
 
 
While some people focus on the indescribability of mental pain, others actually blame the 
word “depression” for its inability to represent the psychic pain they suffer. Resigned to 
the use of “imperfect words” such as “depression” and “melancholy,” the writer Joshua 
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Wolf Shenk reminds himself that despite their inadequacy, “an imperfect word is 
sometimes better than silence…”411 ‘Depression’ serves as the depressive’s token for 
explaining to herself and to other people what she is experiencing. To have a name for 
one’s condition is to have a means for sharing. To have a name for one’s condition is to 
have a type of linguistic currency. Yet one can accumulate linguistic currency and 
nevertheless lack the discursive vitality or social conditions to use it. 
While depression is difficult to understand and difficult to describe, language-loss 
in depression is not solely a matter of the indescribability and unintelligibility of the 
depressive experience. The depressed individual experiences a failure of language in 
general. Nell Casey points out that to be in depression “is not to have words at all, but to 
live in the gray world of the inarticulate, where nothing takes shape, nothing has edges or 
clarity.”412 The depressive’s alienation from language points to something that is more 
far-reaching than unintelligibility and prior to social silencing. Language-loss in 
depression points to a problematic relation with language that is not essentially a problem 
inherent in language itself. 
 
Language as co-existence 
While it might appear to be the case that in depressive speech-loss “all that is 
lacking is the requisite nomenclature,”413 not having the right words cannot account for 
the extent of the depressive’s linguistic disruption. Because the burden of successful 
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communication also lies with the other, we must take into account the issue of the other 
to whom the depressive attempts to speak. According to Mead, the speaker takes up “the 
attitude of the other toward one’s self.”414 One’s ability to speak, how and when one 
speaks, and what one says largely depends on whom the speaker understands the listener 
to be. In particular, speech is affected by what the speaker expects the interlocutor to 
know, what she thinks her response might be, what she knows of her sense of humor, 
taste, politics, and so forth. These assessments are typically based on affective attitudes 
grounded in a repository of deliberative and hasty judgments. The felt safety, comfort 
level, and the repertoire one has with another person have an emotional and intellectual 
bearing on one’s discursive agency. Various kinds of meanings are communicated and 
assessed even prior to the verbal exchange. For instance, if the speaker anticipates that 
she will be misunderstood or that she is speaking to an unresponsive person, this 
expectation of a poor reception can short circuit communication before it begins.  
A certain level of discursive trust must exist before a speaker utters a sentence. In 
addition to impinging on one’s decision to speak and how one speaks, the attitude of the 
other also impacts how one thinks. The internalization of other people’s attitudes can 
effectively keep a person from speaking and can even silence one’s inner voice. Social 
silencing can take place in advance of and after speaking. Fricker argues that some forms 
of testimonial injustice are pre-emptive. In these cases “the speaker is silenced by the 
identity prejudice that undermines her credibility in advance.”415 This wrongful act of 
silencing can take the form of passing over someone in a conversation based on the belief 
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that she has nothing of value to contribute, and systematically excluding groups from 
particular epistemic practices. We typically only speak when we feel that we have the 
right to speak, and this assumed right is often determined in advance by habitually 
reinforced ideas of credibility. In some cases credibility is duly earned and other times 
wrongfully denied. Fricker refers to Hornsby and Langton’s argument that a person can 
be silenced even when she speaks if her illocution is not taken up by the other.
416
 In this 
case, one can be silenced by being ignored or dismissed. 
On the other hand, a responsive conversation partner can bring forth a voice that 
might otherwise be silent and even non-existent around other people. When a person is 
among people with whom she feels at home, the expectation of connection is itself a 
catalyst to speech. Van den Berg writes, “That is why I am speaking so easily; that is why 
I am seeing so much, because my friend is hearing me.”417 With a responsive 
conversation partner a person finds that she can not only share what she has been 
thinking, she can even talk about something that she had never quite thought of before. In 
other words, a sympathetic discursive partner is not merely a responsive force; she is also 
a generative force.  
Social environments and individual people shape and disrupt one’s discursive 
agency in innumerable ways. Meanings are not only made, they are also shared. From the 
sense of a word to the purpose and significance of one’s life, we inherit, embody, 
regenerate, and pass along the meanings shared within our form of life. While the 
depressive is susceptible to social silencing, even depressives who benefit from social 
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receptivity lose the “at homeness” that facilitates meaningful linguistic exchanges. 
Communication demands agreement in the way people judge the world, yet the 
depressive no longer inhabits the same form of life as non-depressives. Manning 
highlights the separation she felt from the language she had always shared with the 
people around her. She writes, “I have lost their language, their facility with words that 
convey feelings.”418 She felt as though her language no longer belonged to her. It was no 
longer her default setting. Part of the reason that the depressive loses the sense of at-
homeness with other people is because she lives in a disrupted and altered form of life. In 
Kristeva’s words, depressives are “absent from other people’s meaning.”419 The 
depressive is out of synch with other people’s possibilities, with the time of other people, 
with the expectations and plans of other people. While the cultivation of voice requires 
someone else to see-with, the depressive’s ability to engage and see-with-others is 
obstructed by seeing-through depression. The nature of the depressive’s estrangement 
from language is a matter of the depressive’s diminished capacity to see-with-others and 
her damaged ability to “think according others.”420 Language no longer functions as a 
means of connection because the depressive’s affective separation is too pervasive, and 
by not serving the function of connecting the depressive with other people, language can 
appear as if it is broken.  
Despite the role that social structures and interlocutors play in contributing to the 
silence about ‘depression’ and the depressive’s silence, the burden of linguistic disruption 
in depression does not primarily rest on the interlocutor. That does not mean, however, 
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that sociality is not implicated in the depressive’s loss of language. Depressive language-
loss is deeply interconnected with the depressive’s withdrawal from other people. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, the connection between social withdrawal and language-
loss is not an arbitrary one. Language-loss, for Merleau-Ponty, is a “refusal of co-
existence.”421 He points to a case study of Binswanger to demonstrate that the loss of 
language is a rejection of communal existence. Binswanger’s young female patient 
exhibited neurotic and hysterical symptoms of language-loss after her mother forbade her 
to see her intimate friend. Earlier in life she also experienced speech-loss after an 
earthquake. In explaining the young woman’s emotional response, Merleau-Ponty states 
that her “emotion elects its expression in loss of speech.”422 He conceptualizes speech-
loss as the patient’s way of dealing with overwhelming social demands. This expression 
of emotion through language-loss does “not merely represent a refusal of speech”; he 
contends that it is also a “refusal of others or refusal of the future.”423  The refusal of 
speech, others, and the future are expressions of a more general withdrawal from life 
itself. 
In the case of Binswanger’s patient, both of the instances that preceded her loss of 
voice are themselves events that cut the girl off from others. The earthquake and the 
forbidden relationship were significant disturbances of communal existence that 
instigated her further withdrawal from co-existence. Relatedly, in depression, an 
individual’s capacity for social connection is damaged. Depression can, however, emerge 
where no apparent disruption of one’s communal existence takes place. In other words, 
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the loss of voice in depression need not be a direct response to a social trigger. Language-
loss in depression is an expression of social withdrawal in so far as the depressive’s 
language-loss and social withdrawal are both features of the depressive’s affective 
disconnection and affective disordering. The depressive’s ability to verbally engage is 
subject to the distortion and inertia that afflicts the depressive’s ability to engage 
generally. 
 
The body and speech  
While language primarily has a communicative function, how the individual lives 
in language expands beyond language’s use as a tool for social connection. The 
breakdown of meanings and the disruption of language in depression does not simply 
take place in the depressive’s speech or in the depressive’s receptivity to written and 
spoken words. In depression, meanings are disrupted prior to any linguistic act. 
While language is based on shared social practices, meaning attribution is not 
exclusively bound by one’s form of life. Meanings are also created and limited by our 
physical and psychological conditions. Consider conditions such as autism and Asperger 
syndrome (a higher functioning form of autism). Individuals with these conditions live in 
a severely modified form of life. They do not attend to most of the same types of features 
and elements of the world that people without these conditions do. They do not read 
emotions from facial features. As infants they may not mimic the gestures and sounds of 
the people around them. What they pick out as significant and interesting is not 
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customarily shared or promoted by their social environments. They often see patterns and 
details that others fail to notice. For those autistic individuals who understand the shared 
linguistic meanings of words, these meanings rarely function in the same way as they do 
for most people. People who fall somewhere along the autism spectrum typically 
interpret language more literally and perceive the metaphorical, poetic, and ironic 
dimensions of language as confusing, nonsensical, or false. Their physiological condition 
radically alters meanings that are shared by their social environment. It is not only the 
case that they lack certain ways of assessing shared meanings, they also perceive and 
interpret phenomena as meaningful differently from how most people do. 
The epistemological and semantic deviations of individuals with conditions like 
autism and Asperger syndrome are typically more evident than they are with depressives. 
These differences are also more commonly interpreted as different ways of seeing and 
understanding, whereas depressives are not typically assessed in this way. Take for 
example the way people talk about autistic individuals.  A mother might say of her 
autistic child, “He does not see things the way we see them.” On the other hand, the 
depressive way of seeing is usually assessed through a more normative lens. That is not 
to say that individuals with autism do not suffer from other’s negative judgments of them.  
In fact, they are often subjected to forceful attempts to curb their behavior and perception. 
They are also systematically misunderstood and often victims of abuse and ridicule. 
Nevertheless, their perceived deviation from normal mental functioning is often assessed 
in an everyday way as a difference in how they see the world. One of the reasons that 
depressives are not typically understood as “seeing things differently than we do” is 
because prior to depression the individual might have fluently participated in the 
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meanings embedded in her form of life. However, the depressive does in fact undergo a 
shift in the way that she sees and understands the world. Her body changes how she 
assesses and attributes meaning. The depressive’s affective disconnection leads to a loss 
of meanings and affective disordering often leads to the emergence of new meanings, 
albeit typically negatively structured meanings.  
The estrangement from meaning that arises from affective disconnection pertains 
to the estrangement from past meanings. While the depressive and theoretician often fail 
to see the ways in which new meanings develop in depression, Ratcliffe observes that 
depressives do not experience a “complete absence of all forms of significance” and that 
the depressive experiences the emergence of new meanings. He shows how meaning 
changes in relation to the depressive’s altered way of relating to the world: 
They still relate to the world in some way, but in a way that is quite different from 
what most of us take for granted most of the time. Everyday world-meaning is 
replaced by a radically altered relationship with the world, characterized by 
irrevocable alienation, despair, futility, guilt, and the like, with no hope of 
reprieve.
424
  
 
The emergence of altered meanings ensues from the depressive’s altered emotional states. 
In depression, semantic changes are usually initiated by affective changes rather than 
intellectual developments. The depressive typically feels the emotions and bodily feelings 
of despair and futility before she understands them as such. Rather than having a clear 
reason for or intentional object of these emotional states, the depressive’s emotional state 
is directed at life itself. Emotional states like guilt and grief become generalized 
conditions in depression. 
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Ratcliffe’s claim that meaning is “replaced” would be better if it reflected the fact 
that new meanings in depression do not function as simple replacements of old ones. The 
new meanings that come about through affective disordering are typically negatively 
structured. These meanings are structured such that the negative space, the absence of 
past meaning, is evident. They are not mere replacements because they do not take up 
psychological and social space in the way that past meanings do. To experience 
something with a newfound sense of pain and terror that previously was associated with 
pleasure is not to simply interpret a practice differently. The depressive both loses the 
reach of certain emotional connections, and she experiences the onslaught of 
overwhelmingly negative emotions and feelings. Both of these types of changes impact 
language-loss in different ways. For example, a lack of emotional connection can create a 
sense of emptiness, confusion, and foreignness. On the other hand, a surge of grief can 
render the depressive unable to externalize and verbally communicate. 
Depression exemplifies how our bodies and emotional conditions participate in 
meaning and produce meaning. In addition to being related to a horizon of a given social 
environment, we are also related to a sphere of possibilities established by our bodies. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, Merleau-Ponty refers to this dual situatedness as a “double 
horizon of external and bodily space.”425 How one perceives the horizon of bodily space 
affects one’s perception of the external horizon, and conversely our social and natural 
environment impacts our perception of our bodily horizon. Depression changes one’s 
bodily horizon and limits one’s ability to access and interact with the world. The 
depressive’s body limits the practical field. Merleau-Ponty explains that the body has 
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become “the place where life hides away.”426 How the depressive experiences herself and 
the world around her, how she perceives and feels time, and what she sees as being 
possible and meaningful have become “arrested in a bodily symptom.”427 Without the 
orienting role of moving-towards-a-future and without the grounding anchor of being 
“caught up” in one’s environment, the horizon of the depressive contracts. 
Affective disconnection and disordering profoundly alter how the depressive 
intellectually processes meaning and language. Not only does the depressive experience 
linguistic disturbances on the level of overt forms of communication; she also 
experiences linguistic disturbances on the level of linguistically structured thought. The 
omnipresent now of depressive corporealization generates neither meaningful inner 
speech nor meaningful dialogue. In a severe episode of depression the rules and 
regulations of verbal and non-verbal practices no longer guide the depressive; they no 
longer apply. Grammatical structures require a command of voice and time, and the 
command slips out of the depressive's grasp.  Solomon describes his slide into 
grammatical and semantic confusion in terms of feeling “the logic disappearing right out 
from under me.”428 Depressives are not able to bring words together and to formulate 
complete thoughts. Their thoughts face a similar inertia as that of their motor movements. 
Brampton’s psychiatrist informed her that if she had taken an IQ test during a depressive 
episode her score would have been down by at least thirty points.
429
 It is not that concepts 
and words completely lose their intellectual significance, but the bodily feelings that 
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customarily imbue concepts with ‘existential meaning’ are altered in depression. This 
loss of felt meaning leads to blurry and seemingly non-linguistically structured thoughts, 
what Kristeva refers to as “an unorderable cognitive chaos.”430 The aspects of cognitive 
life normally structured by language in non-depressives lose their shape and order in 
depression.  
The fact that depressives often experience a linguistically confused, and what 
verges on a non-linguistically structured, cognitive life does not mean that the depressive 
feels trapped in silence. Depressives speak of inner turmoil and chaos, not stillness and 
silence. Other people might see the depressive as quiet and withdrawn, but the depressive 
experiences the world as loud and her own crying as piercing. Estrangement from 
language is not a form of deafness, although at times the depressive cannot discriminate 
among linguistic sounds. In depression, affective disconnection is a form of being 
unreceptive to the world. Sounds are processed as noise, unstructured and nonsensical. 
Nevertheless, the depressive can also be averse to silence. Both noise and silence can 
heighten the depressive’s affective disordering. While the noise of being with people can 
be experienced as overwhelming, confusing, and distant, the silence of being alone can 
amplify the depressive’s obsessive and painful thoughts. Manning writes, “In the total 
quiet, there is nothing to counteract the chaos inside me, the pain that reverberates more 
strongly because nothing balances it from the outside.”431 Without the cognitive structure 
provided by the mostly unnoticed and unnotable linguistically structured thoughts that 
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customarily constitute the guiding backdrop to everyday lived experience, depressives 
struggle to provide or find order and meaning for their lives. 
David Wood addresses the linguistically structured reflections that have an 
orienting function on how we relate to ourselves and our natural and social environments. 
He points out that “in a great diversity of ways, our everyday experience is full of partial, 
and sometimes complete, ‘narrative’ reflections, projections, memories, imaginings, and 
so on.”432 In depression, however, these “sequential constructions” of narrative 
reflexivity become distorted. There are stages in depression in which depressives do not 
reflect on their lived experience in the way that non-depressives do. The depressive lacks 
the sense of time moving forward and also lacks the engagement with life that fosters 
narrative reflexivity. Rather than having grammatically structured reflections, the 
depressive often descends into repetitive – and at times nonsensical – mantras. The 
depressive even exhibits infantile behavior like rocking, crying, repeating words, 
murmuring repetitive sounds, and singing simple consoling tunes. Virginia Heffernan 
describes mumbling made-up lyrics to herself like “I’m in real trouble and Ain’t no 
solace.”433 She admitted that it made her feel better to “sing or say shhhh like you would 
to a baby.”434 These repetitive expressions mimic the recurring and inescapable now that 
relentlessly accompanies mental pain. The depressive’s narrativity is limited to the 
present moment and confined to simple thoughts such as “Not again” and “I can’t take it 
anymore.” What is the semantic status of these partially muttered phrases or of the 
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depressive’s repeated cries? Is the nature of the depressive’s pain such that it does not 
lend itself to “finer descriptions”?435  
Throughout the dissertation I have relied on Kristeva’s insightful descriptions of 
the depressive experience. From what reads like a sensitive firsthand account of 
depression in the opening pages of Black Sun, to her discerning observations of patients’ 
symptoms, and to her depiction of melancholy in literature, Kristeva’s writings give a 
picture of the depth of depressive affect. In addition, Kristeva’s attention to and 
thematization of language-loss in depression gives voice to both the disruption of 
linguistic structures as well as the emergence of non-verbal and partial-linguistic 
expressions. However, while I wish to draw attention to her invaluable perspective on 
depression, I do so without fully ascribing to a psychoanalytic account of depression. In 
reference to the depressive symptoms that resemble a  regression to colicky infantile 
states – uncontrollable crying, insomnia and hypersomnia, non-communicative babbling, 
helplessness, the inability to dress and feed oneself, the unfamiliarity of one’s 
surroundings, a-temporality, limited space of the visual field, and so forth – Kristeva 
explains these symptoms in terms of a “surge of affect and primary semiotic 
processes.”436 For Kristeva, these infantile vocalizations reflect the emergence of 
primordial and preverbal states. She asserts that the sadness of the depressive is itself a 
“rudimentary representation, a presign or prelanguage,”437 and that the depressive’s 
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sadness is “insufficiently stabilized”438 to enter into the realm of the symbolic. By 
positing two fundamental dimensions of meaning, the semiotic and symbolic, Kristeva is 
able to account for the loss of meaning and the surfacing of new meanings. While 
depression disrupts the function and structure of the symbolic order, both in terms of 
linguistic meaning and life meaning, it unleashes semiotic meaning and brings the 
semiotic out into the open. The ‘semiotic’ represents a realm of meanings that are 
expressed in rhythm, tone, and affect, and first and foremost they are expressions and 
meanings that come directly from the body.  
Kristeva’s depiction of meanings emerging from the body accords with Merleau-
Ponty’s account of the presence of the body coming to the fore in illness and obscuring 
lived meaning. In spite of the fact that I endorse these two features of Merleau-Ponty and 
Kristeva, I do not, however, subscribe to Kristeva’s explanation of semiotic expression in 
terms of a residual trace of ineffective mourning for the mother’s body. While this 
analysis may in some cases explain fundamental themes of the depressive’s life and 
meaning, it is my position that her account of the depressive’s relation to the maternal 
body does not necessarily provide either the most comprehensive or final explanation of 
depression. To briefly summarize her account, for Kristeva depression emerges from an 
incomplete mourning for the mother, and meaninglessness arises out of the inadequacy of 
language to compensate for the maternal non-object. The depressive longs to reunite with 
the prelingual chora, and this longing for the maternal body drives the depressive to 
“give up signifying and submerge in the silence of pain or the spasm of tears that 
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celebrates reunion with the Thing.”439 The depressive refuses language as an adequate 
symbolic substitute and desires the connection and unification with the maternal body.  
Both Kristeva and Merleau-Ponty attempt to understand language by returning to 
its origins. Yet in terms of evolutionary history as well as individual human development, 
the functions of language expand along with human linguistic capacities. Thus the 
attempt to understand language by returning to its origins gives a misleading picture of 
how language operates in everyday complex and diverse forms of life. Furthermore, I 
contend that how and why language emerges is not necessarily implicated in how and 
why language breaks down. Accounts of language that are grounded on a view of 
language as primarily serving a compensatory function lead to an understanding of 
language-loss as primarily being a matter of the inadequacy of language. For instance, if 
we hold on to Kristeva’s assertion that the child reaches for language when the mother is 
out of reach, then language will always be based on a fundamental, irremediable loss. If 
language has an originary compensatory purpose, then inadequacy is built into language; 
there can be no complete compensation for the lost thing or existential gap. In contrast to 
this view of language-loss as primarily being about the inadequacy of language to 
compensate for a fundamental loss, a loss which Kristeva argues explains depression, I 
contend that language-loss in depression is not fundamentally grounded in ‘language.’ 
Language is neither the problem nor the site of the problem in the depressive’s 
problematic relation with language. Rather, linguistic disruptions ensue from the 
depressive’s affective disconnection and disordering. Affective disconnection and 
disordering, among other things, disrupts the linguistic life of the depressive and in some 
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cases might disrupt a compensatory function of language. Nevertheless, in depression the 
primary problem is not that language stands in the way of or covers over a deeper reality. 
It is not the case that the language the depressive has cannot touch the reality of her 
experience; the problem is that she no longer has the language she once had.  
 
Part 2: Recovery of Discursive Agency 
 
Rebuilding and revitalization  
Although the depressive becomes estranged from language, she does not lose 
language entirely or permanently. The depressive’s experience of language-loss is not 
uniform throughout a depressive episode. Throughout this chapter I have focused on the 
linguistic disturbances that accompany the severe stages of a major depressive episode, 
yet even during a major episode the depressive may occasionally experience a brief 
reprieve, a glimmer of self and personality, a fleeting glimpse of connection, and a 
slightly discernible yearning for life. Fortunately, a depressed individual who survives a 
severe episode will find that her form of life is not entirely destroyed. Her sense of self 
and her ability to connect with others can be restored. However, after a major episode of 
depression, one cannot entirely recover one’s prior way of living. Depression’s life-
altering disruption leaves a permanent trace, so that even when all the symptoms pass the 
effects of depression remain. In an interview with Andrew Solomon, Bill Stein portrays 
the destabilizing effect of depression on one’s world: “I think you have to let go and 
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understand that the world will be re-created and may never again resemble what you 
knew previously.”440 For better or for worse one cannot experience a severe depressive 
episode and emerge unscathed or unchanged. 
Even in recovery from depression, the depressive cannot simply return to her 
“original” form of life and identity. Simply because the depressive does not have the 
voice she used to have does not mean that she has lost her voice. New voices can emerge 
and traces of one’s voice prior to depression can persist. The poet Chase Twichell came 
to understand, because of her experience with depression and her recovery from it, that 
she will “inhabit subtly new selves, which will think in subtly new language.”441 Rather 
than seeing these alterations as a threat to a ‘true self’ she remarks that it “no longer 
threatens my understanding of what it means to be a ‘self’…”442 José Medina’s thesis of 
the ‘polyphony of identity’ addressed in the previous chapter provides a way for seeing 
how a loss of voice does not mean an end to one’s voice. Rather than understanding 
‘voice’ and ‘identity’ as referring to a singular and unified self, this conceptualization of 
agency in terms of a multiplicity of voices articulates the way that a person’s voice can 
reverberate differently in different social contexts and in different stages of life.  
The ability to rebuild one’s self after depression partly depends on one’s ability to 
forge and reestablish social connections. Merleau-Ponty highlights the role of re-
engagement as a means for recovering one’s voice. He shows that Binswanger’s patient 
recovered her voice by opening herself up to existence and co-existence. He writes, “The 
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momentum of existence towards others, towards the future, towards the world can be 
restored as a river unfreezes.”443 While Merleau-Ponty notes that this opening up of 
oneself in depression can neither happen automatically nor by “an intellectual effort or by 
an abstract decree of will,”444 he does not provide an account of how one can come to the 
place where she can be an active participate in her own life. Based on the reports of 
depressives as well as medical research, it is my position that the revivification of the 
depressive’s voice first requires a restoration of her basic level of functioning. Ultimately, 
the depressive’s brain needs to be restored. Studies have shown that in depressives the 
limbic system is hyperactive, while the level of blood flow and functioning of the cortical 
areas has decreased.
445
 In other words, in depression the area of the brain involved in 
mood and emotion becomes more active, while the area of the brain involved in cognitive 
functioning becomes less active. In addition, the blood flow between these regions has 
decreased, indicating a weakened connection between the regulation of affect and 
cognition in depression.
446
 Talk therapy is one means for restoring health to the 
depressive’s affective life; however, with severe depression individuals typically require 
some type of medical intervention. The combination of medication along with talk 
therapy has proven to be the most effective means for combating severe depression. 
Without rebuilding the lower level processes such as sleep and digestion, the depressive 
cannot arrive at the place where speech can have a therapeutic effect. From 
antidepressant medication, to electroconvulsive therapy, to the experimental technology 
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of Deep Brain Stimulation, unfreezing the river of depressive affectivity often requires 
intrusive physiological intervention. 
In spite of the fact that the depressive’s discursive agency is severely diminished 
in depression, it is in part through speech that depressives are able to heal. It seems 
counterintuitive that the depressive must rely on the very language from which she is 
estranged in order to recover and regenerate meaning. However, the depressive is 
building on a linguistic life that has become inert and weakened, not irretrievably 
obstructed. It is ultimately the felt meaning of language that needs to be restored in 
depression in order for the depressive to regain linguistic confidence and discursive 
vitality. Even when the depressive has regained her ability to speak and read, a sense of 
emptiness and disconnection can still persist. A recovery of voice requires the recovery of 
both language and affective meaning, and in order for the depressive to recover the felt 
meaning of language, she must experience some relief of affective disconnection and 
disordering in general. The revitalization of the depressive’s voice must accompany an 
overall restoration of mental health.  
People who make it through a severe depressive episode are survivors. They have 
endured a life-threatening and life-altering experience. While the depressive might rightly 
feel like a passive victim of a depressive disorder, she cannot remain passive in her 
recovery from depression. The depressive has to be rehabilitated in order to become 
resituated in the lived meaning of a form of life. As survivors of other severe illnesses 
know, simply surviving the traumatic experience is a vital first step of a multi-stage 
recovery. After his recovery from depression, John Bentley Mays referred to therapy as a 
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“re-education.” He describes the healing process as “an intense, uncanny, radical 
relearning how to walk, act and feel…”447 Similarly, Solomon speaks of the lengthy task 
of “rebuilding” the self after depression,448 and Brampton explains the process of 
recovery as feeling like she was “learning to walk again.”449 Many depressives echo 
Solomon’s sentiment about depression: “You need to be reborn after a severe episode.”450 
Even in the wake of lost meaning and lost voices, the hope of many small and 
significant resurrections can persist. Like Zarathustra, the depressive can mourn her lost 
self and celebrate the self that remains and that will be. In The Tomb Song Zarathustra 
proclaims “You are still alive…You have still broken out of every tomb…Indeed, for me, 
you are still the shatterer of all tombs. Hail to thee, my will!”451 While the depressive 
cannot ‘will’ her way into recovery, Nietzsche’s idea of the surviving ‘will’ as that which 
carries over, breaks through, and renews captures the features of agency that can outlast 
depression. The will for Nietzsche is procreative, commanding, and affirming, and these 
qualities point to the role that creativity and the creation of new meaning play in 
overcoming depression. While the destructive nature of depression is not intrinsically 
creative or productive, the experience of depression can, however, be revelatory of new 
possibilities. As Zarathustra points, “only where there are tombs are there 
resurrections.”452 
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Recognition and Receptivity 
According to Kristeva, depressives do not simply need an anti-depressant; they 
also need a “counter-depressant,” a counter-life, a counter-meaning, a counter-world, a 
world that they have a part in creating.
453
 Kristeva claims that a creative use of language 
can function as a counter-depressant to melancholy and suggests that the “cure” to a loss 
of meaning could dwell in the expression of the semiotic. She highlights the ability of 
poetry and art to give cathartic expression to the semiotic. In particular, she focuses on 
the capacity for literary arts to “bear witness to the affect.”454  Writing does not solely 
bear witness through the elaboration and explanation of depressive affect; the cathartic 
aspect of writing is that writing is itself an “imprint of an affective reality.”455  
The enhancement of the depressive’s ability to speak is both an issue of 
recognition as well as articulation. The revitalization of voice cannot happen in isolation. 
A recovery of voice needs the generative force of a receptive interlocutor, as well as the 
restorative force of affective re-engagement. Kristeva focuses on the need and function of 
love and receptivity in the revitalization of language – a revitalization that is itself a 
counter-depressant. She draws attention to the fact that the depressive’s regeneration of 
meaning and language requires a receptive and loving audience. The power to transform 
meaning is as much the effect of to whom one is speaking as it is the effect of how one is 
speaking. The ideal of a receptive audience, however, will not be the same for everyone. 
The ideal for many is not simply an audience, but a partner, a receptive and responsive 
                                                 
453
 Kristeva, 1989, 24-5 
454
 Kristeva, Black Sun, 2002, 193 
455
 Ibid 
251 
 
interlocutor. Many depressives find that the most receptive audience to be other 
depressives. For Kristeva, the loving audience can be an imaginary audience. She 
contends that a loving audience does not have to be a living, breathing interlocutor, and 
she promotes the restorative act of creating an imaginary audience through writing. 
According to Kristeva, the depressive can create a receptive audience through her own 
literary expression. Writing is a means for effective self-parceling; it is a self-splitting 
that allows for self-creation. In other words, in writing I forge my identity and voice. In 
writing I become my loving audience. I do not write to myself per se, but rather to an 
imaginary audience that I imagine. For the depressive, writing is not narcissistic self-
love; it is love for the other, for the stranger within.
456
 While literary creation does not 
cure depression, Kristeva claims that it can provide the amatory support that reestablishes 
a sense of connection. This love then draws the depressed person back into the symbolic; 
it draws the stranger back to the land of the living.  
Kristeva focuses on the receptivity and not the agency of an audience. According 
to her view, the loving audience seems to exist only to let the writer speak. In contrast, 
Medina focuses on the “the voices of imaginary others.”457 He points out that “the 
conversation in which our identity consists remains meaningful only if new voices come 
in, even if they are the voices of imaginary others…”458 He is speaking to people that do 
not feel at home in their form of life and who seek out a discursive environment that 
allows for their voices to be heard. He contends that one can seek out new language-
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games and even create a “new social context populated by the voices of new, possible 
others.”459 Rather than imagining a loving, ideal audience, Medina advances the strategy 
of imagining other voices that can respond to, not just hear, one’s voice. 
For the depressive, writing can be a means for writing herself back into existence 
and co-existence. Gloria Anzaldúa describes writing as a means of survival for women of 
color. She describes the essays collected in Making Face, Making Soul as not only being 
“about survival strategies, they are survival strategies – maps, blueprints, guidebooks that 
we need to exchange in order to feel sane, in order to make sense of our lives.”460 
Similarly, Barbara Christian portrays the act of writing as a form of self-rescue while also 
noting that she is writing to people who share her needs and desire for renewal. Christian 
explains, “what I write and how I write is done in order to save my own life…My 
readings do presuppose a need, a desire among folk who like me also want to save their 
own lives.”461 The writing of depressives can also be a means for one’s own survival as 
well as a beacon of hope for other depressives. The depressive memoirs in particular 
appear to be a means for generating meaning, community, and receptivity, and they 
importantly serve as an assertion of the writer’s discursive agency. Whether one suffers 
from social-silencing or the silence of depression, one not only needs to be heard, one 
also needs to hear the voices of others who share her burden. 
While the model of writing as a means for the recovery of voice is promising for 
the depressed writer and artist, what about the majority of depressives who both before 
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and after depression do not express themselves through literary creation? In order to write 
one’s way through recovery one needs free time, linguistic fluency and literacy, cognitive 
clarity, civic freedom of expression, and a personal sense of freedom. One needs a form 
of discursive trust with the page, that is, a trust of one’s own voice. While these 
capacities can be developed and encouraged, they are not necessary to one’s recovery 
from depression or recovery of voice. Rather than focusing on the medium – writing – the 
essential component to the recovery of voice appears to be the practice of verbal 
expression within a receptive discursive community. Ultimately, the depressive needs a 
way of externalizing and connecting with something beyond herself. For some 
depressives, belief in a higher power can serve a function similar to the function of the 
loving audience of writing. John Bentley Mays spoke of his process of re-learning to 
speak as a matter of re-learning to pray.
462
 For Mays the idea of an all-knowing, all-
benevolent, and personal deity provided an ideal audience for regenerating his voice. For 
Jeffrey Smith, recovery was a matter of becoming connected with nature. He writes, “I’d 
felt replacing my small self a sustaining kinship with something larger: with animals, and 
plants, and landscapes…”463 While the practices of writing, praying, and connecting with 
nature can help enable a person’s recovery of her sense of self and voice, many 
depressives find that the most effective means for recovery is to be in communication 
with other depressives. 
Discursive outlets like group therapy, support groups, and online social networks 
are mediums through which the depressive can learn how to give linguistic expression to 
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her previously unexpressed mental pain. Depressives speak of having a secret knowledge 
only shared by other depressives. They also talk about speaking a different language and 
being able to easily identify other depressives simply by their speech and their 
demeanor.
464
 In an interview with Andrew Solomon, a woman describes having an 
insider’s understanding of the language of depression. She explains that depression 
“speaks, or teaches you, an entirely different [language].”465 Similarly, Virginia 
Heffernan writes, “I began to think that melancholy was a dialect that only some people 
knew – or could even hear – and in my conversations, I sought these people out.”466 
Depressives, it would seem, have forged their own language-game and a discursive 
practice created through an understanding of each others’ suffering. The depressive can 
begin to recreate her voice and identity in conjunction with others who are practitioners 
of the language-game of depression.  
The depressive’s identification with a community and the emergence of shared 
meaning-making practices do not permanently cure depression or the depressive’s 
linguistic and semantic disturbances. Many depressives do in fact continue to struggle 
with depression in one way or another throughout their lives regardless of their 
engagement with a language-game of depression. Also, in the deepest moments of 
depression the notion of ‘community’ is unreachable for the depressed. The language-
game of depression serves as a preparatory ‘survival guide’ for dealing with future 
depressive episodes, as well as a means for coping with the aftershocks of depression.  
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While I argue that the source of language-loss is the depressive’s affective 
disconnection and affective disordering rather than social-silencing, the depressive’s 
social environment largely determines whether she can recover from depression. People 
break down in different ways and people heal in different ways. Race, class, gender, sex, 
and various other forms social identities do affect how one experiences depression and 
how one recovers from it. Some individuals who have broken their silence about their 
depressive experience claim that other depressives who have recovered from depression 
have a moral obligation to speak out about depression. They contend that depressives 
need to not only speak for their own sake and their own recovery, but that they also have 
a responsibility for speaking up for the benefit of other depressives. Terrie Williams 
highlights the moral obligation of people with social and material resources to talk about 
depression. She focuses on the need for African American leaders, in particular, to break 
the silence about depression in the Black community. She explains that depression is 
“killing Black people by the thousands, and I have to talk about it.”467 Williams also 
references Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.’s call to speak out about depression: “It is time that we 
all talk about our depression, and fight with the same vigor we bring to the fight for racial 
justice…talking through our pain, and taking the mask off our helplessness.”468 Openness 
about the experience of depression helps to remove the mystery, stigma, and silence that 
pervade common conceptions of mental illness. Depression is disabling and deeply 
disruptive of agency regardless of the shame attached, but the stigma associated with 
depression can lead to more suffering and weakened resiliency. Releasing depression into 
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the universe of things openly discussed will not cure depression, but it can bring about 
various forms of relief.  
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CHAPTER VI 
  
CONCLUSION 
 
A comprehensive philosophical investigation into depression should give an 
account of the situatedness of depression, the inner-life of the depressive, and the 
embodiment of depression. My account of depression as an embodied disruption of 
agency and a disruption of a form of life speaks to these three levels of analysis. In this 
dissertation I give a phenomenological account of depression, based on firsthand written 
accounts, which provides the foundation for my analysis of the impact that depression has 
on agency and discursive practices. The phenomenological account of depression shows 
how depression leads to an estrangement from meaning, decontextualization of the self, 
disintegration of social relations, desynchronization of one’s sense of time, and altered 
perception of the environment. My investigation into the impact of depression on agency 
and language reveals that depression entails the disruption of a form of life. The idea that 
depression disrupts a form of life speaks to the interconnection of the depressive’s loss of 
language, loss of self, and loss of world. I argue that the disruption of the depressive’s 
form of life, the decontextualization of the depressive’s agency, and the depressive’s loss 
of language are caused by the affective disconnection and affective disordering of 
depression. 
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Major depression is a disorder that cannot be explained exclusively in terms of the 
depressive’s psychic economy. Though depression points to a dysfunction in a psychic 
economy, the sources, symptoms, and reach of depression exceed any purely 
psychological explanation. Likewise, depression cannot be reduced to a neurological or 
social dysfunction. I argue that the fundamental dysfunction of depression pertains to the 
depressive’s affective disconnection and affective disordering, which involves a complex 
intermingling of physiological, psychological, and social causes and dysfunctions. 
Affective disconnection leads to the depressive’s estrangement from the felt meaning of 
practices, relationships, ideas, places, and language. It contributes to the depressive’s loss 
of familiarity, the depressive’s inability to engage in a meaningfully structured way of 
living, and is expressed in the depressive’s withdrawal from co-existence. While affective 
disconnection concerns an absence of feeling and connection, affective disordering 
entails the depressive’s experience of overwhelming emotional states that typically have 
a negative character and often lack an intentional object. Inexplicable grief, inflated sense 
of guilt, and uncontainable sadness are just a few manifestations of depressive affective 
disordering. Affective disordering imbues the depressive’s perception and experience of 
herself and her social and natural environment with a pervasive sense of pain and 
negativity. Both affective disconnection and affective disordering profoundly and 
painfully damage the depressive’s ability to participate in a meaningful and shared life.  
The phenomenon that initially inspired this dissertation is the depressive’s 
experience of language-loss. However, it became evident to me that what is experienced 
by the depressive as a disruption of language cannot be explained by linguistic elements 
alone. Language-loss in depression points to the depressive’s problematic relation with 
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language, a phenomenon that is not essentially a problem inherent to language itself. 
Language-loss ensues from the damage that affective disconnection and disordering does 
to the form of life and agency of the depressive. The depressive’s estrangement from 
language is primarily grounded in a disruption of felt meaning and is inextricably 
intertwined with the depressive’s diminished agential vitality. Based on the premise that 
language only has meaning within a form of life, I argue that language-loss functions in 
the context of the depressive’s relation to various features of a form of life. Depressive 
desynchronization, altered spatialization, social withdrawal, loss of self, and diminished 
agency all contribute to the depressive’s estrangement from language and meaning and 
the disruption of the depressive’s form of life.  
By looking at the relationship between language-use and a life-form, we can 
deduce the following about the relationship between the estrangement from language in 
depression and the disruption of the depressive’s form of life: 1. Language-loss in 
depression does not have a single explanation, 2. Language-loss is a symptom that 
functions in relation to other symptoms of depression, 3. Language-loss is expressed in 
several forms, 4. Language-loss does not belong exclusively to a linguistic context, 5. 
Language-loss takes place in relation to other people, and finally, 6. Language-loss is 
socially and temporally embedded. Wittgenstein’s concept ‘form of life’ helps to 
illuminate the interconnection of shared meaning, language-use, and agency. Ultimately, 
‘form of life’ speaks to the situatedness of an individual in general, and the concept 
provides a way of understanding the embeddedness of the depressive and the meaning 
and function of her symptoms within a context of shared meanings and practices. 
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In this dissertation I give an account of the psychological life of the depressive 
based on a model of inner conflict and multiplicity. The depressive’s experience of 
depression unfolds in developmental stages and changes throughout the course of a 
depressive episode. In line with Merleau-Ponty’s view that there are “several ways for the 
body to be a body, several ways for consciousness to be consciousness,”469 I argue that 
there are several ways for depression to express itself in the depressive’s body and 
consciousness, and that these expressions can be conflictual and contradictory. Due to the 
pluridimensionality of body and mind, depression can take hold and express itself in a 
variety of ways. It inserts itself into the syntheses of the physiological and psychological, 
language and meaning, meaning and identity, identity and social relationality, social 
relationality and voice, voice and language, and so forth. More than a disorder of mood, 
depression is a disorder of meaning, identity, social relations, and voice. Major 
depression alters the depressive’s perception of herself and her world. It disrupts the 
depressive’s temporal life, body, relations with people, sense of self, capacity to function, 
agential vitality, linguistic facility, cognitive attachments, and personal identity. That an 
affective disorder can so deeply disrupt one’s way of living reveals the 
interconnectedness of affective life with a form of life.  
While the main fieldwork of depression lies within the rubric of psychiatry and 
psychology, philosophers do have a place in developing an account of the relationship 
between meaning, identity, and language in depression, and they have a place in 
investigating how these features of the depressive’s life can be both disrupted and 
recovered. The role of the philosopher investigating depression is not necessarily to 
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provide new words to describe or new ways of speaking about depression, but to provide 
a forum in which the depressive’s experience can be made visible and understood in the 
context of philosophical constructs. Rather than assimilating the depressive experience 
into pre-established theoretical structures, the attempt to understand the depressive in her 
own words can illuminate new conceptual connections, new meanings, and new ways of 
seeing. The meanings that emerge from a philosophical analysis of depression that are 
derived from the perspective of the depressive can in turn expand and challenge 
traditional philosophical discourse. For instance, a philosophical analysis of mental 
disorders resituates philosophical questions regarding the relationship between the mind 
and body, freedom and determinism, language and meaning, and so forth. Also, a 
philosophical evaluation of a disorder like depression helps reveal the 
multidimensionality of agency and reveals the interdependence of one’s affect with one’s 
apprehension and generation of meaning. By operating under the presumption of the 
norms of mental health with regard to subjectivity and agency, traditional academic 
philosophy has taken for granted many structures of intelligibility and sociality. A 
phenomenological account of depression demonstrates one of the ways that structures of 
intelligibility, sociality, temporalization, and spatialization can breakdown. 
Philosophy can help create ways for the voices of the mentally ill to be 
acknowledged and counted as legitimate sources of knowledge. I do not claim that the 
mentally ill have been overlooked in academia as both objects of knowledge and subjects 
of knowledge, but they have been more or less quarantined to the halls of psychology, 
psychiatry, and biology. People with mental disorders represent a diverse group of 
individuals who have been largely overlooked as a source for epistemological 
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uniqueness, a source of knowledge that, when considered by philosophy, can contribute 
to the overall field of epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. 
David Karp laments that in most studies of depression “we hear the voices of a battalion 
of mental health experts…and never the voices of depressed people themselves.”470 
People who experience depression do not need to be spoken for, but heard. A 
philosophical account of the recovery of discursive agency ultimately reveals the need for 
depressives to speak for themselves, as well as the need for depressives to have a 
receptive discursive community and generative discursive outlet. This dissertation aims at 
making the depressive experience intelligible by allowing the voices and perspectives of 
depressives to be heard. I use depressives’ account of their own experiences to guide my 
theoretical investigation and argue that philosophy of psychopathology should allow the 
perspective of the mentally ill to both inform and guide further philosophical research. 
I view the role of philosophy in the context of psychology generally and 
psychopathology specifically as being able to provide a critical analysis of the concepts at 
play, a phenomenological account of mental disorders, and a political genealogy of the 
social structures that have bearing on mental disorders. Depression does not operate in 
and disrupt a generic form of life. Likewise, the depressive’s loss of self takes place in 
relation to specific social contexts. One role philosophy can play in expanding the 
knowledge of depression and the intelligibility of depressives is to provide an analysis of 
the social structures operative within the form of life of a particular culture, structures 
that are implicated in both the causes and experience of depression and the recovery from 
depression.  
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This dissertation is neither the last word on depression nor my last word on 
depression. There are many features of the depressive experience to uncover and many 
ways to take some of my insights in new directions. For instance, I have merely skimmed 
the surface of the social structures of depression and the social silencing of depressives. 
One disadvantage of my method of providing a comprehensive picture of depression by 
including a variety of first-person accounts is that at times this strategy can come at the 
expense of a more in-depth analysis of the perspectives presented, as well as the theories 
I present and use to analyze the first-person accounts. As more people inside professional 
philosophy find philosophy of psychopathology to be both a legitimate and valuable 
fieldwork in philosophy, my hope is that I and many others will work this complicated 
field with attention to both the plurality of identity and the function and structures of 
embodied and affective meaning. 
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